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Resumen
Esta tesis doctoral consta de tres cap´ıtulos que tratan diferentes aspectos a trave´s de los
cuales la pol´ıtica pu´blica puede afectar las decisiones de las personas acerca de invertir
en su capital humano. El primer cap´ıtulo analiza los efectos de una llegada masiva de
inmigrantes en los patrones de eleccio´n de escuela en Espan˜a. El segundo cap´ıtulo se enfoca
en entender co´mo la familia y la escuela pueden interactuar en la formacio´n de ha´bitos
saludables en el hogar. El tercer cap´ıtulo estudia los efectos de la economı´a informal sobre
las decisiones ocupacionales y de inversio´n en capital humano de las personas.
En el primer cap´ıtulo, “Sorting of Students by Cultural Traits: The Effects of Immigra-
tion”, estudio los efectos de la llegada de grandes flujos inmigratorios a pa´ıses desarrollados
en la distribucio´n de rasgos culturales (locales versus fora´neos) de los nin˜os en edad escolar,
y analizo co´mo estos cambios pueden impactar en la segregacio´n escolar pu´blico-privada
cuando los padres toman en consideracio´n aspectos culturales al momento de elegir escuela
para sus hijos. En muchos de estos pa´ıses tanto la proporcio´n de padres locales que env´ıan
sus nin˜os a escuelas privadas como la proporcio´n de padres inmigrantes que mandan sus
nin˜os a escuelas pu´blicas aumentaron con el taman˜o de la poblacio´n inmigrante. Espan˜a
es un claro ejemplo de inmigracio´n masiva y subsecuente huida de los padres espan˜oles de
las escuelas pu´blicas. Basa´ndome en la literatura previa sobre eleccio´n de escuela y sobre
transmisio´n cultural, construyo y calibro un modelo de eleccio´n de escuela que puede dar
cuenta de la segregacio´n de estudiantes observada en Espan˜a. El modelo incluye aspec-
tos de equilibrio general en una economı´a con una u´nica ciudad, muchos barrios, y con
generaciones solapadas de individuos heteroge´neos en dos dimensiones: ingreso y rasgos
culturales. Al momento de elegir escuela, los padres toman en consideracio´n el ingreso
esperado para sus hijos en el futuro (el cual dependera´ de la calidad educativa que reciban)
as´ı como tambie´n la identidad cultural que adquieran en las escuelas. Utilizo el modelo
para estudiar el impacto de la inmigracio´n sobre la segregacio´n escolar y barrial, y para
analizar distintas pol´ıticas que pueden afectar la asignacio´n de estudiantes entre escuelas
como tambie´n los resultados de integracio´n cultural de los inmigrantes. Encuentro que
tanto reducir los subsidios a la educacio´n privada como incrementar el valor multi-cultural
de la educacio´n pueden contribuir a reducir la segregacio´n de estudiantes entre escuelas
pu´blicas y privadas, al mismo tiempo que moderar la segregacio´n barrial y mejorar los
patrones de integracio´n cultural y econo´mica de los inmigrantes.
viii
Resumen ix
El segundo cap´ıtulo, “Spillovers of Health Education at School on Parents’ Physical Ac-
tivity” (escrito en colaboracio´n con Dolores de la Mata y Nieves Valde´s) explota las re-
formas educativas sobre Educacio´n para la Salud (ES) a nivel estadual en los Estados
Unidos como un cuasi-experimento natural para estudiar el impacto causal de la ES que
reciben los nin˜os en la escuela sobre la actividad f´ısica que realizan sus padres. Usamos
datos del Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) para el per´ıodo 1999-2005 unidos a
los datos de las reformas estaduales en la curr´ıcula de ES obtenidos de la National Asso-
ciation of State Boards of Education (NASBE) Health Policy Database, y de los registros
del School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS) para los an˜os 2000 y 2006. Para
identificar los efectos derrame de intere´s utilizamos diferentes metodolog´ıas (DDD, CiC,
y DD), en las cuales permitimos la existencia de tratamientos diferenciales. Encontramos
un efecto positivo de las reformas de ES en la educacio´n primaria sobre la probabilidad
de que los padres hagan actividad f´ısica ligera. Implementar cambios sustanciales en la
curr´ıcula de ES aumenta la probabilidad de que los padres comiencen a hacer actividad
f´ısica en una magnitud que va entre los 6.3 y los 13.7 puntos porcentuales, mientras que la
probabilidad promedio para las madres no parece ser afectada. Analizamos la existencia
de varios impactos heteroge´neos de las reformas de ES como una forma de esclarecer los
mecanismos que motorizan el efecto derrame, y encontramos evidencia consistente con
dos hipo´tesis: la especializacio´n por ge´nero en la crianza de los hijos y el hecho de que los
nin˜os efectivamente transmiten la informacio´n que reciben en la escuela a sus padres.
El u´ltimo cap´ıtulo, “Investing in Myself?: Informality, Occupational Choice and Invest-
ments in Human Capital”, se enfoca en los efectos de la economı´a informal –muy presente
en pa´ıses en desarrollo– sobre el emprendedurismo y el nivel educativo alcanzado por
la poblacio´n. La evidencia que compara datos entre pa´ıses sen˜ala que estos feno´menos
esta´n conectados entre s´ı: primero, la tasa de emprendedurismo aumenta con el taman˜o
de la economı´a informal; segundo, la diferencia en el retorno a la educacio´n superior
que reciben emprendedores y trabajadores se hace ma´s grande (favoreciendo ma´s a los
emprendedores) cuando el taman˜o de la economı´a informal crece; tercero, en pa´ıses con
altos niveles de informalidad la fraccio´n de individuos con alto nivel educativo que eligen
convertirse en emprendedores es mayor que en pa´ıses con sectores informales pequen˜os.
Para explicar estos hechos estilizados, construyo un modelo con decisiones de inversio´n en
capital humano, eleccio´n ocupacional y un sector informal, en el cual el capital humano
no solo mejora la eficiencia del trabajo asalariado sino que tambie´n mejora las habilidades
gerenciales de los emprendedores, y donde la tecnolog´ıa para producir bienes se carac-
teriza por la complementariedad entre el capital y la cualificacio´n de los trabajadores.
En esta economı´a hay restricciones crediticias que aparecen como resultado de que las
Resumen x
firmas informales pueden evadir impuestos y esconder el colateral de los intermediadores
financieros, y de que hay un costo de hacer cumplir los contratos de cre´dito. El taman˜o
que toma el sector informal depende de cua´n grandes sean estos costos de asegurar el
cumplimiento de contratos, los cuales limitan el uso de capital f´ısico en la economı´a y
tambie´n afectan los retornos a la educacio´n de manera diferencial entre ocupaciones. Las
predicciones del modelo son capaces de dar cuenta de los tres hechos emp´ıricos que moti-
van este trabajo y tambie´n son capaces de echar luz sobre los mecanismos que operan a
medida que aumenta el taman˜o de la economı´a informal. En particular, un mayor nivel de
informalidad desincentiva las inversiones en capital humano que hacen los trabajadores,
mientras incentiva estas inversiones en el caso de algunos emprendedores, mayormente
informales pero habilidosos.
Abstract
This doctoral dissertation consists of three chapters dealing with different dimensions of
the impacts of public policy on human capital investments. The first chapter analyzes
the effects of massive immigration on the school choice patterns in Spain. The second
chapter studies how families and schools can interact in the formation of healthy habits
in the household. The third chapter deals with the effects of the informal economy on
occupational and educational decisions.
In the first chapter, “Sorting of Students by Cultural Traits: The Effects of Immigration”,
I analyze the effects of large immigration inflows to developed countries in the distribution
of cultural traits (native versus immigrant) of school-age children and I study the impacts
of these changes on the segregation of students across public and private schools, when
cultural considerations play a role in parents’ school choices. In many of these countries
both the proportion of native parents who chose to send their children to private schools
as well as the proportion of immigrant parents who chose public institutions increased
with immigration. Spain provides a clear example of large immigration and subsequent
native-flight out from public schools. Building on previous literature on school sorting
and cultural transmission I construct and calibrate a model of school choice that can
account for the observed sorting of students in Spain. The model economy is a single-
community, multi-neighborhood general equilibrium model with overlapping generations
of individuals who differ along two dimensions, income and cultural traits. Parents care
about their children’s future income and their acquired cultural identity. I use the model
economy to study the impact of immigration on school and neighborhood segregation and
to analyze policies that can affect the allocation of students across schools as well as the
integration outcomes of immigrants. I find that reducing subsidies to private education as
well as increasing its multi-cultural value can reduce the sorting of natives and immigrants
across public and private institutions while ameliorating neighborhood segregation and
improving cultural and economic integration outcomes of immigrants.
The second chapter, “Spillovers of Health Education at School on Parents’ Physical Activ-
ity” (joint with Dolores de la Mata and Nieves Valde´s), exploits state Health Education
(HED) reforms in the US as quasi-natural experiments to estimate the causal impact
of HED received by children on their parents’ physical activity. We use data from the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1999-2005 merged with data on
state HED reforms from the National Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE)
Health Policy Database, and the 2000 and 2006 School Health Policies and Programs
xi
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Study (SHPPS). To identify the spillover effects of HED requirements on parents’ behav-
ior we use several methodologies (DDD, CiC, and DD) in which we allow for different
types of treatments. We find a positive effect of HED reforms at the elementary school
on the probability of parents doing light physical activity. Introducing major changes in
HED increases the probability of fathers engaging in physical activity by between 6.3 and
13.7 percentage points, while on average this probability for mothers does not seem to be
affected. We analyze several heterogeneous impacts of the HED reforms in order to unveil
the mechanisms behind these spillovers. We find evidence consistent with hypotheses such
as gender specialization of parents in childcare activities, or information sharing between
children and parents.
The last chapter, “Investing in Myself?: Informality, Occupational Choice and Invest-
ments in Human Capital”, focuses on the effect of informality –which is pervasive in
many developing countries– on entrepreneurship and educational attainment. Cross coun-
try data shows that these phenomena are connected: First, the rate of entrepreneurship
increases with the size of the informal economy; second, the difference between the skill
premium for entrepreneurs and for workers becomes larger as the size of the informal
economy increases; third, in countries with large informal sectors the fraction of high-
skilled individuals that choose to be entrepreneurs is larger than in countries with small
informal sectors. To explain these facts, I develop a model economy with human capital
investment, occupational choice and an informal sector, where the investment in human
capital improves the efficiency of labor as well as managerial skills, and the technology
to produce goods exhibits capital-skill complementarity. In the model economy, credit
constraints and informal firms emerge as a result of the interplay between the ability of
informal firms to avoid taxes on one hand and their ability to hide their collateral on the
other. In this economy the size of the informal sector is associated with the enforceability
of contracts, which by limiting the use of physical capital in the economy it also affects
the relative returns to education across occupations. The model predictions are able to
account for the three empirical facts, as well as to shed light on the mechanisms at work
when the level of informality in the economy increases. In particular, a higher level of in-
formality disincentivizes human capital investments for workers while it incentivizes these
investments for the case of some managers, mostly informal but talented.
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Chapter 1
Sorting of Students by Cultural
Traits: The Effects of Immigration
1.1 Introduction
Many developed countries have been experiencing large-scale immigration during the last
decades. In these countries as these waves of immigration added cultural and economic
diversity to the adult population, the composition of school-age children (immigrant versus
native) changed as well. In the same period, segregation across private and public schools
in the hosting countries has also been increasing: while more native parents have been
opting for private schools, a larger share of immigrant parents have been choosing public
schools for their children. This “native-flight” is well-documented in many studies which
all find similar evidence about the impact of immigration on school segregation.1
The current literature on the sorting of students across public and private schools is
mostly concerned about income differentials and peer quality as the main driving forces
in this segregation process. However, as argued in Nechyba (2006), student sorting across
racial, ethnic or cultural dimensions may arise independently of income and/or peer qual-
ity sorting. Language, values, and other cultural considerations are important factors
in educational decisions and since large-scale immigration involves changes in all these
matters it may also crucially affect schooling choices.
1For the U.S., see Reardon and Yun (2002), Betts and Fairlie (2001), Fairlie (2006), Fairlie and Resch
(2002), Betts and Fairlie (2003), and Ellen, O’Regan, Schwartz, and Stiefel (2007). For Denmark, see
Rangvid (2007) and Gerdes (2010). For the U.K., see Burgess, Wilson, and Lupton (2005). For Belgium,
see Timmerman, Vanderwaeren, and Crul (2003). For Germany, see Kristen (2008). For Sweden, see
Soderstrom and Uusitalo (2010).
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In particular, parental concerns about the effectiveness of the transmission of the desired
cultural traits at schools may induce them to modify their decisions about the type of
schools they prefer for their children.2 These concerns are likely to arise as a result
of increasing immigration. This is specially the case in a society which was relatively
homogeneous in its composition of cultural traits, and which happen to become unusually
heterogeneous after a large-scale immigration episode. The case of Spain provides a stark
example. During the last decade, Spain has experienced a significant inflow of immigrants
for the first time in its modern history. This demographic phenomenon rapidly mirrored
in schools. Figure 1.1 shows evidence on the native flight in the Comunidad Auto´noma
de Madrid (CC.AA. de Madrid) from 1998-99 to 2008-09. On the one hand, Figure 1.1
shows that in 1998-99, when the fraction of immigrants in Madrid was only 2.6%, about
59% of natives were attending public schools, while one decade later -when immigrants
comprised 17% of total population- roughly 50% of natives chose public institutions. On
the other hand, in 1998-99 only 68% of immigrant parents were choosing public schools,
while in 2008-09 this number raised to 77%. Moreover, the (negative) correlation of the
percentage of natives and immigrants choosing public institutions is very strong.3 These
numbers imply a gap in schooling decisions among natives and immigrants of about 9
percentage points at the beginning of this period that increased to 27 percentage points
by 2008/09.
The consequences of sorting of students by their cultural background cover a wide range
of important social matters. First, the probability of integration of immigrants to the host
culture may be hampered, contributing to the deterioration in social cohesion. Second,
this phenomenon may generate unequal income prospects for individuals with different
cultural backgrounds, since the quality of education received by natives and immigrants
is likely to differ. Finally, the sorting of students can have an impact on the spatial
segregation of immigrants across neighborhoods, leading to the formation of ghettos.
In this paper, I study the effect of immigration on native and immigrant parents’ decisions
about what type of school, public or private, to choose for their children. Some related
2Knafo, Assor, Schwartz, and David (2009) highlights the importance of formal schooling in the
socialization process of children. Also, Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font, and Masella (2008)
find that schools are important institutions for identity formation.
3In the Spanish school system there are three types of schools: public schools, escuelas concertadas
(concerted), and private schools. Concerted schools are private educational institutions that are publicly
subsidized and they account for around 80% to 90% of private schools in Spain. They must provide their
services free of charge. However, in practice, parents do spend a considerable amount of money when
they choose these schools. The out-of-pocket school expenses in escuelas concertadas are about three
times larger than in public schools (Arellano and Zamarro, 2007). In what follows I use the term private
school to refer to a school which can be either a concerted or a purely private school.
Chapter 1. Sorting of Students by Cultural Traits: The Effects of Immigration 3
Figure 1.1: Fractions of natives and immigrants choosing public schools. Madrid, 1998-99
to 2008-09.
questions are: What is the impact of these decisions on spatial segregation? What are
the effects of student sorting by cultural backgrounds on the integration outcomes of
immigrants? What are the consequences of potential integration/segregation patterns on
their future income prospects? How can immigration affect the quality of education in
public versus private schools?
To be able to answer these questions, I build a model of school choice of natives and
immigrants that can account for the segregation observed in the data. The model econ-
omy is a single-community multi-neighborhood general equilibrium model populated by
two overlapping generations of individuals who differ along two dimensions -income and
cultural traits-, and in which parental concerns about children’s future income and ac-
quired cultural traits interact. I use the calibrated model to study the effects of a number
policies that can affect the allocation of students across schools as well as the integration
outcomes of newcomers.
In the model economy, schooling and residential choices entails two key trade-offs. First,
choosing public education may be convenient because this option is cheaper than private
schools, even though the quality of education in public schools may be lower. Second,
choosing to live in a neighborhood with greater quality of housing may be more expensive
than living in a lower-quality neighborhood. If there is a link of residential location to
school enrollment, schooling and housing decisions are linked in such a way that these
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trade-offs need to be solved altogether.4 Furthermore, if public and private schools also
differ in the way they transmit cultural mores and values, e.g. due to the existence of
differentiated linguistic or religious educational policies in public and private education,
there exists a third dimension needed to be considered in parents’ school choice. Parents
that care about the cultural traits acquired by their children may be willing to pay more
for a type of education which can be more effective in the transmission of their own
traits. In this setting, quality of housing, quality of education, and cultural transmission
concerns play important roles in determining the sorting of students across schools and
neighborhoods by not only income but also by cultural traits.
This paper is related to three strands of literature. First, it relates to the literature on
income and peer quality sorting, both in purely public school systems and in systems
with private alternatives. Nechyba (2006) surveys this literature and lists three distinct
forces affecting school choices, and therefore the sorting of students: (i) heterogeneity in
housing markets, (ii) local public funding of schools, and (iii) peer effects. Ferna´ndez and
Rogerson (1996, 1998), Nechyba (1999), and Epple and Romano (2003), among others,
are the key contributions.5
Second, this work is related to the empirical literature on sorting of students by ethnic
and cultural factors. Betts and Fairlie (2001) show that parental characteristics such
as per capita income and educational attainment can only account for 70% of the high
school private attendance gap between white natives and minority groups. For the case of
Denmark, Rangvid (2007) finds that while Danes choose schools with substantially fewer
immigrant peers, immigrants choose schools with on average higher immigrant shares, even
when both immigrant and native parents are shown to be concerned about the quality
of peer in terms of socioeconomic background of the student body.6 Card, Mas, and
Rothstein (2008) examine the so-called tipping point in the dynamics of neighborhood
segregation for the case of the US. They find that one explanation for the importance
of neighborhood racial composition in determining this dynamics is that families are
concerned about the racial composition of schools. Munk (2006) is an empirical study of
schooling choices in the UK and it finds evidence suggesting that socialization and norms
4When the enrollment in private schools is not restricted to those residing in the same district/neigh-
borhood as the school, the availability of private schooling alleviates the bundling of these two decisions.
However, in Spain there are catchment areas for all primary and secondary public and concerted schools,
which implies that the bundling of schooling and residential decisions is still an important feature of the
school system.
5Recent works estimate this type of models. For instance, see Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007),
and Ferreyra (2007).
6Gerdes (2010) finds very similar results for Denmark.
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-factors other than quality of education narrowly defined- play an important role in the
choice of private or public schools.
Third, the current paper is also linked to the literature on the transmission of preferences,
beliefs and norms of behavior (traits), pioneered by Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001).7
There have not been many attempts to put together the traditional school segregating
forces with the elements of cultural transmission, and this is the gap that the current pa-
per tries to fill. Important exceptions are Cohen-Zada and Justman (2005), Cohen Zada
(2006), and Cohen-Zada and Sander (2008).8 These papers include empirical results mea-
suring the religious component in the demand for private education in the US. However,
these works do not include the analysis of the spatial segregation effects of such feature in
the demand for education, neither do they explore the effects of large-scale immigration.
In related work, Ferreyra (2007) structurally estimates a model of schooling and residen-
tial decisions in which she includes a source of heterogeneity in preferences for religious
education, which is independent of the share of individuals sharing each denomination. A
closer approach to the current paper is Ioannides and Zanella (2008), which estimates a
model in which households search for the best location in the presence of neighborhood
effects in the formation of children’s human capital and in the process of cultural trans-
mission. They found that households with children, but not those without, are more likely
to move out of neighborhoods whose attributes -schools as the most important one- are
not favorable to the production of human capital and the transmission of parents’ cultural
traits, and to move into neighborhoods which instead exhibit desirable such attributes. A
related work about how schools may affect the transmission of cultural traits is Aspachs-
Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font, and Masella (2008), which uses a quasi-experiment
approach to study the effects of formal education in shaping identity traits in Catalonia,
Spain.
In this paper, the model economy constructed and calibrated for the case of Madrid
is able to account for the observed segregation across schools and neighborhoods. This
model economy includes cultural concerns about schooling choices as the key sorting force.
The framework is also well-suited to produce a number of policy experiments. First,
7A complete survey of this literature can be found in Bisin and Verdier (2010).
8Gradstein and Justman (2002), Gradstein and Justman (2005) and Kremer and Sarychev (2000) in-
clude cultural transmission concerns together with collective action problems in their analysis of the role of
public education in shrinking social distance between culturally diverse groups. Albornoz, Berlinski, and
Cabrales (2010) is another recent example in this literature. Their model highlights the rich interactions
of collective action problems in the provision of public and private education, the effects of segregation
and the incentives of parents to contribute in the production of education and the transmission of cultural
traits to their children.
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I experiment with the level of subsidies to private education and I find that reducing
these subsidies mitigates the rise in segregation across schools and neighborhoods that
occurs with immigration. Second, I simulate changes in the level of public spending in
both types of educational institutions but preserving the shares allocated to public and
private ones and I find that neither reducing nor increasing the public funding would have
helped to reduce the observed gaps in schooling and neighborhood choices of natives and
immigrants. Third, I conduct a policy experiment in which I simulate changes in the
orientation of private education to make it more or less majority-oriented (i.e., more or
less multi-cultural). For a less multi-cultural private education I find that the sorting of
students by cultural traits is aggravated the larger is the scale of immigration. When I
simulate a private education which is more multi-cultural, i.e. less majority-oriented, I
find that the increasing segregation across schools would be alleviated without worsening
off the spatial concentration of immigrants and natives. Accompanying these results on
the sorting of immigrants and natives across schools and neighborhood the model also
produces some results on educational and integration outcomes. The policy experiments
show that making private education less majority-oriented would also improve educational
outcomes of immigrants and foster their cultural an economic integration outcomes as well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses some key features of immigration
and schooling choices in Spain that help to understand the modeling choices detailed in
Section 1.3. Section 1.4 presents the calibration strategy and the data used in the numer-
ical exercises. Section 1.5 shows the results for the benchmark economy, while Section 1.6
describes the results of the three policy experiments. Last, Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Discussion: Immigration, cultural concerns and
schooling choices in Spain
Two thirds of immigrants in Spain reside in only three out of the seventeen existing re-
gions.9 These regions are Madrid, Catalonia, and Comunitat Valenciana. On the other
hand, very low concentrations of immigrants can be observed in regions such as Ex-
tremadura, Galicia, Asturias, and Basque Country. The recent evolution of schooling
choices in these regions clearly differs from what is shown in Figure 1.1.10 The opposite is
found for Comunitat Valenciana, in Figure 1.2(c). In this region schooling choices of both
9If we include Ceuta and Melilla the total number of Spanish regions (Comunidades Auto´nomas) is
nineteen.
10See Figures A.1(a) to A.1(d) in Appendix A.
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natives and immigrants follow a similar pattern to the one observed in Madrid. How-
ever, the case of Catalonia -shown in Figure 1.2(b)- differs remarkably from the other two
regions that have recently faced large-scale immigration. In this region, as the share of
immigrants in overall population increased, neither natives nor immigrants changed their
private versus public schooling choices. However, although Catalonia is in stark contrast
with the cases of Madrid and Comunitat Valenciana it does not contradict the argument
that parents may be choosing more private education as a result of socialization concerns.
Indeed, Catalonia gives a new insight about the driving forces in this type of sorting.
In Spain a high proportion of private education is managed by religious institutions, mainly
the Catholic church.11 Vast evidence supports the idea that individuals sharing Catalan
identity are more concerned about the preservation of local cultural traits -specially the
Catalan language- than in transmitting religious traits to their children.12 In this region,
the preservation of this cultural trait is carefully taken into account in the curricula of
public schools.13 Therefore, in Catalonia the existing supply of private education may
not became more attractive for natives after an episode of large-scale immigration, since
public schools are thought to handle well the problem of transmitting local cultural traits
through education.14
According to Figures 1.2(a), 1.2(c), and 1.2(b) the native-flight from public to private
seems to be more pronounced whenever private education offers a type of education that
11In Spain, more than two thirds of students choosing private education attend schools managed by
the Catholic church (INE, 2005).
12For instance, results from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) in its 2003 module
about “National Identity” show that 20% of respondents in Madrid said that professing Catholic religion
is “very important” to be considered as Spanish. In that survey, only 3.7% of Catalan individuals agree
on that statement and this number raises to 14.9% for those from Com. Valenciana. ISSP also reveals
that even though Comunitat Valenciana also has an official local language (the Valenciano) apart from
Spanish -which is the country wide official language- only 3.2% of respondents in that region call that
language their primary language of communication. This contrasts with the answers in Catalonia, where
40% of respondents named Catalan as their first language.
13In 1983, Catalonia passed a law of compulsory education in Catalan language, which transformed
the previous Spanish-only educational system into a bilingual one. By 1989-90, 85% of public schools
adhered to use Catalan as the main language for instruction, while this percentage was only about 60%
for the case of private schools (van der Goot, 1996).
14In Aspachs-Bracons, Clots-Figueras, Costa-Font, and Masella (2008) results indicate that there exists
a significant effect of a compulsory language policy implemented in education in Catalonia on the identity
formation, whereas the non-compulsory language policy implemented in the Basque Country did not have
any effect. In Clots-Figueras and Masella (2010) individuals who have experienced greater exposure to
teaching in Catalan are more likely to say that they feel more Catalan than Spanish. Additional results
show that the effect appears to be present also among individuals whose parents do not have Catalan
origins.
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(a) Madrid (b) Catalonia
(c) Com. Valenciana
Figure 1.2: Schooling choices of natives and immigrants in the three regions with more
immigrants in Spain (1998/99-2008/09).
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is oriented to natives’ traits.15 However, other mechanisms could be at work. Sorting
by income, peer effects, and crowding-out hypotheses are usually mentioned as the main
drivers in these type of school segregation. However, existing evidence for the case of
Spain casts serious doubts about the operation of these alterative segregating forces. I
discuss this evidence in Appendix A.
1.3 Environment
The economy is populated by two-period-lived overlapping generations of households of
mass one. Each household consists of a parent (old) and a child of school-age (young).
Every period a continuum of agents of mass one is born. All decisions are made by
old individuals. Households are heterogeneous in two dimensions: income and cultural
trait. Individuals may belong to the group of Natives (N) or Immigrants (I). The
share of natives in the overall population is n. There exist R income levels such that
y1 < y2 < ... < yR. Let ψ
j
r be the fraction of households of group j ∈ {N, I} with income
level yr, where
∑
r ψ
j
r = 1. Hence, each parent in this economy is characterized by a pair
(y, j) of her income level y and her cultural trait j.
In this economy there is one community formed by several neighborhoods. Each neigh-
borhood coincides with a school district. Neighborhoods are denoted by m, where m ∈
{1, 2, ..M}. Each neighborhood is characterized by a different quality of housing, hm,
where h1 < h2... < hM . Supply of housing in each neighborhood is fixed and owners of
the housing stock live outside the community.16 Let ρm be the measure of houses in each
neighborhood, such that
∑M
m=1 ρm = 1.
There are three types of goods: private consumption (c), housing quality (h), and quality
of education (q). The consumption good is the numeraire and the price of housing with
quality hm is pm. There is a technology to produce quality of education and it only uses
spending per student as an input. This technology is available in two types of schools:
public and private. There is one school of each type per neighborhood.17 To be able to
attend a given school it is necessary to reside in the neighborhood in which the school is
located.
15In what follows I use the term majority-oriented education to denote the type of education (public
or private) that helps -relatively more than other types- majority parents to socialize their children on
majority cultural traits.
16All households are renters.
17Or alternatively, since schools operate under constant returns of scale, there can be any number of
schools of each type operating in each neighborhood.
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For public schools, spending per student is the same in all neighborhoods since public
schools are community-financed. Let θm be the number of students attending the public
school in neighborhood m. These students can belong to one of the two cultural groups.
Let θNm and θ
I
m be, respectively, the number of native and the number of immigrant
students enrolled in the public school in neighborhood m. The level of spending per
student, qPub, is determined by a portion of the revenue raised from a proportional income
tax (τ) divided by the number of students attending public schools in all neighborhoods.
In this economy private education is publicly subsidized, and only the fraction (1 − φ)
of this revenue is allocated to finance public schools. Therefore, quality of education in
public schools is
qPub =
(1− φ)τ Y¯
θ
, (1.1)
where
θ =
∑
j∈{N,I}
M∑
m
θjm, (1.2)
is the total number of students in public schools in the community, and Y¯ is the average
income in the community.
Spending per student in private schools consists of two parts: spending by parents, x, and
the subsidies received from public funds. Hence, the quality of education for a student
attending a private school is
qPriv =
φτY¯
η
+ x, (1.3)
where
η =
∑
j∈{N,I}
M∑
m
ηjm, (1.4)
is the total number of students in private schools in this community, where ηjm is the
number of students of cultural group j in private schools in neighborhood m.
Parents derive utility from the private consumption good, the quality of housing ser-
vices, and their child’s future income (yc). In addition, parents derive utility from their
child sharing their same cultural trait. Parents receive higher utility, the higher is the
probability of their child being successfully socialized to their own cultural trait, s.
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Preferences are given by18
U(c, h, yc, s) = uc(c, h) + w(y
c) + g(s). (1.5)
The last term in the parents’ utility function comes from the fact that parents care about
the set of values that they will share with their children in order to enjoy more out of
future mutual relationships. This assumption, resulting from a form of imperfect empathy
(Bisin and Verdier, 2010), can be interpreted as paternalistic altruism, where parents
tend to prefer children with their own cultural trait and hence they make decisions in
order to attempt to socialize them to this trait. To do so, parents have access to a
socialization technology that allows them to affect the cultural traits of their children.
This technology combines the direct socialization that parents promote at home with the
oblique socialization effect of schools. The socialization technology is characterized by the
production function of the probability that the child is socialized to the natives’ culture
sNj = λ1{j=N} + (1− λ)e, (1.6)
where λ represents the relative impact of the effort made inside the family, and e represents
the effect of the school. With respect to direct socialization, I assume that the influence
of the family in the formation of cultural traits is just an environmental effect, since the
focus here is on the effect of the school as a socialization device. Under such assumption
parents need not to put special effort or expense extra time to teach their children their
cultural traits. Therefore, the influence of parents on the formation of children’s traits is
channeled through the parental weight on the socialization technology, and in Equation
1.6 the indicator function.- 1{j=N} takes the value 1 if the parent is native and the value
0 otherwise.
In this economy, oblique socialization -given by e in Equation 1.6- combines the student
body’s composition together with the cultural orientation of the education provided in
each type of school, public or private. This part in the socialization technology captures
the process of transmission by which the “na” child is influenced by peers and teachers at
schools. To formulate e in such a way that is consistent with the differentiated orientation
of public and private schools discussed in Section 1.2, I assume that e is just the exposition
to the composition in the student body in public schools, whereas it is a transformation
18The functional form chosen for preferences is discussed further in the section on calibration (Section
1.4).
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Table 1.1: Probabilities of socialization to Natives’s cultural trait.
Type of school that child attends Native Parent Immigrant Parent
Public School in neighborhood m λ+ (1− λ) θNm
θNm+θ
I
m
(1− λ) θNm
θNm+θ
I
m
Private School in neighborhood m λ+ (1− λ)( ηNm
ηNm+η
I
m
)ω (1− λ)( ηNm
ηNm+η
I
m
)ω
Table 1.2: Probabilities of socialization to Parent’s cultural trait.
Type of school that child attends Native Parent Immigrant Parent
Public School in neighborhood m λ+ (1− λ) θNm
θNm+θ
I
m
1− (1− λ) θNm
θNm+θ
I
m
Private School in neighborhood m λ+ (1− λ)( ηNm
ηNm+η
I
m
)ω 1− (1− λ)( ηNm
ηNm+η
I
m
)ω
of the share of native students (exposition to native students) for the case of private
schools.19,20 That is,
e =
 θ
N
θN+θI
for public schools,
( η
N
ηN+ηI
)ω for private schools.
(1.7)
where 0 ≤ ω. The lower is ω the more native-oriented or majority-oriented is private
education, relative to public education.21 The promotion of majority-oriented educa-
tion entails the emphasis of local’s history, geography, religion, as well as the use of the
majority-language as the only language of instruction. On the other hand, a less majority-
oriented education, reflected in a value of ω close to 1, may be pursued via the teaching of
certain types of knowledge relating to the cultural characteristics of different peoples, and
to the historical, social and economic contexts in which cultural distinctions are rooted
(Eurydice, 2004). Tables 1.1 and 1.2 show, respectively, the probabilities of socialization
to natives’s and to own parent’s cultural traits for the case of both children with native
and with immigrant parents who attend public or private schools.
19This exposition effect is supported by studies in Developmental Psychology, which conclude that
the relative proportions of immigrants and host-society members to whom immigrant youth are exposed
at school may affect their acceptance of perceived parental values (Knafo, Assor, Schwartz, and David,
2009).
20Notice that it is only needed that the ratio of productivities of socialization to natives’ traits is not
equal to one. An example where the oblique socialization is also not linear can be found in Sa´ez-Mart´ı
and Sjogren (2008).
21If parameter ω if smaller than 1, then private education is more majority-oriented than public edu-
cation.
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Each individual’s realized income is a draw from a discrete approximation to a lognormal
distribution whose mean depends on q. Income received when old depends on the quality
of education (q) received when young as well as on a random idiosyncratic shock. This
income process is given by
logy′ = µ(q) + ε with ε ∼ N(0, σ2ε), (1.8)
where µ(q) describes a concave relationship between the quality of education and the
mean of future income.22 Let Pr(q) be the probability that an education investment of q
is associated with a future income level yr, where Pr(q) is the discrete approximation of
(1.8).
Hence, in this economy spending on education is closely related to future income. This
connection takes place through the assumption that quality of primary and secondary
education positively affects future earnings and that quality of education is determined
by financial inputs (spending, public or private).23
1.3.1 Decisions
All decisions are made by old individuals (parents), who have to decide how much to
consume, where to live, and the type of school for their children. I denote the decision
about where to live by b(y, j). That is, b(y, j) = m indicates that a parent with type (y, j)
chooses to reside in neighborhood m. Possible values for the school choice, d(y, j), are
d(y, j) =
1 if parent chooses public school0 if parent chooses private school. (1.9)
The timing of decisions is such that there are two stages -no elapsed time in between- in
which parents first decide where to live, then they decide the optimal level of consumption
and the type of school. If parent (y, j) chooses to live in neighborhood m, then she
has to pay pm for housing services.
24 Hence, the disposable income she is left with is
22This income process is similar to the one in Ferna´ndez and Rogerson (1998). See further details in
Section 1.4 on calibration.
23There is a large literature discussing the production function of education, see Hanushek (1986), Card
and Krueger (1992), Betts (1995), Card and Krueger (1996). Here I will omit the importance of other
factors possibly entering as inputs in this production function.
24Notice that each household in this economy has to reside somewhere, hence every household spends
some fraction of their income on housing services.
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(1− τ)y − pm.25 Given the residential decision, parents have to decide the type of school
for their children and they have an amount of resources (1− τ)y − pm to allocate among
private consumption and expenditure in schooling. Notice that if public education is
chosen the amount of private resources allocated to schooling is equal to zero.
To make their optimal choices parents compare value functions for public and private
schooling alternatives in each possible location. Then they decide the best of all possible
locations in order to maximize their utility.
Let V j(y; pm, θ
I
m, θ
N
m, θ, Y¯ ) denote the indirect utility of an individual of cultural group j,
who chooses to send her child to a public school and to live in neighborhood m. This
value function depends on the total number of students attending public schools as well
as on the composition of the student body in the public school in neighborhood m and
the community average income, Y¯ . The overall number of students in public schools, θ,
directly affects the quality of education through the level of spending per student. For a
given tax revenue this spending is lower the higher is the number of students in public
schools. The share of immigrant or native students in the student body of the public
school in neighborhood m, (θjm/(θ
j
m+θ
−j
m )), affects the probabilities of socialization of the
child to each one of the two cultural traits. The average community income affects the
spending per student -and thus the quality of education- through the revenue raised by
the income tax, which is used to finance public schools’ expenditure.
For the case of natives the value function for an individual choosing a public school in
neighborhood m is
V N(y; pm, θ
I
m, θ
N
m, θ, Y¯ ) = uc((1− τ)y − pm, hm) + w(yc(d(y,N) = 1)) (1.10)
+ g((λ+ (1− λ) θ
N
m
θNm + θ
I
m
)).
For the case of immigrants the value function of choosing a public school in neighborhood
m is
V I(y; pm, θ
I
m, θ
N
m, θ, Y¯ ) = uc((1− τ)y − pm, hm) + w(yc(d(y, I) = 1)) (1.11)
+ g(1− (1− λ) θ
N
m
θNm + θ
I
m
).
25In this economy choosing private education does not exempt parents from paying the income tax.
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The value function of choosing a private school for an individual that chooses to reside
in m is denoted by W j(y; pm, η
I
m, η
N
m , η, Y¯ ). The indirect utility of a native who sends her
child to a private school in neighborhood m is
WN(y; pm, η
I
m, η
N
m , η, Y¯ ) = max
x
uc((1− τ)y − pm − x, hm) + w(yc(d(y,N) = 0))(1.12)
+ g[λ+ (1− λ)( η
N
m
ηNm + η
I
m
)ω].
For immigrant parents, the value function of choosing private schooling is
W I(y; pm, η
I
m, η
N
m , η, Y¯ ) = max
x
uc((1− τ)y − pm − x, hm) + w(yc(d(y, I) = 0))(1.13)
+ [1− (1− λ)( η
N
m
ηNm + η
I
m
)ω].
Let simply denote by x(y,N) and x(y, I) the decision rules for natives and immigrants,
respectively.26 The first order condition for the optimization problems in equations 1.12
and 1.13 is the same for natives and immigrants and it is given by
∂uc((1− τ)y − pm − x, hm)
∂x
=
∂w(yc(d(y, j) = 0))
∂x
. (1.14)
Finally, parent (y, j) chooses d(y, j) and b(y, j) so as to solve her individual decision
problem
{b(y, j), d(y, j)} = arg max
b,d
{
M∑
m=1
1{b=m}(dV j(y; pm, θIm, θ
N
m, θ, Y¯ ) (1.15)
+ (1− d)W j(y; pm, ηIm, ηNm , η, Y¯ ))}.
The existence of the socialization technology described above implies that the distribution
of students across schools and neighborhoods -obtained as a result of parents’ decisions-
26Notice that x(y,N) = x∗N (y; pm, η
I
m, η
N
m , η, Y¯ ) and x(y, I) = x
∗
I(y; pm, η
I
m, η
N
m , η, Y¯ ), where x
∗
N and x
∗
I
are the solutions for the optimization problems in equations 1.12 and 1.13, respectively.
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defines a law of motion for the share of individuals sharing natives’ cultural traits. This
law of motion for n is given by
n
′
=
M∑
m=1
[θNm(λ+ (1− λ)
θNm
θNm + θ
I
m
) + ηNm(λ+ (1− λ)(
ηNm
ηNm + η
I
m
)ω)] (1.16)
+
M∑
m=1
[θIm(1− λ)
θNm
θNm + θ
I
m
+ ηIm(1− λ)(
ηNm
ηNm + η
I
m
)ω].
In equilibrium housing markets clear and no parents want to change their schooling and
residential choices. The steady state equilibrium for this economy is characterized by three
stationary distributions: distributions of income for individuals in both cultural groups
and a distribution of cultural traits in the overall population.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
Given τ and φ, the steady state equilibrium for this economy is a vector of decisions
{x(y, j),
b(y, j), d(y, j)}∀j,∀y, prices {pm}∀m, a distribution of students across schools {θNm, θIm, θm, ηNm ,
ηIm, ηm}∀m, a share of individuals with natives’ cultural trait n, and fractions {ψN}∀r and
{ψI}∀r, such that
1. Each individual (y, j) maximizes her utility -taking {pm}∀m, n, and {θNm, θIm, θm, ηNm ,
ηIm, ηm}∀m as given- by choosing x(y, j), b(y, j), and d(y, j) so as to solve the decision
problem characterized by Equations (1.10)-(1.15).
2. Housing markets clear
R∑
r=1
[1{b(yr,N)=m}ψ
N
r n+ 1{b(yr,I)=m}ψ
I
r (1− n)] = ρm, ∀ m. (1.17)
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3. The number of students in each type of school in neighborhood m is consistent with
parents’ decisions, i.e. the following accounting identities hold
R∑
r=1
1{d(yr,N)=1}ψ
N
r n = θ
N
m, (1.18)
R∑
r=1
1{d(yr,I)=1}ψ
I
r (1− n) = θIm, (1.19)
and
θNm + θ
I
m = θm, ∀ m. (1.20)
Each parent chooses one neighborhood and one type of school, i.e.
M∑
m=1
[ηNm + θ
N
m] = n, (1.21)
and
M∑
m=1
[ηNm + θ
N
m + η
I
m + θ
I
m] = 1. (1.22)
4. The share of individuals with natives’ cultural trait, n, is constant, i.e., n′ = n in
Equation (1.16).
5. Fraction ψNr and ψ
I
r are such that, ∀ r
ψNr =
M∑
m=1
R∑
i=1
{ψNi [1{d(yi,N)=1}1{b(yi,N)=m}[λ+ (1− λ)
θNm
θNm + θ
I
m
]Pr(
(1− φ)τ Y¯
θ
)
+ 1{d(yi,N)=0}1{b(yi,N)=m}[λ+ (1− λ)(
ηNm
ηNm + η
I
m
)ω]Pr(
φτY¯
η
+ x(yi, N))]
+ ψIi [1{d(yi,I)=1}1{b(yi,I)=m}(1− λ)
θNm
θNm + θ
I
m
Pr(
(1− φ)τ Y¯
θ
)
+ 1{d(yi,I)=0}1{b(yi,I)=m}(1− λ)(
ηNm
ηNm + η
I
m
)ωPr(
φτY¯
η
+ x(yi, I))]},
and
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ψIr =
M∑
m=1
R∑
i=1
{ψNi [1{d(yi,N)=1}1{b(yi,N)=m}[1− [λ+ (1− λ)
θNm
θNm + θ
I
m
]]Pr(
(1− φ)τ Y¯
θ
)
+ 1{d(yi,N)=0}1{b(yi,N)=m}[1− [λ+ (1− λ)(
ηNm
ηNm + η
I
m
)ω]]Pr(
φτY¯
η
+ x(yi, N))]
+ ψIi [1{d(yi,I)=1}1{b(yi,I)=m}[1− (1− λ)
θNm
θNm + θ
I
m
]Pr(
(1− φ)τ Y¯
θ
)
+ 1{d(yi,I)=0}1{b(yi,I)=m}[1− (1− λ)(
ηNm
ηNm + η
I
m
)ω]Pr(
φτY¯
η
+ x(yi, I))]}.
That is, the share of natives (immigrants) with income yr, ψ
N
r (ψ
I
r ), is consistent
with school and residential decisions of both natives and immigrants.
1.4 Benchmark Economy
I calibrate the benchmark economy to the case of Madrid. In the exercises below I restrict
the number of neighborhoods to M = 2. I do this by dividing Madrid in two sets of
school districts or neighborhoods.27 The first group of districts represents the low-quality
neighborhood (m1) and the second one represents the high-quality neighborhood (m2). To
select which are the “good” and the “bad” neighborhoods, I ordered all districts according
to prices of housing in 1998. The low share of immigrants in 1998 makes the relative
price a good measure of the relative quality of housing in the two neighborhoods because
plausible effects of immigration on housing prices are still absent.28 After constructing
this ranking of neighborhoods according to housing prices I selected the best districts to
be included in the high-quality neighborhood in order to match the total supply of housing
in good neighborhoods (m2) to be around one fourth of total housing stock in 1998.
29,30
Therefore, I set ρ2 to be roughly one fourth.
31 Finally, I normalized h1 = 1 which gives
h2 = p
1998
2 /p
1998
1 = 1.45 as the relative quality of housing.
27For the calibration of parameters related to neighborhoods I use data for Madrid Metropolitan Area
instead of CC.AA. de Madrid due to lack of data at the state level.
28See Table A.3 in Appendix A.
29Results are robust to the use of other fractions for the relative supply of good to bad housing.
30The supply of housing in one particular neighborhood is the percentage of individuals residing in that
set of districts.
31I use ρ2 = 0.236 in the calibration exercise due to the finite number of neighborhoods (see Table A.3
in Appendix A).
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I chose the academic year 2001/02 to calibrate the steady state of the benchmark economy.
This year lies in the middle of the decade of mass immigration to Spain. After obtaining
the calibrated parameter values, I compute the model results for several other years,
ranging from years with very low shares of immigrants -such as 1998/99, when the foreign-
born individuals represented only 2.6% of the population- to years with very high shares
of immigrants -like 2008/09, when immigrants’ share was about 16.7%- in Madrid. Then,
I compare these steady states, which only differ in their share of immigrants in overall
population, and the aim of this comparison is to see whether an increase in the share
of foreign-born population can account for the observed segregation by type of school
reported in Figure 1.1.
1.4.1 Functional forms
For the utility function I chose standard forms,
uc(c, h) =
αcc
δ + (1− αc)hδ
δ
, (1.23)
w(yc) =
αy[E(y
c)]γ
γ
, (1.24)
g(s) = αss, (1.25)
where 0 < αc < 1, 0 < αy, 0 < αs, are weights of consumption, income of the child (with
expected value E(yc)), and the probability of socialization to parents’ traits in parents’
utility. Parameters δ, and γ belong to the interval (0, 1).
Following Ferna´ndez and Rogerson (1998), the concave relationship between the expecta-
tion of future income (expected mean income of the child) and the quality of education
received when young is given by
µ(q) = y0 +B
(1 + q)υ
υ
, (1.26)
where B and υ are such that µ(q) is increasing (B > 0) and concave (υ < 1).
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1.4.2 Parametrization
In this section I describe the parametrization of the benchmark economy which is designed
to match aggregate data for Madrid. My strategy is to fix parameters that can be mapped
a priori to existing estimates and then set the remaining free parameters so that the steady
state match an equal number of moments from the data.
I fix parameters τ , φ and λ using a priori information. I calibrate τ in order to match the
share of government spending on primary and secondary education (public and private)
in the GDP of Madrid in 2002.32 From 1998 to 2006 public spending on this type of
education remained almost constant as a share of GDP (see Figure A.5 in Appendix A),
thus I set τ = 0.018. Figure A.5 also shows that subsidies devoted to private education
have also remained stable around 20% of total public spending in education. Therefore,
I set φ = 0.2.
Parameter λ describes the relative importance attributed to direct socialization in the
probability of socialization to natives’ cultural traits. As a measure of this weight I take
the share of non-sleeping hours that a child of school age spends at home. I construct this
number from the annual class hours divided by the total number of non-sleeping hours
available in one year, which I assume are 16 hours a day. According to ME (2008) the
number of class hours in primary education is about 792 hours a year in Spain.33 The total
number of non-sleeping hours a year is 5840, and dividing this number by 792 produces
the value 1− λ = 0.136, so λ = 0.864.
I calibrate the remaining parameters y0, υ, B, σ
2
ε , αc, αy, αs, δ, γ, and ω jointly, in order
to match: (i) income per capita; (ii) mean/median ratio of the income distribution; (iii)
elasticity of earnings with respect to spending per student, which I denote by ξq; (iv) share
of spending in private education; (v) share of spending in housing; (vi) relative price of
good to bad housing in 2002; (vii) shares of immigrant and native parents choosing public
schools; and (viii) shares of immigrants and natives residing in neighborhood m1.
Data on spending in private education comes from the Encuesta de Presupuestos Famil-
iares (EPF).34 Households spend in private education about 3% of their total expendi-
tures. Data on housing expenditure was obtained from the EPF 2002, and the share
32I obtained data on public spending from the Spanish Ministry of Education (ME) and data on regional
GDP from the Spanish Institute of Statistics (INE).
33According to Eurydice (2009) this number is higher (875) but some other sources indicate that the
actual number of class hours is below 700 hours a year.
34Data used to compute this moment corresponds to the the year 2007, when the EPF included a
supplement on household expenditure in education.
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of housing services in total household expenditure -10.6%- includes only the actual and
imputed rentals for housing. I also use as a moment in the calibration the relative price of
housing in the “good” neighborhood (m1) relative to the price in the “bad” neighborhood
(m2), which I found to be equal to 1.35 in the data for the year 2002.
35
One important feature of the model economy is the link between spending on education
and future earnings. As in Ferna´ndez and Rogerson (1998), my calibration strategy in-
cludes matching the elasticity of earnings with respect to spending per student. They
use a value of 0.1911 for this elasticity and argue that in the previous literature this elas-
ticity is close to 0.2.36 Following the same steps as in Ferna´ndez and Rogerson (1998)
I construct a measure of this elasticity with data for Madrid. To obtain this estimate
I use the result in Card and Krueger (1992) that states that a reduction of 10 students
in the student-teacher ratio leads to an increase in average future earnings of 4.2%. The
average student-teacher ratio for 1990-2006 for CC.AA. de Madrid was about 25.6.37 The
share of teacher salaries in total expenditure on education in Madrid for the period 1995-
2005 was about 51%.38 Then, I first construct the percentage increase in the number of
teachers needed to reduce the student ratio in 10 students, and next -assuming that the
share of expenditure in teachers salaries in total spending remains constant- I compute
the associated change in the cost of such change in the number of teachers. The variation
in spending needed is 24.9%, and this number combined with the increase of 4.2% in
future earnings yields a value of 0.17 for the elasticity ξq. In addition, I use the GDP per
capita in Madrid for the year 2002 to match the per person income. From the Encuesta
de Estructura Salarial 2002 (EES 2002) I take the ratio of mean/median wages.39
Table 1.3 reports the calibrated values for the parameters in the benchmark economy.
Table 1.4 shows model and data moments for the calibration targets, according to which
the model produces a good match to the those moments for the calibrated values of the
parameters.
35Data on prices was obtained in the website of the Ayuntamiento de Madrid.
36Betts (1996) presents estimations that are around 0.1.
37Average number of students per teacher in primary education in Madrid in the period 1990-2008,
according to data from ME.
38From Encuesta de financiacio´n y gastos de la ensea privada INE (1995, 2000, 2005).
39I had to make use of labor earnings, instead of a broader measure of income, due to the lack of
microdata on the distribution of income in Spain in 2002.
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Table 1.3: Parameter values
Parameters Values
Parameters set a priori
Weight of direct socialization λ 0.864
Income tax rate τ 0.018
Subsidy to private education φ 0.2
Parameters calibrated to data
Income process y0 10.3
B 9.3
v -0.54
σ2e 0.39
Utility function αc 0.643
αy 7.1
αs 1.73
δ 0.195
γ 0.275
Shape of the oblique socialization ω 0.21
Table 1.4: Targets
Moments Data Model
Share of spending in private education 0.03 0.03
Share of spending in housing 0.11 0.10
Relative price of “good” to “bad” housing 1.35 1.35
Elasticity of earnings with respect to spending per student 0.17 0.17
Mean income 23.41 23.43
Mean/median income 1.24 1.23
Share of immigrant parents choosing Public schools 0.72 0.72
Share of native parents choosing Public schools 0.55 0.54
Share of immigrants residing in m1 0.68 0.72
Share of natives residing in m1 0.77 0.77
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1.5 Results
This section presents the main results of changes in the share of immigrants in overall
population. Table 1.5 and Figures 1.3 and 1.4 present the main simulation results about
the impact of increasing immigration on school and neighborhood segregation. The num-
bers in bold in Table 1.5 refer to the year used to calibrate the model economy, and the
rest are predicted and observed values for school and residential choices of both immigrant
and native parents. Also, I discuss the results in Table 1.6 which reports the effects of
increasing immigration on some key educational and integration -cultural and economic-
outcomes.
School Segregation. The first panel in Table 1.5 and Figure 1.3 report the results on
school segregation. In 1998/99, when there was only 2.6% immigrants in total population,
the percentage of natives in public schools produced by the model is 57%, while in the
data this number is 59%. For the same academic year the model predicts that 67% of
immigrants would choose public institutions and in the data this number is 68%. On
the other hand, for the academic year 2008/09 -when the share of immigrants in overall
population increased to 16.7%- the model predicts that 49% of natives would choose
public schools and data shows that this number is 50%. In that year, the simulated
benchmark economy gives 80% of immigrants choosing public schools, while the actual
number is around 77%. Comparing the same magnitudes for every year in the period
1998/99-2008/09 shows that the predictions of the model follow closely what was actually
observed in the data. Therefore, the model economy that includes cultural concerns as a
key sorting force is able to account for the increasing sorting of students into public and
private education that is observed in the case of Madrid.
The intuition behind this result is the following. When parents choose the type of school
for their children they consider both the cost of education and the effect of each type of
school on their children’s socialization to their own culture. In Madrid, private education is
more productive in the formation of native (majority) cultural traits. As a result, when the
immigration levels are low, immigrants choose private schools as private education provide
better education and both public and private schools are not good for the transmission
of immigrant values. On the other hand, as immigration increases, public schools become
better options for immigrants (they are cheap, and with many immigrants they are also
good for the transmission of minority traits). By a similar logic, private schools become
better options for natives.
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Table 1.5: School and Neighborhood Sorting in the benchmark economy, 1998/99-
2008/09.§
Year Share School sorting Neighborhood sorting
of immig.
Share of natives Share of immig. Share of natives Share of immig.
in public in public in m1 in m1
schools schools (worse neigh.) (worse neigh.)
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
1998/99 0.026 0.59 0.57 0.68 0.67 0.77 0.77 0.63 0.69
1999/00 0.032 0.58 0.56 0.70 0.67 0.77 0.77 0.65 0.69
2000/01 0.057 0.57 0.55 0.71 0.71 0.77 0.77 0.67 0.70
2001/02 0.080 0.55 0.54 0.72 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.68 0.72
2002/03 0.103 0.54 0.53 0.73 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.73
2003/04 0.114 0.54 0.53 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.70 0.75
2004/05 0.131 0.53 0.51 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.71 0.75
2005/06 0.133 0.52 0.51 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.72 0.76
2006/07 0.143 0.51 0.51 0.75 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.73 0.77
2007/08 0.159 0.50 0.49 0.76 0.79 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.78
2008/09 0.167 0.50 0.49 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.76 0.80
§ Benchmark case in bold.
Neighborhood Segregation. As the share of immigrants increased in Madrid, not only
students were being sorted out into public and private institutions, but also neighborhoods
where becoming more segregated to a certain extent. This is shown in the second panel in
Table 1.5. The results show that as the share of immigrants increased from 2.6% to 16.7%
the percentage of immigrants that chose to reside in the “bad” neighborhood grew from
63% to 76%. On the other hand, the share of natives residing in that type of neighborhood
remain almost constant along the whole period. Results in Table 1.5 and in Figure 1.4
show that the model is also able to replicate the increase in residential segregation of
immigrants in this period of time.
Spatial segregation is closely related to school segregation due to the bundling of decisions
that characterizes school systems with district-restricted school enrollment. For instance,
choosing private schools inside a “bad” neighborhood is an attractive option for some
native parents who desire to send their children to a school in which they will be better
exposed to the transmission of majority-traits but who can not afford changing residence
to the “good” neighborhood so as to take advantage of the favorable share of natives
in public schools there. As a result, in the “bad” neighborhood the share of immigrant
students in public schools’ classrooms increases. This fact attracts immigrants to the
district with low quality of housing, in which not only housing services are cheaper, but
also public schools are an attractive option for the formation of minority-traits. Since the
model economy include all these separating forces, the simulations done for different levels
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Figure 1.3: School segregation in the data and in the model in Madrid, 1998/99-2008/09.
of the share of immigrants in the overall population are able to replicate the neighborhood
sorting observed in the data.
Educational outcomes. Equality of opportunity through education is often advocated
as a key goal for public policy. In the case of countries facing large-scale immigration, the
increase in the native-immigrant educational gap is a concern that is closely related to
segregation across the private and public school systems.40 Table 1.6 shows some statistics
on educational outcomes for the cases of low, moderate, and high levels of immigration.
The model predicts that the share of immigrants in public schools raised from 2% in
1998/99 to 24% in 2008/09, which is exactly what is observed in the data for the case of
Madrid. Table 1.6 also reports other statistics that are crucial to evaluate the impact of
immigration on the school system.41
First, simulations show that the quality of education received by natives was only 9%
higher in the case of low immigration, while this gap raised to 24% in the scenario with
high immigration, corresponding to the academic year 2008/09. This result is mainly
driven by the more intensive use of private education by natives with immigration. In
40Schnepf (2007) uses PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS databases to show that school segregation is an im-
portant determinant of the native-immigrant educational gaps in Continental Europe.
41Unfortunately, many of the results produced by the model -such as educational and integration
outcomes- cannot directly be compared to existing data for the case of Madrid. Therefore, the evaluation
of the suitability of the model to assess the impact of immigration on such dimensions has to rely on
indirect evidence or on facts surveyed in previous literature.
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Figure 1.4: Residential decisions of natives and immigrants in Madrid. Data and model
results, 1998/99-2008/09.
addition, this result is in line with the evidence in PISA 2000, 2003 and 2006. Data in
these surveys for Spain indicates that average scores in Maths, Reading and Science for
natives versus immigrants have been increasing with the share of immigrants in the overall
population.42
Second, the average quality of education in private schools relative to that in public schools
decreased as immigrants increased their participation in overall population. For instance,
in 1998/99, when there were 2.6% of immigrants in total population, the average quality
in private schools was 2.54 times higher than in public ones, and this ratio was reduced to
2.33 in the year with high immigration (2008/09).43 This implies a reduction of more than
9% in this dimension of educational gaps. In this case, two effects reinforce each other.
On the one hand, those natives opting out from public institutions are poorer than those
who were choosing private institutions in the case of low immigration, and therefore are
buying less education in private institutions. In this regard, the emergence of non-elite
private education could be a phenomenon linked to the type of sorting across private and
public systems under analysis.44 On the other hand, the lower number of students in
42See Table A.1 in Appendix A.
43See Table A.2 in Appendix A. That table shows that in Spain the average score in private is higher
than the one in public schools, but the gap has remained almost constant in the three years that the PISA
study was conducted. The CDI (Prueba de Conocimientos y Destrezas Indispensables) is a standardized
exam for all sixth grade students in the region of Madrid which started in the academic year 2004/05.
According to the results of the last CDI, the ratio of scores in concerted versus public schools was reduced
from 1.14 in 2007/08 to 1.07 in the next academic year (El Pa´ıs, 2010), a result in line with the prediction
of the model.
44See for instance Figlio and Stone (1999) for some empirical evidence on the existence of non-elite
private education.
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public schools induces an increase in the spending per student in these schools -which is
modeled as the key input in the production of education- and this in turn increases the
denominator in the ratio of relative quality provided by each type of schools.
Third, the model produces an average quality of education in the “good” neighborhood
(m2) which is higher than the average observed in the “bad” neighborhood (m1) for all
the three academic years reported in Table 1.6. However, as the immigrant population
increased its share in total population the gap between the good and the bad neighborhood
is reduced. According to results in Table 1.6, with low immigration, the average quality of
education in m2 was about 2.28 times higher than in m1, while this ratio is 2.10 with high
immigration. Here, two key forces are at work. In the first place, those individuals who
after the large-scale immigration episode remain in the good neighborhood and who were
also choosing private schools there, may now choose to be back in public schools when less
immigrants -those choosing to reside in m1- are enrolled in those schools. Furthermore,
those natives residing in m1 and that have opted-out from public schools and have chosen
to send their children to private institutions are helping to increase the average spending
in education in m1 and in this way raising the denominator in the ratio of average quality
of education of good to bad neighborhoods.
Integration outcomes. The model economy is well-suited to produce two types of
integration outcomes of immigrants. First, there is the probability of cultural integration
into the hosting society. This quantity measures how likely is that an individual not
sharing native’s cultural traits is socialized to them. Recall that in the model economy the
probability of acquiring majority’s cultural traits is given by a technology that combines
both direct and oblique socialization, and predictions of the model in this dimension only
capture the changes occurred on the oblique socialization part. In the bottom panel of
Table 1.6, the simulation results indicate that the probability of integration of newcomers
to the hosting culture is decreasing with the share of immigrants in overall population.
This is a result in line both with empirical evidence and with other theoretical approaches
to cultural integration (Lazear, 1999).
Second, the model can also produce predictions about what would be the economic pe-
nalization for not being integrated to the hosting society. According to results in Table
1.6, the portion of expected income that is lost if not integrated is an increasing mapping
of the share of immigrants in overall population. For instance, in the case of low immi-
gration, the expected economic penalization is 2.5% of income, while in the case of high
immigration this cost raises to 6.1% of earnings. This result follows from the solution that
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Table 1.6: Results on education and integration outcomes, benchmark economy.
Statistics 1998/99 2001/2002 2008/09
(low immig.) (moderate immig.) (high immig.)
Model Model Model
Educational Quality of educ. for natives 1.09 1.13 1.24
outcomes relative to immigrants’
Quality of educ. in private 2.54 2.50 2.33
relative to public schools
Quality of educ. in the “good” 2.28 2.20 2.10
neigh. relative to the “bad” neigh.
Share of immigrants 0.02 0.10 0.24
in public schools
Integration Cultural Integration: 0.134 0.126 0.109
outcomes Probability of cultural integration
Economic penalization for 2.5% 3.6% 6.1%
not being integrated:
Income loss (%) if not assimilated
immigrant parents find for the trade-off of what type of school to choose -which includes
the comparison of quality of education that can be acquired in each type of school with
the relative productivity in terms of socialization to minority’s traits- and which favors
the election of public schools the more immigrants are in overall population.
1.6 Policy Experiments
In this section I present the results of three types of policy experiments. These experi-
ments are aimed to assess the different ways in which public policy can affect school and
neighborhood segregation as well as education and integration outcomes of immigrants.
The three experiments I present include:
1. Changes in the level of subsidies to private education (changing φ): this policy
only varies the composition of public expenditure in education -but not the overall
amount of public financial provisions- giving a higher or lower portion of total tax
revenue to public institutions.
2. Changes in the amount of public expenditure in education financed with changes
in the tax rate (changing τ): this policy affects public provisions for public and
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for private schools, which are split among them in the same proportion as in the
benchmark economy.
3. Changes in the orientation of private education (changing ω): this policy makes
private education even more majority-oriented (lower ω) or more “multi-cultural”
(higher ω).
1.6.1 Changing subsidies to private education
Changing the share of total tax revenue allocated to subsidize private education (chang-
ing φ) would impact school and neighborhood choices of natives and immigrants. This
happens since a higher (lower) φ implies more (less) resources for private schools and
less (more) for public institutions. The residential decisions are also likely to be affected
because school and neighborhood choices are tied up. Table 1.7 and Figures 1.5 and 1.6
present results of experiments in which φ is increased to 0.3 and it is reduced to 0.05 from
its benchmark value of 0.2.
School Segregation. Reducing subsidies to private education implies that parents need
to pay more for each unit of quality of education acquired in those schools, which makes
public schools relatively more attractive for both immigrant and native parents. Those
natives that in the benchmark were choosing private schools because of the advantage in
terms of socialization to natives’ traits, may now switch to public schools because with
a low φ buying the desired traits through private schools is too expensive. On the other
hand, immigrants that in the benchmark were choosing private schools were doing so
only to buy high quality education, since socialization in these schools is not favorable to
immigrant traits. Therefore, the reaction to a more expensive private education is likely
to be less strong for immigrants than for natives. In this way, the gap in schooling choices,
i.e. the difference in the proportion of immigrants and natives choosing public schools, is
probably affected when changing φ. Numbers in Table 1.7 show that the gap in schooling
choices was 10 percentage points in the benchmark with low immigration, raising to 18
and 31 points with moderate and high immigration. When we reduce subsidies to private
education these gaps shrink to 4, 12 and 20 percentage points with low, moderate and
high immigration, respectively. Therefore, reducing subsidies helps to reduce the widening
of the gap that follows immigration. Results for increasing subsidies to private schools
produces the opposite impact on such gaps, as shown in Figure 1.5(b).
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Neighborhood Segregation. According to results reported in Table 1.7 and Figures
1.6(a) and 1.6(b), when individuals face different levels for the subsidy to private educa-
tion they rearrange their location decisions. With low subsidies to private schools these
institutions become less attractive to natives, who are thus more prone to attend public
schools. Those immigrants that were choosing public schools in the good neighborhood
find out that with low φ there are many more natives in public schools and they react to
this less favorable -in terms of the production of their desired cultural traits- composition
of classrooms opting to reside in the bad neighborhood and sending their children to pub-
lic schools there. Figure 1.6(a) show that the effect of lower subsidies to private education
is that immigrants are sorted out into the bad neighborhoods from the very beginning of
the period, and continue in the same situation towards the end of the period analyzed.
That is, neighborhood sorting is not increasing with immigration. The opposite holds
true for the case of high subsidies to private schools, as shown in Figure 1.6(b).
Educational outcomes. The effects of changing the level of subsidies to private school
on educational outcomes mix several counteracting forces, and the final effects are not
easy to discuss a priori. Results on these educational outcomes reported in Table 1.7
indicate that if we reduce subsidies to private education we would also reduce the gap in
the mean quality of education received by natives and immigrants. This gap would have
dropped to 3% in 1998/99 -compared to the observed 9% in the benchmark economy-
and to just 18% -instead of 24% in the benchmark- in the year with highest share of
immigrants in overall population. This result is a combination of more natives attending
public schools and the lower (higher) endowment of public resources to private (public)
education. Contrarily, with high subsidies the native-immigrant gap is increased for the
three levels of immigration.
The spatial distribution of quality of education is also affected with the changes in sub-
sidies. With a low level for φ, the gap in the quality of education in the good compared
to the bad neighborhood is higher in the case of low and intermediate immigration rates
than in the corresponding results for the benchmark case. However, with low subsidies
and high immigration this gap is reduced, i.e., quality of education is spatially more evenly
distributed than in the benchmark. The opposite is valid for the case of high subsidies.
The gap in the quality of education across types of institutions is increased for the three
levels of immigration. This is a result explained by the fact that even when public provi-
sions to private schools are lower, those who decide to remain in private schools are those
who are sufficiently rich to afford private schools. Since quality of education is a normal
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(a) Low φ (b) High φ
Figure 1.5: School sorting: benchmark economy and simulations with low and high φ
(subsidy to private education), 1998/99-2008/09.
good, these individuals spend relatively more because they are richer, and this increase
the numerator in the ratio of qualities of education.
Integration outcomes. Table 1.7 shows that the probability of cultural integration to
the hosting society only shows sizeable changes in the case of high immigration. There,
low subsidies implies a higher probability of integration, while higher subsidies reduce this
probability. The important result here is that a large school segregation by traits implies a
low probability of cultural integration of newcomers, and since reducing subsidies alleviates
this segregation it also helps on integrating immigrants to the the local culture. On the
other hand, the results about economic integration are fairly large. The key result is that
economic integration of immigrants is decreasing with the level of subsidies to private
schools.
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(a) Low φ
(b) High φ
Figure 1.6: Neighborhood sorting: benchmark economy and simulations with low and
high φ (subsidy to private education), 1998/99-2008/09.
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Table 1.7: Changing subsidies to private education.
Statistics 1998/99 (low immigration) 2001/02 (moderate immigration) 2008/09 (high immigration)
Benchmark Low High Benchmark Low High Benchmark Low High
subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy subsidy
φ=0.20 φ=0.05 φ=0.30 φ=0.20 φ=0.05 φ=0.30 φ=0.20 φ=0.05 φ=0.30
School Share of natives 0.57 0.66 0.50 0.54 0.64 0.48 0.49 0.61 0.41
Sorting choosing pub. Schools
Share of immigrants 0.67 0.71 0.62 0.72 0.76 0.69 0.80 0.81 0.79
choosing pub. Schools
Neighborhood Share of natives 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.76 0.76 0.76
Sorting in the “bad” neigh.
Share of natives 0.69 0.77 0.65 0.72 0.75 0.70 0.80 0.81 0.79
in the “bad” neigh.
Educational Educ. quality for natives 1.09 1.03 1.11 1.13 1.10 1.15 1.24 1.18 1.27
outcomes relative to immigrants
Educ. quality in the “good” 2.28 2.48 2.15 2.20 2.40 2.11 2.10 2.04 2.07
neigh. relative to the “bad”
Educ. quality in private 2.54 2.68 2.53 2.50 2.62 2.44 2.33 2.53 2.27
relative to public schools
Share of immigrants 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.24 0.20 0.27
in public schools
Integration Cultural Integration: 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.126 0.127 0.127 0.109 0.112 0.107
outcomes Prob. of cultural integration
Income loss (%) 2.5% 1.0% 3.0% 3.6% 2.5% 4.1% 6.1% 3.2% 6.5%
if not integrated
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1.6.2 Changing taxes
Changes in the income tax rate lead changes in the amount of total resources allocated
to finance both types of education.The simulations below are obtained for the cases of:
(i) reducing in 25% the income tax rate (the new income tax rate is as low as 1.35%); (ii)
increasing in 25% the income tax rate (the new income tax rate is 2.25%).
School Segregation. With lower public provisions schools affected the most are the
public institutions, because their only source financing comes from the tax revenue. There-
fore, with a low tax rate both natives and immigrants are expected to flight out from public
education. However, when immigration is large enough, immigrants may start opting in
public schools again as a way to assure the transmission of their traits to children. Figure
1.7(a) shows that reducing the tax rate actually makes public education a relatively less
attractive option for both native and immigrant parents. However, for immigrants, large
immigration makes public schools more desirable since they are better prepared to help
parents in transmitting their cultural traits than private schools. Therefore, when the
share of immigrants in the overall population is very low -only 2.6% of total households-
immigrants and natives behave almost alike in their elections of public schools and the
gap on these decisions is close to zero. Table 1.8 shows that around half of both groups
chooses public schools in 1998/99. However, the gap on these choices raises to about 40
percentage points at the end of the period. Increasing the tax rate leads to a pattern of
choices that is the shifted-up version of the one obtained for the benchmark case, as shown
in Figure 1.7(b). In this case, the gaps along the whole period under analysis are always
similar in magnitude to those obtained in the simulations of the benchmark economy.
Neighborhood Segregation. When the income tax rate is low, immigrants prefer to
concentrate less in the bad neighborhood, since the main reason for doing so is to take
advantage of the desired oblique socialization at public schools there. However, those
schools are less attractive when the public financing is poor because choosing public
schools implies a large sacrifice in terms of quality of education just to get the desired low
exposition to majority cultural traits (Figure 1.8(a)). In the case of a high income tax rate,
the amount of public resources grow more for public than for private schools.45 Therefore,
taking advantage of public education is an attractive option for immigrant parents, who
therefore decide to concentrate more densely in the bad neighborhood (Figure 1.8(b)). In
45Since the share of tax revenue allocated to finance private schools is just 0.20.
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both scenarios, with low and high income tax rates, segregation of immigrants in the bad
neighborhoods is increasing with the share of immigrants in overall population.
Educational outcomes. For a low income tax rate, the native-immigrant educational
gap is not a monotonic function of the share of immigrants in overall population. First,
Table 1.8 shows that in the academic year 1998/99 natives receive a quality of education
that is 9% higher than the one received by immigrants in the benchmark case, and for a
lower tax rate this gap would be reduced to a 1.4%. However, as immigration increases,
the gaps are higher in the case of lower tax rate than in the benchmark economy. This is
what is shown in Table 1.8 for the simulations in the years 2001/02 and 2008/09. While
the gaps in the benchmark were 13.4% and 24%, with a low tax rate they are equal to
16% and 29%, respectively. When looking at the results with a high tax rate we find that
the gap is always lower than in the benchmark, for the three years ranging from low to
high shares of immigrants in overall population.
Table 1.8 reports that with a low τ there are not sizeable changes in the ratio of the
average quality of education in good to bad neighborhoods. However, as expected, the
quality of education imparted at private schools is relatively higher than in the benchmark
for all levels of immigration. Also, the opposite holds true for the the experiment with a
higher income tax rate.
Integration outcomes. Probabilities of cultural integration are not affected much in
comparison to the benchmark. However, with a low income tax rate the economic pe-
nalization for not being integrated show a differentiated pattern for the years with low,
medium and high immigration shares. First, in the year 1998/99, this income loss is lower
than in the benchmark economy, but for the years 2001/02 and 2008/09 the associated
income losses are higher that in the benchmark. On the other hand, a higher income tax
rate is associated with lower income losses for all the three simulation scenarios reported
in Table 1.8.
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(a) Low τ (b) High τ
Figure 1.7: School sorting, comparing the benchmark economy and the cases with low
and high τ (income tax rate), 1998/99-2008/09.
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(a) Low τ
(b) High τ
Figure 1.8: Neighborhood sorting, comparing the benchmark economy and the cases with
low and high τ (income tax rate), 1998/99-2008/09.
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Table 1.8: Changing the income tax rate.
Statistics 1998/99 (low immigration) 2001/02 (moderate immigration) 2008/09 (high immigration)
Benchmark Low tax High tax Benchmark Low tax High tax Benchmark Low tax High tax
rate rate rate rate rate rate
τ=1.8% τ=1.35% τ=2.25% τ=1.8% τ=1.35% τ=2.25% τ=1.8% τ=1.35% τ=2.25%
School Share of natives 0.565 0.477 0.633 0.542 0.462 0.614 0.487 0.394 0.569
Sorting choosing pub. Schools
Share of immigrants 0.673 0.495 0.714 0.715 0.605 0.755 0.797 0.756 0.830
choosing pub. Schools
Neighborhood Share of natives 0.768 0.771 0.765 0.769 0.771 0.770 0.762 0.768 0.757
Sorting in the “bad” neigh.
Share of natives 0.685 0.585 0.719 0.718 0.667 0.756 0.800 0.753 0.823
in the “bad” neigh.
Educational Educ. quality for natives 1.085 1.014 1.061 1.134 1.160 1.100 1.240 1.287 1.188
outcomes relative to immigrants
Educ. quality in the “good” 2.285 2.205 2.231 2.201 2.181 2.185 2.105 2.134 1.958
neigh. relative to the “bad” neigh.
Educ. quality in private 2.545 2.795 2.392 2.503 2.694 2.316 2.334 2.531 2.262
relative to public schools
Share of immigrants 0.025 0.012 0.028 0.100 0.082 0.089 0.241 0.270 0.214
in public schools
Integration Cultural Integration: 0.134 0.135 0.133 0.126 0.129 0.127 0.109 0.108 0.111
outcomes Prob. of cultural integration
Income loss (%) 2.5% 0.5% 1.4% 3.6% 5.2% 2.3% 6.1% 7.5% 4.4%
if not integrated
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1.6.3 More or less multi-cultural private education
In this section I present a policy experiment that changes the value of the parameter
ω, which is part of the technology for the production of socialization to native traits.
With a lower ω children in private schools are more likely to acquire majority traits. In
contrast, a higher value of ω is related to a less majority-oriented private education, which
can also be thought as a more multi-cultural approach to socialization through private
education.46 A higher ω may involve changes in the teaching-style or in the curricula such
that certain types of contents relating to cultural heterogeneity, and to the historical,
social and economic contexts of the newcomers are introduced in private schools. In the
simulations below I change the value of this parameter, which takes the value ω = 0.21
in the benchmark economy, to evaluate the cases of a more majority-oriented private
education with ω = 0.05, and the case of a less majority-oriented -more multi-cultural-
private education, with ω = 0.40.
School Segregation. Making the private education system less multi-cultural (lower
ω) makes public schools more attractive for immigrants, specially when the share of im-
migrants in overall population is high. This is due to a sort of increasing returns of
socialization to minority traits in public relative to private schools as the share of im-
migrants in overall population increases. When immigration is low, immigrants are not
able to find a type of school that significantly helps them to transmit their traits to their
children, since the exposition to immigrant students cannot be high enough due to the
few immigrants in the population. In this case, immigrants do not choose public schools
that much, since doing so would imply to obtain a lower quality of education compared
to that one that can be bought in private institutions. When immigration is high enough,
the possibility of a immigrant child is exposed to a greater share of immigrant students
in public schools makes these type of schools more attractive. Simulations This pattern
of decisions is shown in Figure 1.9(a) and also in Table 1.9. The fact that with lower
ω immigrants are choosing less public schools than in the benchmark case is connected
to their residential choices. Some immigrants may relocate, changing residence to the
neighborhood in which is more likely to find schools with the largest possible presence of
immigrants.47 Figure 1.9(a) also shows that as immigrants increase their share in overall
population, the option of public schools is a more attractive one for immigrants. For
46This higher value for ω can be also interpreted as a relatively more attractive -in terms of socialization
productivity- public education for natives.
47This neighborhood is the bad one, as it will be discussed in the paragraph on neighborhood segrega-
tion.
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the case of natives, the reaction to having a more majority-oriented private education is
almost null in the simulation when compared to the benchmark economy.
The results of the simulations results for the case of a more multi-cultural private education
(higher ω) are the opposite, as shown in Figure 1.9(b). There, it can be observed that
the school sorting, represented by increasing gaps in natives’ and immigrants’ decisions as
the share of immigrants in overall population increases, is less pronounced. That is, the
sorting out of immigrants and natives across types of schools is present from the beginning
of the period analyzed and increases with immigration although at a slower pace than in
the benchmark case. This result follows from the fact that when private schools are not
as good device to assure the transmission of natives’ traits as it was in the benchmark,
native parents may choose, for instance, to rearrange their residential decisions in order
to invest in the socialization probability of their children to majority traits. Notice that
figure 1.9(b) resembles what is observed in Figure 1.2(c) for Com. Valenciana, or to a
more extreme case -for an even higher value of ω- this experiment would produce the
patterns observed for Catalonia, in Figure 1.2(b). Therefore, this type of policy takes
the case of Madrid closer to the relative orientation of private-public in these other two
regions, as discussed in Section 1.2.
Neighborhood Segregation. In the case of a low value for ω, the presence of a very
majority-oriented private education makes that a higher number of immigrants, comparing
to the benchmark economy, opt for residing in the low-quality in the beginning of the
period. These families concentrate more in the bad neighborhood and choose to reside
there because they can take advantage of the more favorable student composition in
public schools. This is what Figure 1.10(a) reports for the case of immigrants. In the
simulations with a high value of ω, those who are more prone to rearrange residential
decisions -comparing with the benchmark case- are the natives. Figure 1.10(b) shows
that at the beginning of the period natives tend to reside in the good neighborhood, and
the reason for doing this is to take advantage of the classrooms’ composition in both public
and private schools in this more expensive neighborhood, where relatively less immigrants
are residing at the time. However, as the share of immigrants in the population increases
the relative gains of switching residence decreases, returning some natives towards the
cheaper neighborhood.
Educational outcomes. According to results in Table 1.9, the native-immigrant ed-
ucational gap is lower with a more majority-oriented private education only when the
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(a) Low ω (more majority-oriented private educa-
tion)
(b) High ω (less majority-oriented private educa-
tion)
Figure 1.9: School sorting, comparing the benchmark economy and the cases with low
and high ω (type of education), 1998/99-2008/09.
share of immigrants in the society is low. With high immigration this gap is higher than
in the benchmark. This is driven by the degree of separation across public and private
schools explained above. On the other hand, having a more multi-cultural private educa-
tion helps to reduce the native-immigrant educational gap as immigration increases. The
rest of educational outcomes reported on Table 1.9 do not show sizeable effects relative
to those shown for the benchmark economy.
Integration outcomes. In the case of high immigration, both indicators of integration
improve with a more multi-cultural private education. In this case, the probability of
cultural integration increases by a small proportion -from 10.9% to 11.3%- and the income
loss if not integrated falls from 6.1% to 4.4% out of the average earnings.
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(a) Low ω (more majority-oriented private education)
(b) High ω (less majority-oriented private education)
Figure 1.10: Neighborhood sorting, comparing the benchmark economy and the cases
with low and high ω (type of education), 1998/99-2008/09.
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Table 1.9: Changing the orientation of private education.
Statistics 1998/99 (low immigration) 2001/02 (moderate immigration) 2008/09 (high immigration)
Benchmark More Less Benchmark More Less Benchmark More Less
majority- majority- majority- majority- majority- majority-
oriented oriented oriented oriented oriented oriented
priv. educ. priv. educ. priv. educ. priv. educ. priv. educ. priv. educ.
ω=0.21 ω=0.05 ω=0.40 ω=0.21 ω=0.05 ω=0.40 ω=0.21 ω=0.05 ω=0.40
School Share of natives 0.565 0.565 0.564 0.542 0.545 0.544 0.487 0.482 0.504
Sorting choosing pub. Schools
Share of immigrants 0.673 0.621 0.661 0.715 0.695 0.710 0.797 0.820 0.753
choosing pub. Schools
Neighborhood Share of natives 0.768 0.765 0.677 0.769 0.760 0.705 0.762 0.756 0.750
Sorting in the “bad” neigh.
Share of natives 0.685 0.770 0.764 0.718 0.771 0.769 0.800 0.809 0.772
in the “bad” neigh.
Educational Educ. quality for natives 1.085 1.027 1.085 1.134 1.099 1.120 1.240 1.253 1.181
outcomes relative to immigrants
Educ. quality in the “good” 2.285 2.254 2.256 2.201 2.205 2.221 2.105 2.147 2.002
neighborhood relative
to the “bad” neigh.
Educ. quality in private 2.545 2.575 2.553 2.503 2.510 2.489 2.334 2.354 2.399
relative to public schools
Share of immigrants 0.025 0.025 0.029 0.100 0.092 0.097 0.241 0.242 0.214
in public schools
Integration Cultural Integration: Prob. 0.134 0.134 0.133 0.126 0.127 0.127 0.109 0.109 0.113
outcomes of cultural integration
Income loss (%) 2.5% 1.2% 2.3% 3.6% 2.9% 3.7% 6.1% 6.0% 4.4%
if not integrated
Chapter 1. Sorting of Students by Cultural Traits: The Effects of Immigration 44
1.7 Conclusions
Schools are important institutions for cultural transmission. The importance of these
institutions becomes much more clear when the composition of cultural traits in a society
is changed as a result of large-scale immigration. Parents, who desire that their children
share their cultural traits, may react to the new composition of traits in the population
by changing the type of education for their children. Furthermore, when schooling and
residential decisions are tied-up because of institutional enrollment restrictions, not only
a native-immigrant sorting of students by type of schools may arise but also certain level
of neighborhood segregation is likely to be present. In this sense, the existence of cultural
concerns related to schooling choices affects both school and neighborhood segregation.
In this paper, the model economy constructed and simulated for the case of Madrid,
which includes cultural concerns as a key sorting force, is able to account for the observed
segregation across schools and neighborhoods. The model is also well-suited to produce
a number of policy experiments. All the simulated policies have been in the political
agenda of local authorities, media, and various commentators during last decade. This
work contributes to the evaluation of these types of interventions, which is a difficult
task to accomplish due to the existence of many non trivial interacting forces, e.g., the
general equilibrium effects generated through the housing market. First, I experiment
with the level of subsidies to private education and I find that reducing these subsidies
mitigates the rise in segregation across schools and neighborhoods as the share of immi-
grants in overall population increases. On the other hand, increasing subsidies to private
education would make both the school sorting and the neighborhood sorting worsen as
immigration increases. Second, I simulate changes in the total amount of public spending
in both types of educational institutions. I obtain that neither reducing nor increasing
this funding would have helped to reduce the observed gaps in schooling choices of im-
migrants and natives. In addition, this type of policy is also ineffective in ameliorating
the rise in neighborhood segregation. Third, I conduct a policy experiment in which I
simulate changes of cultural orientation of private education. For a less multi-cultural
private education I find that the sorting of students by cultural traits is aggravated the
larger is the scale of immigration. Contrarily, a more multi-cultural approach in private
education makes segregation across schools less pronounced, without worsening off the
spatial concentration of immigrants and natives. This type of policy also improves the
integration of immigrants to the hosting society.
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Further research could focus on the effects that the labor market penalization for immi-
grants that are not successfully integrated might have on parents’ incentives to socialize
their children into traits that differ from those shared by the majority. In this line, an
interesting issue is how these incentives affect the formation of networks as informal in-
stitutions to overcome the penalization in the labor market. Neighborhood segregation
is likely to be affected, and the study of ghetto formation can be enriched by adding
these considerations to the analysis. Along similar lines, an interesting avenue for future
research is the assessment of the interactions of welfare state provisions -such as unem-
ployment benefits- with the incentives of immigrants to integrate their children into the
new society. Adding this dimension would improve our understanding of how public pol-
icy can foster integration of the newcomers. All these issues are at the core of the political
agenda about the creation of social cohesion and the reduction of conflict.
Chapter 2
Spillovers of Health Education at
School on Parents’ Physical Activity
2.1 Introduction
Non-communicable diseases such as obesity, cancer, cardiovascular conditions, and dia-
betes have reached epidemic-like proportions in recent decades. Physical inactivity and
sedentary habits are among the most important risk factors for these diseases (WHO,
2003). As a result, prevention increasingly involves changes in lifestyles, such as intro-
ducing the practice of regular physical activity in order to reduce risk factors (Kenkel,
2000). This type of preventive measures also implies savings in health care costs, which
for the US are estimated to be at least US$ 500 per year lower for physically active versus
inactive individuals (WHO, 2003).
Interactions within the family may crucially affect the “production” of healthy lifestyles.
As Kenkel (2000) points out, the family is often identified as the unit of production of
preventive practices. Previous literature on intra-household health decisions has focused
on the interactions between spouses (e.g. Clark and Etile, 2006). As well, the literature
on intergenerational transmission of characteristics such as health, education or income,
has focused on the effects that parents’ decisions can have on children’s behaviors and
outcomes. However, little research has been done to evaluate the impact of children on
parents’ decisions, in particular on choices regarding healthy lifestyles.1
1One exception is Kuziemko (2011), who analyzes the effect of children on parents’ investments in
education.
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Schools can play a fundamental role in providing children with information about healthy
lifestyles and health decisions, which may complement what they learn at home. At school,
the knowledge about health is transferred to children through the implementation of
specific curricular modules, often known as Health Education (HED).2,3 There is evidence
indicating that HED consisting of physical education, nutrition or sexual education could
be effective in directly improving the health profiles of children (Cawley, Meyerhoefer,
and Newhouse, 2007, Cawley, Frisvold, and Meyerhoefer, 2012, Dupas, 2011, McGeary,
2009). However, it may be the case that parents are as well affected by the education
about preventive health care that their children acquire at school.
The first goal of this paper is to assess the existence of spillover effects of Health Educa-
tion received by children at elementary school on their parents.4 We exploit the quasi-
experiment provided by the changes in the state-level HED requirements in elementary
schools implemented between the school years 1999/2000 and 2005/2006 in the US to
quantify the effects of these programs on parents’ physical activity. Thus, the focus is on
a policy that does not imply any transfer of resources to children -the targeted individuals-
but instead provides them with new information. A second goal of this paper is to analyze
the heterogeneous impacts of this policy as a way to start unveiling the plausible channels
through which children receiving HED at schools may affect the probability that their
parents engage in physical activity.
To identify the spillover effects of HED policies, we use three methodologies: Triple differ-
ences (DDD), Changes-in-Changes (CiC), and Difference-in-Differences (DD). We prefer
the DDD estimator over DD and CiC, because we consider that the identifying assump-
tions behind the DDD estimator are more likely to be fulfilled in our analysis, than those
for the DD and the CiC estimators. In the DDD identification strategy we exploit not
only the time series and cross-state variation, but also within-state variation. The vari-
ation within states makes possible controlling for state-specific time trends that can be
correlated with the change in HED policies. We are able to exploit the third difference
because within each state there are individuals who were exposed to the treatment and
2According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) “Health Education is a planned,
sequential, and developmentally appropriate instruction about health designed to protect, promote, and
enhance health literacy, attitudes, skills, and well-being” (Kann, Telljohann, and Wooley, 2007).
3As stated by WHO (1999), there are several reasons for promoting healthy behaviors through schools.
Schools are an efficient way to reach school-age children and their families in an organized way and students
spend a great portion of their time in schools, where education and health programs can reach them at
influential stages in their lives.
4HED in middle and high school levels is not mandatory.
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others who were not.5 The data we use is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) for the period 1999-2005, merged with data on state HED reforms from the State
School Healthy Policy Database of the National Association of State Boards of Education
(NASBE), and the 2000 and 2006 surveys of the School Health Policies and Programs
Study (SHPPS).
Our results show evidence of a positive effect of HED received by children in elementary
schools on their fathers’ probability of engaging in physical activity. Introducing major
reforms in HED in elementary schools makes a father exposed to this policy between 6.3
and 13.7 percentage points more likely to be physically active than a comparable father
not affected by the policy. We do not find concluding evidence that the policy under
analysis affects the decision of mothers to engage in physical activity.
We explore other heterogeneous impacts of HED reforms along dimensions such as the
education and income levels of parents, their type of employment (blue or white collar,
etc.) and labor supply (labor force participation, and part versus full time work), and the
gender of the children affected by the policy. The impacts are found to be larger among
parents with lower levels of education, and we do not find conclusive evidence on other
regards analyzed.
We discuss a number of channels that may help to generate the indirect effects of HED
programs on parents. The evidence about heterogeneous impacts is consistent with several
mechanisms. For instance, a sort of “role modeling” in parenting may be at work, given
the differential impact found for fathers and mothers. Parents usually spend more time
with their children doing gendered activities, such as physical activity in the case of
fathers. Therefore, the promotion of healthy behaviors at school is likely to have an
effect on the behavior of fathers rather than that of mothers. A role model component
in parenting seems to be more natural in the cases of parents that share their gender
with their children (father-son, mother-daughter), but, as noted before, we do not find
evidence on this respect. On the other hand, heterogeneous impacts according to the
level of education of parents can be thought to be a consequence of an “information
sharing” channel. Less educated parents are those who can gain the most by the arrival
to the household of the new information about healthy habits. However, the larger impact
on parents with lower education can be consistent with other mechanisms as well. For
instance, given that the opportunity cost of time is lower for less educated individuals,
5We show in Section 2.3.4 that there are remarkable differences in the pre-treatment trends in the
outcomes of experimental versus non-experimental states, indicating that the implementation of HED
policies is correlated with the behavior of the outcome of interest, which makes the use of a DDD
estimator crucial here, while invalidates the DD estimator.
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they are precisely those more willing to substitute away hours of work by more time spent
in physical activity. Nonetheless, we do not find evidence of this type of substitution
effect, neither in the extensive nor in the intensive margin of labor supply (hours worked
or labor force participation).
Also, we perform a number of robustness checks that include the use of different identi-
fication strategies (CiC and DD), and alternative definitions of the control group. In all
cases, we show that results are robust.
This work is related to two strands of literature. First, to the literature on policy evalua-
tion trying to measure the spillover effects of policy interventions on non-targeted individ-
uals, also known as Indirect Treatment Effects (ITE). There is a small number of works
in the economic literature assessing the existence of spillovers on non-targeted individuals
within the household that present reliable results by using neat identification methodolo-
gies. One example is Bhattacharya, Currie, and Haider (2006), who analyze the effects
of the School Breakfast Program (SBP) in the US on not only targeted children but also
on adult (non-targeted) family members. They find that the SBP improves the quality of
diets even for family members who were not directly exposed to the program. The expla-
nation for family spillover effects in this work is that the particular program reduces family
budgetary constraints, freeing resources that may be redirected towards other household
members. In contrast, we explore family spillovers occurring for non-budgetary reasons.6,7
The second strand of literature related to our work consists of recent research evaluating
the direct impact of particular aspects of health education at the school level on students’
health outcomes and behaviors. Cawley, Meyerhoefer, and Newhouse (2007) find positive
effects of physical education requirements on the amount of time high school students
engage in physical exercise, although they do not find any impact on Body Mass Index
(BMI) or the probability of students being overweight. Cawley, Frisvold, and Meyerhoefer
(2012) find that physical education in elementary school lowers BMI z-score and reduces
the probability of obesity among 5th graders (in particular, boys). Also, McGeary (2009)
assesses the effects of state-level nutrition education program funding on the BMI, the
probability of obesity, and the probability of above normal weight. Her results suggest
6Harre and Coveney (2000) and Nandha and Krishnamoorthy (2007) analyze two interventions explic-
itly designed to induce school-age children to affect their families and other community members’ health
behaviors. Regrettably, neither of these case studies is able to state causality since the interventions were
not randomly assigned and affected few individuals.
7There are also some works in this literature evaluating external effects at the community level instead
of the family level. Some examples are Angelucci and Giorgi (2009), Lalive and Cattaneo (2006), and
Miguel and Kremer (2004).
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that this funding is associated with reductions in BMI and in the probability of an indi-
vidual having an above-normal BMI. Moreover, Dupas (2011) finds that sexual education
reduced the incidence of teen pregnancy in a randomized controlled trial in Kenya.8 Even
though there is evidence indicating that HED does have direct effects on children, this is
not necessarily required to generate indirect effects, given that some of the mechanisms
explored in this paper (see Section 2.4.2) can be present in absence of such direct effects
on children.
The existence of spillovers of HED on parents’ lifestyles indicates that the interaction
between children and parents plays a role in the formation of healthy lifestyles within the
household, which must be taken into account to properly design policy interventions aimed
at increasing the adoption of healthy lifestyles in a given community. Although we are not
able to rule out the existence of many mechanisms driving the spillovers, we do provide
suggestive evidence about the presence of a number of them and leave the question open
for future research that can be conducted in experimental or quasi-experimental setups.
2.2 Health Education Policies in the US
In the 1970s and 80s, research studies showed that healthy kids did better in school and
scored higher on achievement tests. As a consequence, some states started to develop and
implement HED programs in public schools. In the 1990s, many educators called for the
creation of a set of national health education standards that states could use as a template.
In 1995, the National Committee for Health Education Standards created national health
education standards with K-12 benchmarks covering several content areas of health. In
1998, the Congress urged the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to “ex-
pand its support of coordinated health education programs in schools” (Wyatt and Novak,
2000).
As Kahn, Ramsey, Brownson, Heath, Howze, Powell, Stone, Rajab, and Corso (2002)
explain, “HED classes that provide information and skills related to decision making are
usually multicomponent, with the curriculum typically addressing physical activity, nutri-
tion, smoking, and cardiovascular disease. HED classes are designed to affect behavior
8Also, Kahn, Ramsey, Brownson, Heath, Howze, Powell, Stone, Rajab, and Corso (2002), Salmon,
Booth, Phongsavan, Murphy, and Timperio (2007) and van Sluijs, McMinn, and Griffin (2007) summarize
the results of several interventions aimed at evaluating the effectiveness of HED programs in changing
children’s physical activity, and they all conclude that the interventions reviewed provide inconclusive
evidence because of various limitations regarding the validity of the randomization procedures, the short
duration of follow-ups, the lack of precision of the physical activity outcome measures, etc.
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change through personal and behavioral factors that provide students with the skills they
need for rational decision making”.
State HED programs are typically characterized by two dimensions. The first is the
health education curricula indicating the health related topics schools are required to
teach. Panel A of Table 2.1 lists the topics included as potential HED requirements. We
focus in these five topics because all of them may affect the knowledge about the benefits
of being physically active. The second dimension is specific regulations to guarantee and
strengthen the effective and coordinated implementation of health education in schools.
We broadly refer to these regulations as enforcements. Panel B of Table 2.1 describes the
three specific state requirements enforcing HED we focus on.9
Table 2.1: HED Programs
A) Curricula: Topics covered
1) Alcohol- or Other Drug-Use Prevention
2) Emotional and Mental Health
3) Nutrition and Dietary Behavior
4) Physical Activity and Fitness
5) Tobacco-Use Prevention
B) Enforcements
1) State requires districts or schools to follow national or state
health education standards or guidelines
2) State requires students in elementary school to be tested
on health topics
3) State requires each school to have a HED coordinator
In the period 1994 and 1999 school health policies at the state level generally remained
unchanged, but important changes were detected between 1999 and 2005 (Kann, Brener,
and Allensworth (2001) and Kann, Telljohann, and Wooley (2007)). During this period,
states either implemented HED programs for the first time or expanded one or both
dimensions of pre-existing programs.
9 The full list of potential topics and enforcements that can be required are shown in Table B.6 in
Appendix B.
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2.2.1 Databases for HED programs: NASBE and SHPPS
The information we use to define which states have HED programs and the degree of
development of such programs -i.e., which topics were required and which enforcements
were mandatory at different points in time- comes from two complementary sources: the
NASBE State School Health Policy Database and the School Health Policies and Programs
Study (SHPPS).
The NASBE Database is a comprehensive set of laws and policies related to health issues
at schools of all states in the US. It began in 1998 and is maintained with support from
the Division of Adolescent and School Health (DASH) of the CDC. The database contains
brief descriptions of laws, legal codes, rules, regulations, administrative orders, mandates,
standards, resolutions, and other written means of exercising authority. While author-
itative binding policies are the primary focus of the database, it also includes guidance
documents and other non-binding materials that provide a detailed picture of a state’s
school health policies and activities.
The NASBE Database was designed to build upon the SHPPS, conducted by the CDC
every 6 years since 1994. SHPPS is a nationwide survey that gathers detailed and com-
parable information about the characteristics of HED programs at the state level across
elementary, middle, and high schools. While SHPPS collects state policy information by
means of survey questionnaires that are completed by state education agency personnel,
the NASBE Database provides the legal support for the policies reported in SHPPS.
The information of the year in which the reforms were implemented is incomplete in
the NASBE Database and non-existent in the SHPPS. However, using the information
provided by both sources we can recover the characteristics of the existing HED program
in each state in 1999 and 2005. With this information we classified each state as either an
“Experimental State”, if the state changed the HED program between 1999 and 2005, or
as a “Non-Experimental State”, if no changes were introduced in the state HED program
during the period. Tables B.7 and B.8 in Appendix B give a detailed description of HED
programs in all states in 1999 and 2005.
In the NASBE Database and in the SHPPS surveys we found that HED policies across
states are highly heterogeneous, not only in terms of whether the state has implemented
a HED program, but also regarding the scope and effectiveness in the implementation of
such programs. Accordingly, we divided the non-experimental and experimental states
into several groups. The non-experimental states are those states that did not change
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their HED policies between 1999 and 2005. We classified the non-experimental states into
two groups: (1) States without HED programs in 1999 and 2005; (2) States with HED
programs implemented by 1999, and without changes in 2005. We name these groups S1
and S2, respectively.
The experimental states are those that introduced some HED reforms between 1999 and
2005. There are three types of treatments that define three types of experimental states.
Group S3 are states that, while having some topics in their HED curricula in 1999, did not
introduce changes in those topics by 2005, but introduced some reforms in enforcements.
Group S4 are states that, while having some topics required in 1999, increased the number
of topics required by 2005, without introducing changes in enforcements. These two
policies involve only minor changes in the already implemented HED programs, so in
what follows we refer to these groups of states as “Moderate changes A” and “Moderate
changes B”, respectively. Finally, we include in the group S5 those states that for the
first time introduced required topics at state level in their HED programs by 2005. We
refer to group S5 as “Major changes” group. In S5 there are states like Arkansas and
Florida which introduced topics for the first time by 2005, New Mexico and Wyoming
which introduced topics as mandatory by 2005 and simultaneously strengthened their
HED policies by introducing new enforcements. Also, group S5 includes Texas which by
the academic year 2001/2002 implemented a coordinated HED program, and in 2004 the
State Board of Education required all public schools in the state to have all HED topics
in curriculum.
2.3 Identification Strategy and Data
Our goal is to identify the spillover effects of elementary school HED policies implemented
in certain states (the “experimental states”) on the behavior of parents of elementary
school-age children (the treatment group). Identifying this effect requires, as stated in
Gruber (1994), controlling for any systematic shocks to the parents’ outcome behavior
in the experimental states that are correlated with, but not due to, changes in HED
policies. To do so, we use a “differences-in-differences-in-differences” (DDD) approach
that allows us to exploit the variation of HED policies across time (time dimension),
across states (geographical dimension), and across different groups of individuals residing
in the same state (individual dimension). That is, we compare the treatment individuals in
experimental states to a set of control individuals in those same states and we measure the
change in the treatments’ relative outcome, relative to those in states that did not change
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HED policies. The identifying assumption requires that there is no contemporaneous
shock affecting the relative outcome of the treatment group in the same state-year as the
change in the HED policy.
We use a DDD identification strategy instead of the more commonly used “difference-in-
differences” (DD) because it does not require the common trend assumption for treatment
and control groups. We consider that this assumption will most likely be violated given
the characteristics of the policy we are analyzing. In particular, the DD estimator of the
spillover effects of HED policies on parents will be biased if the states that increased their
HED requirements between 1999 and 2005 were those where health indicators and health
habits were deteriorating more rapidly. Section 2.3.4 provides evidence supporting this
hypothesis.
The population under analysis includes adults who have children aged 22 years old or
younger living with them. Let yit be the outcome of interest for individual i at time t.
Our model specification, that allows for different types of treatment, is
yit = β0 + β1τt + β2elemi +
5∑
k=2
β3,kSki
+ β4(elemi × τt) +
5∑
k=2
β5,k(Ski × τt) +
5∑
k=2
β6,k(elemi × Ski)
+
5∑
k=3
β7,k(τt × elemi × Ski) + β8Xit + uit,
(2.1)
where i = 1...N indexes individuals, and t = 0, 1 indexes time (0=before the policy change,
1999; 1=after the policy change, 2005). τt is a dummy variable, equal to one in 2005,
capturing a nationwide time trend in the outcome; elemi is a dummy variable that takes
the value one if individual i has at least one child of elementary-school-age, reflecting a
group fixed effect; and Ski is a dummy variable equal to one if individual i resides in the
group of states k = 2, .., 5, which allows for group-of-state fixed effect. The experimental
states are k = 3, 4, 5. Xit is a set of observable individual characteristics including age,
race, marital status, number of children, children of high-school-age, education level,
employment status, full-time/part-time employment, per-capita family labor income, and
state dummies. The model allows for differential time trends: (1) between parents of
elementary school-age children versus parents of children of other ages, captured by the
interaction (elemi × τt) and (2) between individuals living in different groups of states,
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captured by the interactions (Ski × τt), for k = 2, .., 5. Since parents of elementary
school-age children in a given group of states may have a different outcome than parents
of children below and above elementary school age living in the same group of states,
we include the interactions (elemi × Ski), for k = 2, .., 5. Finally, the triple interaction
(τt × elemi × Ski) is equal to one only for treated individuals in experimental states
k = 3, 4, 5, in the post-treatment period. The average treatment effect of HED reforms
on the treated in group of states k = 3, 4, 5 are given by the β7k parameters, respectively.
We call these effects Indirect Average Treatment effects on the Treated, IATT, since we
are estimating the indirect effects of HED policies.
2.3.1 Database
We analyze the impact of HED policies on the behavior of adults who have children attend-
ing elementary school using data from two sources. We complement the information on
HED policies obtained from the NASBE Database and the SHPPS, with the information
on individuals obtained from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of individuals in the US
(men, women, and children) and the family units in which they reside. In 1999, the PSID
started gathering more detailed information on health status and health behaviors. We
concentrate on the indirect effect of HED policies on levels of physical activity, which is
reported in this survey.
We base our analysis on the PSID survey years 1999 and 2005, using 1999 as the pre-
reform period. We use these two waves as two repeated cross-sections, rather than as a
panel. Our final sample consists of 11,026 observations that include parents of children
aged 22 years old or younger living with them, who participated in the 1999 and/or 2005
PSID.
Besides the PSID, there are other household and individual surveys containing information
about health lifestyles. However, these surveys do not include all the variables we require
to conduct our analysis for the years in which we can identify HED policy changes.10
10In the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the National Health and Nutrition Examination
Survey (NHANES) the public-use data files do not include the state identifiers. In the Behavioral Risk
Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) the information on the age of children is incomplete. Finally, there
are important limitations in the information about adult’s physical activity recorded in the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).
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In our setting, treated individuals, those exposed to changes in HED policies, are adults
who reside in an experimental state, and who have elementary school-age children (6-
10). The PSID does not provide information on whether a child is attending elementary
school. However, it provides information on the age of children, allowing us to determine
if individuals have school-age children.
The control group consists of individuals who were unaffected by changes in state HED
requirements; it includes adults who have elementary school-age children (6-10) living in
states that did not change HED policies (S1 and S2 groups). Furthermore, to control
for possible correlation of state HED policies with unmeasured state trends in health
and health behaviors, we use a sample of adults who have children living with them but
not of elementary school-age as a within-state comparison group. We group the non-
treated individuals in three different control groups. We include in the Treatment-Non-
Experimental group (Control 1) individuals with elementary school-age children residing
in non-experimental states. The Control-Experimental group (Control 2) includes individ-
uals with children not of elementary school-age residing in experimental states. Finally,
in the Control-Non-Experimental group (Control 3) we include individuals with children
above and below elementary school age residing in non-experimental states.
The information available in the NASBE database and SHPPS surveys regarding HED
in the District of Columbia, Minnesota, and New Hampshire was not conclusive, so we
could not classify these states and, consequently do not include them in our sample. Table
2.2 presents the aforementioned state classifications and the sample sizes for the states
included in the sample.11
Table 2.2: States classification by changes in HED requirements between 1999 and 2005.
Group Type of policy Num. of Num. of
states Obs.
Non- S1 Does not have HED in ’99 and ’05 5 825
Experimental S2 Existing HED in ’99 23 6,602
remains unchanged in ’05
S3 Moderate changes A 6 1,095
Experimental S4 Moderate changes B 7 1,193
S5 Major changes 5 1,311
Total 46 11,026
Source: NASBE State School Health Policy Database, SHPSS surveys, and PSID database. The
number of observations is the number of individuals in each group of states.
11The complete list of states in each group, and the number of observations in each state are reported
in Table B.9 in Appendix B.
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2.3.2 The outcome variable
Our outcome variable is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the individual
does light physical activity at least once a week and zero otherwise.12 Although other
measures of intensity of physical activity can be relevant from a medical point of view
-like the exact amount of time spent doing physical activity- we restrict our analysis to
this other margin -physically active versus physically inactive individuals- since the PSID
does not ask about the exact time spent each time individuals do physical activity.13
Also, it is worth mentioning that the margin physical activity-inactivity is often cited as
very important from a health policy perspective, since many of the risk factors associated
to chronic diseases are directly linked to physical inactivity or sedentary habits (WHO,
2003).
The two graphs in the left panel in Figure 2.1 show the proportion of physically active
individuals by gender in 1999 and 2005 for the treated and control groups. We observe a
downward trend in all groups for both genders. In particular for the treated groups, the
proportion of physically active individuals goes down by 7 percentage points for males,
and by 12 percentage points for females. This simple Before-After estimator tells us that
HED policies have had a negative impact on the outcome of interest. However, these
estimates are obviously biased given that the average of the outcome variable in the three
control groups also has a downward trend.
Exploring gender differences, we can see that females in the Treatment-Experimental
group (Treated) present a larger drop in the proportion of physically active individuals
than that observed for males in the same group. This suggests the need to take gender
differences into account when estimating the effect of HED policies.
12PSID respondents are asked about their physical activity habits through two questions, the first
about how often they do light physical activity (number of times) and the second whether this frequency
is daily, weekly, monthly or annual. The exact wording of the questions is reported in Appendix B.
13The American College of Sports Medicine and the American Heart Association recommends a mini-
mum of 150 minutes per week of light physical activity to promote and maintain health. This moderate-
intensity aerobic activity can be accumulated from bouts lasting 10 or more minutes (Haskell, Lee, Pate,
Powell, Blair, Frankli, Macera, Heath, Thomson, and Bauman, 2007). Even though changes around this
margin of minutes would be very interesting to be analyzed, with our dataset we could at most compute
the number of times per week individuals report doing physical activity and not the total amount of time
spent.
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Figure 2.1: Proportion of physically active individuals by treated/control groups (left
panel), and treated individuals by treatment groups (right panel), and by gender, in 1999
and 2005.
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Notes: Treated: individuals with elementary school-age children in experimental states. Control 1:
individuals with elementary school-age children in non-experimental states. Control 2: individuals with-
out elementary school-age children in experimental states. Control 3: individuals without elementary
school-age children in non-experimental states. The type of policies corresponding to the groups of states
Sk are as follows. S3: Moderate changes A; S4: Moderate changes B; S5: Major changes. Source: PSID.
As discussed above, the implementation and modification of HED policies between 1999
and 2005 were not homogeneous across states. Therefore, we can expect differences in
the temporal evolution of the outcome of interest for treated individuals across the three
groups of experimental states. The two graphs in the right panel in Figure 2.1 show the
proportion of physically active treated individuals, by gender and by group of experimental
states. In the first graph we see that in states belonging to group S5, the states that
introduced major HED changes, the downward trend in the proportion of physically active
males is substantially smaller than the corresponding downward trend in groups S3 and
S4, the groups of states that introduced moderate HED changes. Moreover, the reduction
in the proportion of physically active males in the group S5 is lower than the fall in all
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three control groups. This relatively moderate downward trend for treated males in S5
experimental states suggests a positive effect of HED policies on the outcome variable,
although it does not seem to be the case for females.
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
In Table 2.3 we report average values and standard errors of the outcome variable, and
other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for treated and control individuals
in 1999 and 2005.
For each group, we find evidence of statistically significant differences in some observable
characteristics between 1999 and 2005, although most of these differences vanished when
we compute differences in trends between treated and control individuals (reported in col-
umn (7)). These differences may produce changes in the observed proportion of physically
active individuals between 1999 and 2005 that are not a consequence of changes in HED
programs. Hence, to avoid a biased estimation of the effect of interest, in the specification
in equation 2.1 we control for observable individual characteristics. Additionally, given
the existence of different time trends on the frequency of light physical activity between
females and males (Figure 2.1), we interact the whole model in equation 2.1 -except for
the vector Xit- with a gender dummy.
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics: All individuals in the sample.
Treated individuals Control individuals Control vs
1999 2005 Difference 1999 2005 Difference Treated
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)=(6)-(3)
Proportion of physically active 0.90 0.80 -0.10*** 0.90 0.80 -0.10*** 0.00
parents (0.30) (0.40) (0.30) (0.40)
Frequency of light physical 4.32 3.81 -0.52*** 4.38 3.76 -0.62*** -0.10
activity (times per week) (3.07) (3.25) (3.09) (3.23)
Female 0.56 0.57 0.01 0.56 0.57 0.01 -0.00
(0.50) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Age 36.13 36.11 -0.02 37.21 38.82 1.62*** 1.63***
(6.37) (6.93) (8.29) (9.61)
Years of Education completed 13.01 13.23 0.22* 12.79 13.01 0.22*** -0.00
(2.36) (2.24) (2.75) (2.52)
Num. of Children 2.65 2.59 -0.06 2.34 2.30 -0.03 0.02
(1.36) (1.26) (1.25) (1.21)
Num. of Children of 1.25 1.29 0.03 0.45 0.33 -0.13*** -0.16***
elementary school-age (0.50) (0.52) (0.72) (0.61)
White 0.53 0.51 -0.02 0.56 0.53 -0.03*** -0.01
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Married 0.77 0.75 -0.02 0.78 0.76 -0.02** -0.00
(0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43)
Unemployed 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.01** 0.02
(0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.20)
Retired 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Disabled 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01*** 0.01
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Full time workers 0.73 0.71 -0.03 0.76 0.73 -0.03*** -0.01
(0.44) (0.46) (0.42) (0.44)
Family income 17,109 24,966 7,857 18,778 20,707 1,929*** -5,928
per capita (20,929) (192,026) (22,019) (29,287)
Sample size 699 685 4,280 5,362
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses below the corresponding average or proportion. Stars in columns (3) and (6) show statistical significance of differences in mean
(continuous variables and variables with more than 12 categories) or proportion (dummy variables) of the referred variable, between years 1999 and 2005. Stars in column (7) show
statistical significance of differences in mean. Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
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To confirm the existence of a close relationship between individuals’ health status, and
the practice of physical activity, we looked at correlations between different measures
of health status and whether the individual does light physical activity, using the PSID
dataset.14 As expected, we found negative and statistically significant correlations between
the probability of having some health conditions, such us having suffered a stroke, and
having hypertension, diabetes, and emotional related illnesses. We also found that being
physically active is positively correlated with reporting a better self reported health status,
and negatively correlated with the body mass index.15
2.3.4 Pre-treatment trends in experimental and non experimen-
tal states
To explore the possibility that the DD common trends assumption absent the policy
is not satisfied, we analyze the pre-treatment trends (1994-1998) of health indicators of
adults with children under 18 years old in experimental and non-experimental states using
data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).16 As shown in Table
2.4, the proportion of individuals at risk because of overweight or obesity has increased
more rapidly in experimental states than in non-experimental states. As well, between
1994 and 1998 the proportion of individuals with sedentary lifestyles has increased more
in experimental than in non-experimental states. Therefore, the different trends in the
outcomes of experimental versus non-experimental states indicate that the implementation
of HED policies is correlated with the evolution of the outcome of interest, which makes
the use of a DDD estimator crucial here.
14We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting the inclusion of this empirical evidence to
enhance the motivation of the paper.
15A complete report of correlations and statistical significance can be found in Table B.2 in Appendix
B.
16BRFSS is also a nationally representative survey designed to measure behavioral risk factors in the
adult population. Note that we made use of this other dataset to evaluate the pre-treatment trends
because the PSID does not contain information on health behaviors for this period of time. Additionally,
we only consider adults with children under 18 given that is the only information available about age of
children living with them, that is, we cannot identify parents with children between 18 and 22 years old
as we do in PSID.
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Table 2.4: Lack of common trends between experimental and non-experimental states.
Year Obesity 1 (%) Obesity 2 (%) Sedentary lifestyle (%)
Non-exper. Exper. Non-exper. Exper. Non-exper. Exper.
states states states states states states
1994 33,1 32,8 28,3 28,4 59,5 56,9
(22824) (13693) (22824) (13693) (22824) (13693)
1996 35,7 35,6 30,7 31,5 59,0 59,4
(24612) (16470) (24612) (16470) (24612) (16470)
1998 36,9 39,8 32,4 34,9 57,0 59,1
(29052) (20767) (29052) (20767) (29052) (20767)
Var. % 11,6% 21,3% 14,4% 22,7% -4,2% 4,0%
(’94-’98)
Source: BRFSS 1994, 1996, and 1998. Sample sizes in parentheses. Definitions: Obesity 1 (%):
Percentage of population (with children under 18 years old) at risk for obesity (greater than 120% of
weight for height percent median). Obesity 2 (%): Percentage of population (with children under
18 years old) at risk for overweight based on BMI. At risk defined as: >27.8 for males and >27.3 for
females. Sedentary lifestyle (%): Percentage of population (with children under 18 years old) at
risk for sedentary lifestyle (sedentary or irregular physical activity profile).
2.4 Indirect Treatment Effects
Table B.1 shows the IATT estimates for the three types of treatment, by gender, ob-
tained using a linear probability model (column 1 to 4) and a probit model (columns 5
to 8).17 Marginal effects for probit models are obtained using the methodology proposed
by Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Reenen (2004).18 The “DDD” columns present the IATT
estimates obtained with the triple difference estimator defined in equation 2.1. The “DD”
columns present the IATT estimates obtained with a difference-in-difference identification
strategy. In this case, we compare parents of children in elementary school in experimen-
tal states before and after of the policy change, and we use as control group parents of
children in elementary school in non-experimental states.
17Estimates for the probit DDD model are reported in Table B.3 in Appendix B.
18The methodology of Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Reenen (2004) for the case of the DDD estimator
is derived in Appendix B. We thank a referee for suggesting this methodology for the identification and
computation of marginal effects in non-linear setups.
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Table 2.5: IATT by type of treatment and gender.
Group of Linear Probability Model Probit
experimental Male Female Male Female
states DD DDD DD DDD DD DDD DD DDD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
S3: Moderate -0.021 -0.012 -0.018 -0.054 -0.035 -0.043 0.010 -0.049
changes A (0.032) (0.049) (0.058) (0.059) (0.051) (0.059) (0.067) (0.104)
[0.521] [0.802] [0.751] [0.365] [0.490] [0.460] [0.876] [0.638]
S4: Moderate -0.002 -0.021 0.046 0.000 -0.024 -0.048 0.074 0.012
changes B (0.047) (0.073) (0.045) (0.089) (0.060) (0.088) (0.073) (0.118)
[0.971] [0.780] [0.317] [0.999] [0.692] [0.587] [0.310] [0.918]
S5: Major 0.063 0.085 -0.028 -0.076 0.098 0.137 -0.060 -0.107
changes (0.026) (0.043) (0.050) (0.048) (0.023) (0.035) (0.072) (0.064)
[0.021] [0.056] [0.581] [0.121] [0.005] [0.057] [0.398] [0.095]
Notes: Each entry reports marginal effect of the corresponding treatment. Robust standard errors
reported in parenthesis are clustered at the state level (analytic standard errors for Linear Probability
Models, and bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000 replicas for Probit models). P-values reported
in brackets. Sample size for DD estimators: 4,196. Sample size for DDD estimators: 11,026. All
regressions include the following covariates: age, age squared, race, gender, marital status, number
of children, children of high school-age, years of education and its square, employment status, full-
time/part-time employment, log of family income per capita, and state fixed effects.
The DD estimate shows that the change in the HED program in the S5 group of states
increases the probability of fathers doing physical activity by 6.3 or 9.8 percentage points,
depending on the model considered (Columns 1 and 5). Since the DD estimator is likely
to be downward biased, this estimate is a lower bound of the real effect under analysis.
Using the DDD estimator we find evidence that the effect for fathers affected by this
policy is slightly higher, reaching 8.5 or 13.7 percentage points (Columns 2 and 6). The
effect on the probability of mothers engaging in light physical activity has opposite sign to
that found for fathers, but the effect is statistically significant only in one case (Column
8, with a p-value equal to 0.95). So we conclude that there is no clear evidence of the
existence of an indirect effect of HED on mothers. Contrarily to this situation, all four
estimates reported for males in the S5 group of states are statistically significant, so our
conclusion is that the policy has a clear positive effect on fathers.
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The estimated effects are not statistically significant for males and females residing in the
group of states S3 and S4. These results suggest that moderate changes in HED programs
do not have indirect effects.
Regarding the differences between estimates obtained with the DD estimators and the
DDD estimators, we found that these estimates are not statistically different. This is the
case for all treatments, gender, and linear and non-linear models.19
2.4.1 Heterogeneous effects
We provide evidence on the existence of heterogeneous effects of HED reforms according
to several socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of individuals. In all cases
described below, we compare at most two additional categories (on top of gender of
parents and treatment groups) due to sample size restrictions. For instance, we look at
differential impacts on two educational and income levels, or type of employment groups.
First, we analyze differences by educational level. We define a dummy variable that takes
the value one if the individual has 12 or more years of education (“high” education level),
and zero otherwise (“low” education level). We then estimate the linear probability model
(both the DD and the DDD specification) interacting the whole model with this dummy.
Results for the DDD specification are reported in Table 2.6.20 The effect is positive and
statistically significant for both low and high educated fathers in the group of states S5
(columns 1 and 2). The effect is higher on low educated fathers relative to high educated
fathers, and the difference is statistically significant. For mothers in S5 we find that the
difference in the effects between low and high educated individuals (column 6) is similar
as for fathers (column 3) and it is statistically significant as well, but the effect is negative
for high educated mothers (columns 5). This result is puzzling and may also be explaining
the average null effect found for mothers in Table B.1.
We also looked at heterogeneous effects along other dimensions: income levels (richest
quintile of income versus the others), employment status (workers versus non workers, and
full time workers versus part time workers), type of employment (blue collar or services
versus white collar occupations), gender of the child receiving the HED program (parents
with boys in elementary school versus parents with girls in elementary school). In none
of these cases we find statistically different effects between groups.21
19Results are available upon request.
20Results for the DD specification are reported in Table B in Appendix B.
21Results not reported, but available upon request.
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Table 2.6: IATT by type of treatment, gender and education level. Linear Probability
Model (DDD).
DDD Male DDD Female
Education Level Education Level
LOW HIGH Difference LOW HIGH Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S3: Moderate -0.119 -0.022 -0.097 -0.148 -0.041 -0.107
changes A (0.183) (0.049) (0.157) (0.166) (0.054) (0.159)
[0.517] [0.650] [0.537] [0.374] [0.443] [0.504]
S4: Moderate 0.051 -0.060 0.112 0.121 -0.012 0.133
changes B (0.325) (0.077) (0.348) (0.141) (0.085) (0.090)
[0.875] [0.431] [0.748] [0.392] [0.884] [0.139]
S5: Major 0.309 0.012 0.297 0.173 -0.124 0.297
changes (0.127) (0.042) (0.116) (0.055) (0.052) (0.065)
[0.015] [0.770] [0.010] [0.002] [0.017] [0.000]
Notes: Each entry in columns 1, 2, 4 and 5 reports marginal effect of the corresponding treatment.
Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis are clustered at the state level (analytic standard
errors). P-values reported in brackets. Sample size: 11,026. All regressions include the following
covariates: age, age squared, race, gender, marital status, number of children, children of high school-
age, years of education and its square, employment status, full-time/part-time employment, log of
family income per capita, and state fixed effects. All the models are estimated interacting the dummy
variable that takes the value 1 if the individual has 12 or more years of education and zero otherwise.
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2.4.2 Linking heterogeneous effects and plausible mechanisms
at work
We analyze the heterogeneous impacts discussed above as a way to shed some light on the
question of what mechanisms can be generating the spillovers of HED on parents. First,
the positive impact on fathers and the null average effect on mothers may be informing
about a sort of “role modeling” mechanism driving the spillovers. This hypothesis states
that parents may do more physical exercise in response to the knowledge children acquire
via HED, not because they were not already aware of the benefits of exercising but because
they want to complement the instruction received by the child so as to form the desired
healthy lifestyle in the child.22 Since parents usually spend more time with their children
doing gendered activities, the impact of HED reforms on physical activity is more likely to
appear for fathers rather than for mothers.23 However, we do not find evidence indicating
that, if exists, this “role modeling” is reinforced in same sex parent-child pairs (mother-
daughter, father-son).
On the other hand, since lower levels of education are related to less knowledge about
health (Kenkel, 1991, Tinsley, 2003), it may be that effects of HED reforms are larger for
individuals with lower levels of education, for whom there is more room for improvements
in the case of the arrival of “new” information about healthy habits. That is, a sort of “in-
formation sharing” between children and their parents may give rise to the heterogeneous
effects shown in Table 2.6. However, since the opportunity cost of time is higher for more
educated individuals, they may be less willing to substitute away work time by time spent
in doing physical activity, and, for this reason (and not due to information sharing), they
may be less inclined to increase physical activity as a result of indirect exposure to HED
reforms. Nonetheless, as noted before, we do not find evidence of this type of substitution
effect, because there is no effect of HED reforms in the extensive or intensive margins of
labor supply of parents (neither in the labor force participation nor in hours worked).
22According to the President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports “...parents can be considered
to be the “gatekeepers” of children’s physical activity in that they enable or constrain opportunities for
their children’s physical activity involvement... An important form of influence of parents on children’s
level of physical activity consists of role modeling practices,..., particularly through shared physical activity
experiences...” (Brustad, 2010).
23Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows some evidence on this respect with data from the American Time
Use Survey (ATUS). Women spend roughly twice as much time in childcare as do men, a pattern which
holds true for all subgroups and for almost all types of childcare, except for “Recreational” childcare. This
type of childcare activity includes playing games with children, playing outdoors with children, attending
a child’s sporting event or dance recital, going to the zoo with children, taking walks with children, etc.
In the case of “Recreational” childcare, mothers allocate relatively less of their time with children than
do fathers. Thus, this is evidence that fathers are more likely to do stereotypically male activities with
their children, among them physical activity.
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2.5 Robustness
2.5.1 An alternative identification strategy: Changes in Changes
(CiC) estimator
The CIC estimator introduced by Athey and Imbens (2006), generalizes the difference-in-
difference estimator under fewer assumptions for consistent estimation. In particular, the
CiC estimator is suitable when the policy change analyzed affects a group with different
characteristics (observed and/or unobserved) than the group not affected, and the ex-
pected benefit of the policy may vary across groups. In the case of HED reforms, it means
that the CiC estimator is consistent even if the policy change took place in those states
with higher incidence of obesity and lower levels of physical activity among its population.
For this reason, the CiC estimator may be an alternative to the DDD estimator presented
so far, provided that the assumptions for consistency are fulfilled. The CiC is particularly
appealing in our application since the authors developed an extension of the estimator to
deal with discrete dependent variables.24
In what follows we discuss the assumptions behind the CiC estimator in its simplest
version, that is the one without covariates.25 The crucial assumption for identification
with the CiC estimator, called the “Time Invariance Within Groups”, states that the
distribution of unobservables can vary across groups (treated vs. controls), but not over
time within groups. In our case, this assumption means that the distribution of unobserv-
ables can differ between individuals residing in experimental and non-experimental states,
something highly likely since the experimental states are those with higher proportion of
population with weight problems, and higher proportion of physically inactive population.
Additionally, the distribution of unobservables in both groups of states (experimental and
non-experimental), cannot change over time. This part of the assumption we find dif-
ficult to be fulfilled since we observe outcomes within a six years gap (1999 and 2005).
The assumption requires that the distribution of unobservables that determines whether
parents are physically active or not, let’s say in the experimental states, does not change
between 1999 and 2005. A phenomenon that is contained in those unobservables is the
aging of the individuals, whose distribution changes over time mainly because a relevant
proportion of our dataset is a panel.
24We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this methodology for the identification of ATT in non-linear
models.
25For a more formal discussion of the CiC estimator, and the use of covariates, see Appendix B.
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The CiC estimator for discrete outcomes, without further assumptions, provides bounds
for the effect of interest, rather than a point estimate. In some applications, as it is in
our case, the bounds are too broad to provide a clear conclusion on the direction of the
effect of a policy change. One of the alternatives proposed by Athey and Imbens (2006) to
narrow the bounds is to impose a conditional independence assumption. One example in
which the assumption holds is if the distribution of unobservables for individuals who are
physically active in 1999, and reside in the experimental states, is equal to the distribution
of unobservables for individuals who are physically active in 1999, and reside in the non-
experimental states.
Summing up, we consider that for the policy under analysis the identifying assumption of
the CiC estimator (under conditional independence) is less likely to be fulfilled than the
identifying assumption of the DDD estimator. However, we accept that the assumptions
behind the CiC estimator are more likely to hold than those of the DD estimator. For this
reason, in Table 2.7, we present and compare the IATT for the three estimators, using
non-linear models and no covariates.
Reassuringly, the conclusions we can make on the indirect effect of HED programs are
consistent across the three estimators: there is a positive and significant effect of major
changes in HED programs on fathers of children of elementary-school age, while mothers
seem not to be affected by such policy reforms. Significant HED reforms increase fathers’
probability of doing physical activity between 7.2 and 13.4 percentage points, depending
on the estimator chosen. In general, the CiC estimates are quantitatively smaller than
the DD and DDD comparable estimates. Note that the CiC estimates are closer to the
DD estimates than DDD estimates. This might be because CiC and DD assumptions are
more similar than DDD assumptions.
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Table 2.7: IATT by type of treatment and gender. DD, CiC, and DDD estimators (non-
linear models without covariates).
Group of Male Female
experimental DD CiC DDD DD CiC DDD
states (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S3: Moderate -0.029 -0.020 -0.042 0.003 -0.023 -0.057
changes A (0.053) (0.032) ( 0.059) (0.066) (0.067) (0.104)
[0.584] [0.539] [0.478] [0.960] [0.737] [ 0.587]
S4: Moderate -0.030 -0.011 -0.047 0.075 0.036 0.016
changes B ( 0.059) (0.062) (0.087) (0.072) (0.042) (0.117)
[0.615] [0.865] [0.590] [0.297] [0.389] [0.895]
S5: Major 0.100 0.072 0.134 -0.052 -0.040 -0.102
changes (0.036) (0.019) ( 0.071) (0.072) (0.040) (0.067)
[ 0.005] [0.000] [0.059] [0.474] [0.313] [0.125]
Notes: Each entry reports marginal effect of the corresponding treatment. No covariates in all models.
Bootstrap robust standard errors clustered at state level (1,000 replicas). DD and CiC estimators
computed using only sample of parents with children of elementary school age. The CiC estimators
corresponds to the average treatment effect on the treated. For the CiC we ran separated estimations
for female and males, and by treatment (S3, S4, S5). DD and CiC sample sizes: 1,819 males and
2,401 females. DDD sample sizes: 6,198 females and 4,828 males. To compute CiC estimators we use
the MATLAB code written by Prof. Susan Athey and available in her webpage.
2.5.2 Other robustness checks
To determine whether our results are sensitive to the definition of the within-state control
group, we perform two tests. First, we consider only parents with at least one child
below elementary-school-age (parents with children below 6 years old) and we drop from
the within-state control group those parents with children above elementary-school age.
The marginal effects of the three treatments estimated from a linear probability model are
reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.8. Second, we consider only parents with at least
one child above elementary-school-age (parents with children above 10 years old) and we
drop from the within-state control group parents with children below elementary school
age. The marginal effects of the three treatments estimated from a linear probability
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model are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.8.26 In both exercises the estimates
of the effects of the three treatments are very similar to those obtained with the baseline
model, indicating that the results are not sensitive to the definition of the control group.
Additionally, we analyze whether our results are sensitive to the definition of the non-
experimental states. In our baseline model, the non-experimental states are both those
that never had HED (group of states S1), and those states that had HED in 1999 but
did not change its implementation between 1999 and 2005 (group of states S2). To test
whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion of S2 as non-experimental states, we
repeat the estimation keeping only S1 in this group. The results are reported in columns
(5) and (6) of Table 2.8, and the conclusions are in line to those obtained with the baseline
model. Moreover, in this specification the three treatments have a positive and higher
effect on males, although the only significant effect is still for the group of states S5,
implying that including S2 produces a downward bias in the estimates. This bias may be
generated by the fact that the states in S2 are likely to be improving their HED policies,
although this is not captured in NASBE or SHPPS databases.
Finally, the existence of movers may be a concern for the implementation of a DDD
procedure. To check the robustness of the results to this issue, we performed the estimation
dropping from the sample those individuals that have moved between states (4.3% of our
sample) and we obtained the same results as in the baseline estimation.27
26All the robustness checks performed in this section are carried out with linear models. We do not
use non-linear models because in these exercises sample sizes are smaller. Having a reduced number of
observations limits the use of the bootstrapping procedure needed to compute the standard errors of
marginal effects in non-linear models with the methodology proposed by Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and
Reenen (2004)
27Results are available upon request.
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Table 2.8: Sensitivity Analysis of control groups. IATT by type of treatment and gender.
Linear Probability Models.
Sensitivity 1 Sensitivity 2 Sensitivity 3
Control: Only parents Control: Only parents Non Experim. states: only
with kids < 6 with kids > 10 states never had HED
DDD Male DDD Female DDD Male DDD Female DDD Male DDD Female
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S3: Moderate 0.041 -0.012 -0.059 -0.088 0.138 -0.055
changes A (0.058) (0.065) (0.049) (0.061) (0.083) (0.063)
[0.485] [0.849] [0.239] [0.161] [0.111] [ 0.392]
S4: Moderate -0.097 -0.011 0.049 0.014 0.139 0.003
changes B (0.074) (0.069) (0.078) (0.098) (0.100) (0.095)
[0.196] [0.876] [0.533] [ 0.891] [0.178] [ 0.972]
S5: Major 0.084 -0.035 0.095 -0.097 0.252 -0.069
changes (0.048) (0.043) (0.048) (0.061) (0.081) (0.053)
[0.090] [0.416] [0.051] [0.122] [0.005] [ 0.206]
Notes: Each entry reports marginal effect of the corresponding treatment. Robust standard errors
reported in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. Sample size for sensitivity 1: 7,075 , Sample
size for sensitivity 2: 8,624, Sample size for sensitivity 3: 4,424. All regressions include the following
covariates: age, age squared, race, gender, marital status, number of children, children of high school-
age, years of education and its square, employment status, full-time/part-time employment, log of
family income per capita, and state fixed effects.
2.6 Conclusions
We find evidence for positive spillovers of HED imparted in elementary schools on the
probability of parents engaging in light physical activity. However, our results suggest
that fathers and, on average, not mothers are those affected by the HED reforms. We
also investigate about the existence of other heterogeneous effects, along several dimen-
sions: educational attainment and income levels of parents, employment status, type of
employment, and gender of the child receiving the HED program. We only find that
impacts of HED reforms are larger for parents with a lower educational attainment, and
find no statistically different effects for the other types of groups compared. We discuss
whether the evidence about heterogeneous effects allows to state some channels giving
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rise to spillovers of HED on parents. We conclude that this evidence seems to be consis-
tent with mechanisms of role modeling in parenting and of information sharing between
children and parents.
Also, our results highlight the importance of clearly distinguishing the existence of sev-
eral dimensions in the implementation of a policy. In our case, it is important for policy
evaluation to consider the two dimensions in HED reforms, changes in topics and enforce-
ments, as well as the distinction between “Moderate changes” and “Major changes” in
HED requirements. Our main result shows spillovers only in states that carried out deep
reforms in their HED programs.
Spillovers of HED on parents’ lifestyles indicate that the interaction between children and
parents plays a role in the formation of healthy lifestyles within the household. Therefore,
taking these spillovers into account is important in the cost-benefit analysis of health
education in schools, as well as to properly design policy interventions aimed at increasing
the adoption of healthy lifestyles.
Chapter 3
Investing in Myself?: Informality,
Occupational Choice and
Investments in Human Capital
3.1 Introduction
Countries differ greatly in their levels of schooling and also in their rates of entrepreneur-
ship. At the same time, the share of the so-called “shadow economy” -informal economic
activities- is very large in some countries and very small in others.1 This paper explores
some key channels that connect these three phenomena. In particular, it focuses on as-
sessing whether the extent to which firms can hide from tax authorities -i.e., operate in
the informal economy- may affect the incentives of individuals to invest in human capital
and also distort their occupational choices.
The cross country data shows that the levels of educational attainment, rates of en-
trepreneurship and the level of informality are connected. First, across countries there
is a positive association between rates of entrepreneurship and the sizes of the informal
sector. Second, the difference in the skill premium received by entrepreneurs and workers
is negligible for economies with low levels of informality, while it becomes positive and
increasing for more informal economies. Third, in more informal economies the fraction
of high-skilled individuals that choose to become entrepreneurs is larger. Moreover, the
1As defined in Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2011), the shadow economy is “all market-based
legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities...to avoid
paying taxes or meeting certain standards or complying with certain administrative procedures”.
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share of the labor force that is skilled and the size of the informal economy are related in a
non-linear way: for low levels of informality the share of skilled individuals first decreases
but then it rapidly stabilizes for countries with sufficiently large informal sectors.
To account for these facts, I develop an occupational choice model with human capital
investment and an informal sector. I adapt Lucas (1978) span-of-control model to a life-
cycle economy in which investments in human capital can positively affect the returns
to entrepreneurship as well as the efficiency of labor.2 In addition, the economy features
credit constraints which arise as a result of the possibility of hiding the collateral and
eluding the fiscal authority, as in Amaral and Quintin (2006).
In the model economy, every period a cohort of measure one of two-period lived agents
is born. In the first period, agents split their time between unskilled work and education
(investment in human capital). Agents are heterogeneous in their endowment of innate
ability. The production function of human capital combines ability and time spent in
education when young. In the second period, agents can supply unskilled or skilled la-
bor. They have the option of becoming entrepreneurs instead of workers, and operate a
technology that combines physical capital, skilled and unskilled labor, in which the hu-
man capital of the manager plays the role that innate ability plays in Lucas (1978). This
technology is also characterized by capital-skill complementarity.
Managers can operate in the formal or the informal sector, and in both sectors they can
self-finance part of their physical capital with savings from the first period. In addition,
managers can use part of their savings as a collateral to get loans from banks, but they can
also choose to default bearing a cost proportional to their income. Given this possibility,
there is a cost of enforcing contracts that implies that some agents will end up being credit
constrained. In the model, the higher these costs are, the larger will be the number of
managers deciding to operate in the informal sector. Therefore, higher costs of contract
enforcement is the model’s correlate of a more informal economy.
In this model, the link between informality, entrepreneurship, and human capital operates
in other dimensions as well. With high costs of enforcing contracts (high informality)
entrepreneurs only receive a limited amount of lending from banks, and therefore choose
to operate with low amounts of physical capital. Given capital-skill complementarity,
this translates into a low demand for skilled labor and into relatively low earnings for
skilled workers. As a result, in countries with high informality, workers do not have much
2Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg (2008) and Parker and Van Praag (2006) review the
evidence about the effects of education on the returns to entrepreneurship and conclude that there exists
a positive association.
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incentives to invest in skills. In contrast, the returns to education for entrepreneurs can be
high since education enhances the productivity of their operations, which can compensate
for the lack of physical capital.
Given a parametrization of this model economy that can generate an equilibrium with a
positive mass of individuals choosing each one of the six possible occupations (unskilled
workers, skilled workers, informal unskilled managers, informal skilled managers, formal
unskilled managers, and formal skilled managers), I analyze theoretically how all these
effects interact with one another when the costs of contract enforcement increase. I
conclude that the model is able to reproduce the three empirical facts mentioned above.
This work is mainly related to three strands of literature. First, it is related to the
literature studying the relationship between occupational choices and informality. In
particular, this work is close to Amaral and Quintin (2006), who construct an occupational
choice model that is able to describe how skilled and unskilled labor are competitively
assorted into formal and informal sectors, without any type of segmentation in the labor
markets. However, Amaral and Quintin (2006) do not include the possibility of investment
in managerial abilities, which is a key aspect to be considered in order to account for the
differential incentives that a higher informality implies for the investments in human
capital of managers and workers. This work is also related to the research addressing the
effects of market imperfections on occupational choices, for instance the effects of entry
costs (Antunes and Cavalcanti, 2007), of taxes on financial intermediaries (Erosa, 2001),
of other financial frictions that increase credit costs (Buera, Kaboski, and Shin, 2011), or
of size-dependent policies (Guner, Ventura, and Xu, 2008). However, none of these works
analyze human capital investments.
Second, this work is also in line with the research analyzing the interplay between edu-
cation and occupational choices, for instance Poschke (2010), Boha´cˇek (2006) or Bhat-
tacharya, Guner, and Ventura (2013). Poschke (2010) studies the relationship between
educational attainment and the prevalence of low-productivity versus high-productivity
entrepreneurship, but his model does not explicitly model human capital investments nor
does include an informal sector in order to study its impacts on the relationship between
education and entrepreneurship. On the contrary, Boha´cˇek (2006) and Bhattacharya,
Guner, and Ventura (2013) do model investments in human capital, and, of particular
interest for the present work, they model the investments for developing managerial skills
but not the one made by workers.
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Last, this paper contributes to the rich literature on cross-country differences on educa-
tional attainment (Bils and Klenow, 2000, Schoellman, 2008, Co´rdoba and Ripoll, 2009,
Hanushek and Woessmann, 2010, Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia, 2010, Hendricks,
2010) by analyzing a mechanism that produces differential incentives to investing in hu-
man capital across occupations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes in detail the empirical
facts that motivate the connection bewteen informality, occupational entrepreneurship
and education. The model economy is presented in Section 3.3. In Section 3.4 I provide
a characterization of the equilibrium choices in terms of the cutoffs for occupations and
educational levels. Section 3.5 describes what are the effects of an increase in the costs of
enforcement and links these effects to the empirical motivation. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Empirical facts
Across countries in the world, the average years of schooling for the adult population
(15+ years old) ranges from about 2 years to more than 12 years (Figure 3.1(a)). The
size of the informal economy also varies significantly (Figure 3.1(b)), ranging from 8%
of GDP for a country like the United States to 60% of GDP for a country like Bolivia
(Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro, 2011). Furthermore, Figure 3.1(c) shows that the
rate of entrepreneurship, measured as the business ownership rate, is also very dispersed
across countries.
This paper explores the connection between these three magnitudes. The main hypothesis
is that the level of informality in an economy affects individuals’ decisions about human
capital investments as well as occupational choices. Cross-country evidence reveals three
key facts in line with this hypothesis. First, the business ownership rate is positively
correlated with informality, as shown in Figures 3.2(a) and 3.2(b).3
Second, in countries with small informal sectors the Mincerian returns to education for
entrepreneurs and for workers do not differ much, but a gap widens up as the level of
informality becomes relatively high (Figure 3.3(a)). This evidence suggests that with high
informality the returns to education for entrepreneurs may be larger than for workers,
3Figures 3.2(a) and 3.2(b) only differ in the measure of informality used. The first measure (size of
the informal economy) is the share of the GDP produced in the informal sector, and it is taken from
Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2011).The second measure is the share of vulnerable employment
over total employment, according to the definition in the WDI (World Development Indicators, World
Bank).
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(a) Schooling years, 2005. Source: Barro
and Lee database.
(b) Size of the informal economy (% of
GDP), pooled years 2001-2007. Source:
Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2011).
(c) Rate of entrepreneurship, pooled years
2001-2008. Source: Global Entrepreneur-
ship Monitor (GEM) Database.
Figure 3.1: Cross-country distributions of schooling, informality, and entrepreneurship.
which is the same to say that in such economies there is a wage premium for skilled
individuals that choose to be entrepreneurs instead of salaried workers. Another piece
of similar evidence is shown in Figure 3.3(b) which, for a subset of countries (Latin
American plus United States), shows that the relationship between this wage premium
and the share of the shadow economy is specially present when we compare the wages
of skilled informal entrepreneurs to those of skilled formal workers.4 Since there exists
vast evidence suggesting that education increases the returns to entrepreneurship5, some
entrepreneurs may be more inclined to invest in education as a way to overcome the low
productivity of their businesses when informality is high (availability of credit is low).
This is as to say that managers invest in their own human capital instead of in physical
4The definition of informality used is based on the productive characteristics of the occupations,
according to which informal workers or entrepreneurs are those individuals who work in firms with less
than five employees, irrespective of whether they contribute to social security systems, which corresponds
to a more legalistic definition of informality. However, both ways of defining informality produce measures
that are very much correlated.
5Parker (2004), Hartog, Van Praag, and Van Der Sluis (2010) and Block, Hoogerheide, and Thurik
(2011) present evidence showing how education affects the returns to entrepreneurship.
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(a) Business ownership rate and the informal economy.
Sources: GEM Database and Schneider, Buehn, and
Montenegro (2011).
(b) Business ownership rate and vulnerable employ-
ment. Sources: GEM Database and WB-WDI.
Figure 3.2: Fact 1 - The rate of entrepreneurship increases with the size of the informal
economy.
capital. On the other hand, when informality is very low (and access to credit is broad)
investing in education is an attractive alternative for workers due to the relatively higher
wages paid to skilled workers.
Third, in countries with relatively large informal sectors, a larger fraction of skilled indi-
viduals choose to be entrepreneurs. This fact is shown in Table 3.1, where the mean ratio
of skilled entrepreneurs to skilled labor force is higher for countries with a larger informal
sector. Figure 3.4 presents the distributions of this ratio for countries with very low and
very high shares of the informal economy, and shows that for the former group skilled en-
trepreneurs are as frequent as skilled individuals in the labor force (distributions is highly
concentrated around the number 1, left panel), while for the latter group of countries
(right panel in Figure 3.4) this figure shows that skilled entrepreneurs are more frequent
Chapter 3. Investing in Myself?: Informality, Occupational Choice and Investments in
Human Capital 79
(a) Mincerian returns (%) to education (more than
high school) for entrepreneurs minus those returns but
for workers, as a function of the size of the informal
economy. Sources: Household surveys for 88 coun-
tries, and Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2011).
(b) Mincerian returns (tertiary education completed)
for informal entrepreneurs (less than 5 employees)
minus Mincerian returns for formal workers (in firms
with 5+ employees), as a function of the size of the in-
formal economy. Sources: SEDLAC and Gluzmann,
Jaume, and Gasparini (2011), and Schneider, Buehn,
and Montenegro (2011).
Figure 3.3: Fact 2 - Differences in skill premium (Mincerian returns) by occupations as a
function of the size of the informal economy
than skilled persons in the labor force (the distribution is biased towards numbers greater
than 1).
These facts suggest that the returns for skilled informal entrepreneurs increase with the
extent of informality in the economy (fact 2). They also suggest that not only more
business start up when informality is high (fact 1), but also that some of these business
are run by skilled individuals, generating the fact that skills are more concentrated among
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Table 3.1: Distribution of skilled individuals across occupations, for very low-informality
and very high-informality countries.
Group of countries Description Ratio: % of skilled entrepreneurs% of skilled labor force
Min Max Mean
Very low-informality Countries in the bottom 25%
of the distribution of sizes of 0.59 1.42 1.02
informal economy
Very high-informality Countries in the top 25%
of the distribution of sizes of 0.58 1.69 1.12
informal economy
Sources: GEM database and Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2011).
Figure 3.4: Fact 3 - Concentration of skills by occupation in countries with very low
or very high levels of informality. Sources: GEM Database and Schneider, Buehn, and
Montenegro (2011).
entrepreneurs the larger is the size of the informal economy (fact 3). Hence, pervasive
informality in the economy may induce some individuals to invest in human capital in
order not to become salaried workers in the formal sector, but to run their own business
probably in the informal sector. As a result of this mechanism, the share of skilled
individuals do not fall as much as it would otherwise. As shown in Figures 3.5(a) and
3.5(b), the correlation between the share of the labor force with post-secondary education
(skilled) and the size of the informal economy appears to be indeed non-linear: the share
of the skilled workforce first declines and then it rapidly stabilizes, or even raises, as the
level of informality increases.
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(a) Years of schooling and Informal Economy. Sources:
World Bank EdStats and Schneider, Buehn, and Mon-
tenegro (2011).
(b) Education and Vulnerable Employment. Sources:
World Bank EdStats and World Bank WDI.
Figure 3.5: Educational attainment of the labor force and the size of the informal sector.
3.3 The Economy
Consider the following model populated by agents who live for two peirods. The time is
discrete and every period a new cohort of measure one of two-period lived agents is born.
Agents are heterogeneous in their endowment of innate ability, denoted by z ∈ [0, 1],
which is distributed according to Γ(z). There are three factors of production: skilled and
unskilled labor -ls and lu, that receive salaries ws and wu in competitive labor markets-
and capital k.
Each individual is endowed with one unit of time that can be offered in the market for
unskilled workers, both when young and when old. In the first period, agents can also split
their unit of time between unskilled work and education (investment in human capital).
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I denote by te ∈ {tUe , tSe }, with tUe < tSe , the fraction of time devoted to education when
young. To simplify notation, and as a normalization, I let tUe = 0, while 0 < t
S
e ≤ 1
represents the fraction of one model-period that needs to be allocated to the formation
of skills.6 That is, (1 − tSe ) is the quantity of unskilled labor supplied by a young agent
that decided to invest in human capital. Next period this individual will have z˜ units of
human capital, which is formed according to
z˜ = z˜(te, z) = z
θ( 1
θ
−te), (3.1)
where 0 < θ < 1
tSe
is a parameter that guarantees that this technology is: increasing in
z and te; concave in z; z˜(0, z) = z and z˜(te, 0) = 0, ∀z and ∀te; and bounded such that
z˜ ∈ [0, 1].7
In the second period, agents can be workers or become entrepreneurs (managers), and
their amount of human capital z˜ can then be allocated to two alternative uses: managerial
ability, denoted by m, or units of skilled labor, ls. The agent that did not invest in skills
when young and continues as a worker when old supplies her unit of labor lu = 1 in the
unskilled labor market in the second period of her life, as she did in the first one.
All production is carried out by entrepreneurs, who operate a technology
y = mγF (k, lu, ls)
1−γ, (3.2)
that exhibits capital-skill complementarity, and in which F (k, lu, ls) has constant returns
to scale.8 The share of the profits that goes to the manager is γ. Capital depreciates
entirely from one period to the next.
There can be unskilled managers (with m = z, because they had chosen te = 0) as well
as skilled ones (with m = zθ(
1
θ
−te) > z ∀z, because they chose te = tSe when young). The
interpretation of these modeling choices indicates that managerial ability can be increased
by investing time in education, and that innate ability z also intervenes in its formation.
Moreover, managerial ability increases the productivity of the firm.9
6For instance, for a model economy with a period-length of 20 years (in which agents are born at age
20) the value tSe can be set to 1/4, which is the average time invested in post-secondary education (5
years).
7As described next, investing in skills in the first period is costly not only due to the forgone income
when young, but also due to a direct cost c per unit of time spent to education.
8For instance, the production technology can take the form of a nested CES with perfect capital-skill
complementarity: y = mγF (k, lu, ls)
1−γ = mγ [min{bls, k}]α(1−γ)l(1−α)(1−γ)u .
9Evidence supporting this assumption can be found in Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg
(2008).
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The entrepreneurs (or managers) can act in the formal or the informal sector of the
economy. In both sectors managers can self-finance part of the physical capital with
savings from the first period, but they can also borrow money from a financial intermediary
in order to rent the capital they need to run their businesses. In the formal sector, profits
are taxed at τ > 0.10 In the informal sector, managers do not pay taxes. The financial
intermediary lends at rate r, which is exogenously given, and formal managers can choose
to default bearing a cost proportional to their income (η). Informal managers can easily
hide any collateral from the intermediary, that is, they do not face a cost η in case of
defaulting. Preferences are such that U(c1, c2) = logc1 + βlogc2, where β ∈ (0, 1) and
β(1 + r) ≤ 1.
For a given level of managerial ability m, and a given demand for capital k, the profits of
entrepreneurs before paying taxes are
Π(k,m) = max
lu,ls≥0
mγF (k, lu, ls)
1−γ − (1 + r)k − wsls − wulu.
In a world with perfect contract enforcement (η = 1) formal managers would employ the
uniquely defined optimal level of physical capital k∗(m) = arg maxk≥0 Π(k,m). However,
here managers have the option to default and credit contracts must be self-enforcing (as
in Amaral and Quintin, 2006). Therefore, the net profits of managers are
W (a,m; η, τ) = max
s≤a,d≥0
(1− τ)Π(s+ d,m) (3.3)
s.t. (1− τ)Π(s+ d,m) + a(1 + r) ≥ (1− η)(1− τ)[Π(s+ d,m) + (s+ d)(1 + r)]
+ (a− s)(1 + r),
where d is the loan obtained from the financial intermediary and s is the collateral used
to obtain that loan, which has to be lower than the savings from the first period (a). The
solution to this maximization problem has to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint
that says that the contract has to be such that the intermediary will only lend an amount
d that makes default sub-optimal. The left-hand side of this constraint is exactly equal
to the net income of the manager if she repays. The right-hand side is her net income
in the case of defaulting, where the manager saves the principal plus the interest that
otherwise would have gone to the intermediary. I denote by s(a,m; η, τ), d(a,m; η, τ),
ldu(a,m; η, τ), l
d
s(a,m; η, τ) the solutions to the problem of a manager with savings a and
managerial skills m. Entrepreneurs choose the formal sector when their access to outside
10The proceeds from taxation are dissipated.
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financing is sufficient to offset the fact that they become subject to taxation, that is, when
W (a,m; 0, 0) ≤ W (a,m; η, τ).
3.3.1 Individuals’ choices
The individual with ability z solves the following problem of maximizing her lifetime
utility by solving
V (z) = max
a≥0, te∈{tUe ,tSe },φw∈{0,1},φf∈{0,1}
log(c1) + β log(c2), (3.4)
subject to
c1 = (1− te)wu − cte − a,
c2 = a(1 + r) + φw[(1− te
tSe
)wu +
te
tSe
wsz˜(z, te)] +
(1− φw)[φfW (a, z˜(z, te); η, τ) + (1− φf )W (a, z˜(z, te); 0, 0)],
and z˜ = zθ(
1
θ
−te).
Note that in the second period she has her asset income, a(1+r), and if the agent chooses
to be unskilled, i.e. te = t
U
e = 0, and decides to be a worker, i.e. φw = 1, then she also
earns wu. If she decides to be a manager, she uses her z˜ = z units of skills to run a firm.
The firm can be formal, and in this case the manager earns W (a, z˜(z, te); η, τ). If the firm
is informal, on the other hand, the net profit of the manager is given by W (a, z˜(z, te); 0, 0).
For an agent who decides to become skilled, the second period income is wsz˜(z, te) is she
decides to be a worker. If a skilled agent decides to work as a manager, she uses her
managerial ability z˜(z, tSe ) > z either as a formal or as an informal manager.
The solution to this problem gives the agent’s decision on how much to save (i.e., a(z; η, τ)),
the amount of time spent investing in her human capital when young (i.e., te(z; η, τ) ∈
{0, tSe }), her occupation when old (i.e., φw ∈ {0, 1}), and, if she chooses to be a manager,
the sector in which to operate (i.e., φf ∈ {0, 1}).11
11We focus on equilibria in which wages are constant over time (denoted by ws and wu).
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3.3.2 Labor markets
In each period, the aggregate demand for skilled labor is given by
Lds(ws, wu; η, τ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
lds(a(z),m(z, te(z)); η, τ)[1− φw(z)]φf (z)Γ(z)dz (3.5)
+
∫
z∈[0,1]
lds(a(z),m(z, te(z)); 0, 0)[1− φw(z)][1− φf (z)]Γ(z)dz.
Similarly, the aggregate demand for unskilled labor is
Ldu(ws, wu; η, τ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
ldu(a(z),m(z, te(z)); η, τ)[1− φw(z)]φf (z)Γ(z)dz (3.6)
+
∫
z∈[0,1]
ldu(a(z),m(z, te(z)); 0, 0)[1− φw(z)][1− φf (z)]Γ(z)dz.
In each period, the aggregate supply of skilled labor is
Lss(ws, wu; η, τ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
z˜(z, te(z))
te(z)
tSe
φw(z)Γ(z)dz. (3.7)
The aggregate supply of unskilled labor is
Lsu(ws, wu; η, τ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
[(1− tSe )
te(z)
tSe
+ (1− te(z)
tSe
)]Γ(z)dz (3.8)
+
∫
z∈[0,1]
φw(z)(1− te(z)
tSe
)Γ(z)dz.
3.3.3 Equilibrium
Given η, τ , and Γ, a steady state equilibrium for this economy is a pair {ws, wu} of wage
rates and a list of policies for each z-type agent such that: (i) policies are optimal for all
agents (they solve the problem stated in (3.4)); and (ii) labor markets for both types of
labor clear, that is
Lds(ws, wu; η, τ) = L
s
s(ws, wu; η, τ),
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and
Ldu(ws, wu; η, τ) = L
s
u(ws, wu; η, τ).
3.4 Characterization of the equilibrium
This section is intended to explore the main features of an equilibrium for the model
economy described above. To do so, we first inspect the main features of the demand
for credit in this model economy, and then the key aspects regarding occupational and
educational choices.
It is important to note that in the model economy, and for the existence of an equilibrium
with positive production, there has to be some agents who choose to be workers and some
others who choose to be entrepreneurs. Furthermore, given the technology to produce
goods, in the equilibrium there must be skilled and unskilled workers supplying labor to
entrepreneurs. Needless to say, the exact equilibrium occupational choices for each ability
level will depend on the values of the parameters values of the parameters characterizing
preferences (basically β), the technology for producing goods (γ, α and b)12, the technology
for human capital formation (tSe , θ, and the direct costs of education, c), and those shaping
the distribution of innate ability (µz and σz).
13 However, any quantitative version of
this economy that tries to resemble key aspects of the data -in which both formal and
informal sectors exist and in which both type of managers can be either skilled or unskilled-
, will need a set of parameter values that not only produces an equilibrium with six
types of occupations (unskilled workers, skilled workers, informal unskilled managers,
informal skilled managers, formal unskilled managers, and formal skilled managers) but
also satisfies the allocation of credit and the order of the cutoffs that are described next.
3.4.1 The demand for credit
In order to characterize the demand for credit, first note that the incentive compatibility
constraint can be written as
12Where b is the technical coefficient in a nested CES with perfect capital-skill complementarity: y =
mγ [min{bls, k}]α(1−γ)l(1−α)(1−γ)u .
13Occupational choices will of course also depend on the exact functional forms of preferences and
technologies. The key technological assumption for the results is that there is a sufficiently high degree
of capital-skill complementarity in the production function of goods.
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η(1− τ)Π(s+ d,m) + s(1 + r)[1 + η + η(1− τ)] ≥ d(1− η)(1− τ)(1 + r), (3.9)
which allows us to show that s(a,m; η, τ) = a, i.e., those managers that can access to
credit will pledge all their savings as the collateral for the loan.14 It is also immediate
from inequality (3.9) that this incentive compatibility constraint will be binding at the
optimum.15 Figure 3.6 illustrates this result.
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Figure 3.6: The incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) and the demand for loans.
On the other hand, the amount of credit that a manager is able to get from the inter-
mediary depends on her level of human capital (which affects the overall productivity of
the firm she runs), as well as on the costs of contract enforcement (η).16 In particular,
the amount of loans demanded (and granted) for a manager with savings a < k∗(m) (i.e.,
constrained) is increasing in m and η. These results are shown in Figures 3.7(a) and
3.7(b).17
14In the inequality (3.9) it is easy to see that the left-hand side is increasing in s while the right-hand
side is a linear function of d, given the parameters. In addition, since the objective function is also
increasing in s, the constraint s ≤ a in the individual’s maximization problem will be binding at the
optimum.
15The LHS in (3.9) is a linear increasing and concave function of d, given a, m and the parameters τ, η.
The RHS is increasing in d up to the level of optimal use of capital, k∗(m) -which results from solving the
unconstrained version of the maximization problem in (3.3)-, and for all d > k∗(m) the RHS is constant.
Since the objective function is also increasing in d, the demand for loans d(a, h; η, τ) can be found in the
intersection between the LHS and the RHS.
16Of course, the amount of credit that the intermediary is willing to lend to the entrepreneur will also
depend on her savings, because this affects the amount of resources that can be used as a collateral. Note
that the result stating that s(a, h; η, τ) = a, together with the fact that the LHS in (3.9) is increasing in
s for all possible values of d, produce this result.
17For the first of these results, notice that a manager with a high m runs more efficiently her business
compared to a manager with low levels of managerial skills. This higher productivity or profitability
makes more reliable the promise of repayment and, as consequence, the intermediary can lend a higher
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Finally, in the model economy while formal entrepreneurs are able to borrow from financial
intermediaries, informal managers are not able to do so. This result follows from the
fact that for informal managers η = τ = 0. As a result, the constraint (3.3) becomes
0 ≥ d(1 + r). Therefore, informal managers must self-finance the physical capital they
use in their operations with their savings from the first period.
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(a) Loan increasing in m (m′ > m).
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(b) Loan increasing in η (η′ > η).
Figure 3.7: Characterization of the demand for loans.
amount to the more skilled manager (Figure 3.7(a)). Second, an improvement in the enforcement of
credit contracts (higher η) increases the loan d, because even in case of default lenders can regain a larger
share of the loan, as shown in Figure 3.7(b).
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3.4.2 Occupational and educational choices
Given a set of parameter values that produce an equilibrium with a positive mass of
individuals choosing each one of the six possible occupations, the order of the cutoffs
over the support of innate ability (z ∈ [0, 1]) can be characterized. First note that given
that the equilibrium requires the use of at least some amount of unskilled labor, and
because the value for unskilled workers is independent of z, it has to be that the less
talented individuals choose to be unskilled workers. Furthermore, since m and k are
complementary, managers with the highest levels of managerial ability will choose the
formal sector to operate their businesses. Finally, for any z higher than the cutoff from
which entrepreneurs switch from the formal to the informal sector, all managers will
also be formal, that is, managers will not revert their sector decision.18 On the other
hand, individuals that were born with very high levels of ability (those with z → 1)
will choose not to invest in their own human capital, i.e., they will choose to be formal
unskilled managers.19 Hence, it is possible to characterize the occupations in the lower
tail (unskilled worker) and in the upper tail (formal unskilled manager) of the distribution
of innate ability.
For the rest of the occupations, it is important to note that skilled informal managers
need to be abler than unskilled informal managers. Since acquiring education is costly,
only abler individuals among informal managers will find profitable to invest in their
own human capital.20 As a result, we end up with four possible configurations of the
occupational cutoffs. In these four cases the bottom part of the distribution of z is
occupied by unskilled workers, while in the top there are unskilled formal managers.
Each case differs in where the mass of agents that choose to be skilled workers is located.
The first case is represented in Figure 3.8, and the other three cases can be found in
Figures C.1, C.4, and C.7 in Appendix C.21
18If a manager of ability z accepts to pay taxes in exchange of getting access to the credit market, then
a manager with a higher ability (z′ > z) will also prefer to do so, because of the complementarity between
ability and physical capital.
19This is a result of the shape of the technology for human capital formation (stated in equation (3.1)),
in which for z → 1 the contribution of education to increase m is close to zero. Anecdotically, one can
think in Bill Gates or Steve Jobs as two examples of highly productive and formal entrepreneurs that are
college dropouts.
20This is true as long as informal managers are not too able, that is, as long as they lie in the “middle”
of the support for innate ability. This condition is likely to be fulfilled because both types of formal
managers (skilled and unskilled) have higher levels of innate ability z, and therefore they lie closer to 1
in the support of z.
21The notation used for the cutoffs identifies with a subscript the previous occupation and with a
superscript the following occupation in the support of z. In Case 1 the order of the cutoffs is: zˆS,WU,W ,
zˆU,I,MS,W , zˆ
S,I,M
U,I,M , zˆ
S,F,M
S,I,M , and zˆ
U,F,M
S,F,M . In Case 2, the order is: zˆ
U,I,M
U,W , zˆ
S,W
U,I,M , zˆ
S,I,M
S,W , zˆ
S,F,M
S,I,M , and zˆ
U,F,M
S,F,M .
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Figure 3.8: One plausible configuration of occupational, educational, and sector choices
along the support of z.
3.5 The effects of higher costs of contract enforce-
ment
We are now ready to analyze the effects of higher contract enforcement costs. When
the cost of enforcing contracts is higher, the demand for credit of formal managers is
lower (see Figure 3.7(b)), so is the use of capital in their operations. However, the use of
capital of informal managers is not directly affected, since they self-finance the amount
they pay for the services of physical capital. Therefore, through this channel, a moderate
increase in the cost of enforcing contracts (lower η) will induce a fall in the value obtained
by formal managers, and at the same time this will first leave unaffected the values
obtained by informal managers (both skilled and unskilled).22 Moreover, since formal
managers use more intensively skilled labor -due to capital-skill complementarity in the
production function-, in a scenario with higher costs of contract enforcement the demand
for skilled labor will be reduced, which in equilibrium will imply lower relative earnings
for skilled versus unskilled workers. These two are the key mechanisms at work when η
In Case 3 the order is: zˆU,I,MU,W , zˆ
S,I,M
U,I,M , zˆ
S,W
S,I,M , zˆ
S,F,M
S,W , and zˆ
U,F,M
S,F,M . Last, in Case 4 the order is: zˆ
U,I,M
U,W ,
zˆS,I,MU,I,M , zˆ
S,F,M
S,I,M , zˆ
S,W
S,F,M , and zˆ
U,F,M
S,W .
22Notice for instance that W (a(z),m(z); η, τ) is increasing in η (see Figure 3.7(b)) while
W (a(z),m(z); 0, 0) is independent of η.
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falls, and they are illustrated in Figure 3.9 as movements in the values of formal managers
and skilled workers. Of course, these are the first effects that are triggered, and in the
general equilibrium the values for the rest of occupations will also be affected. However,
the changes in the values of formal managers and skilled workers are of first order and
will likely quantitatively dominate. In addition, the key results obtained below regarding
changes in occupations and educational attainment of z-type agents will be preserved when
adding these subsequent -general equilibrium- changes in the values of other occupations.23
As shown in Figures 3.9 and 3.1024, these key movements of the value functions produced
by a higher cost of enforcing contracts (lower η) will increase the number of entrepreneurs
acting in the informal sector.25 Hence, in the model economy there is a direct map-
ping between the cost of contract enforcement and the number of informal entrepreneurs.
Moreover, the cutoff for becoming an entrepreneur will decrease (lower zˆU,I,MS,W ) when η is
lower, i.e., when the level of informality in the economy raises. As a result, in an economy
with equilibrium cutoffs as those in Figure 3.8, an increase in the costs of contract enforce-
ment will induce not only a larger proportion of informal entrepreneurs, but also a larger
number of entrepreneurs, amplifying the rate of entrepreneurship in the economy. This
observation is consistent with the empirical fact 1 (Figure 3.2) that shows that countries
with larger informal sectors also have larger shares of their labor force in entrepreneurial
activities.
Furthermore, note that since there is no reason to think that the value obtained by skilled
informal entrepreneurs will be lower if η falls (in fact, this value is likely to increase
due to lower salaries paid to skilled labor), their skill premium will not be negatively
affected. Since the salaries of skilled workers are now relatively lower because they are
less demanded, then the difference in the skill premium of entrepreneurs and of workers
changes, favoring more the entrepreneurs the lower is η. This result is consistent with the
empirical fact 2 (Figure 3.3(b)) that shows that the gap between the premium received
by skilled informal entrepreneurs and skilled workers is increasing with the importance of
the informal sector in the economies.
A final remark about the effects of a lower value for parameter η is in order. As it was
stated above, when costs of enforcing contracts increase less individuals choose to be skilled
23For instance, the values of informal managers are likely to be improved due to the lower ws paid to
skilled workers.
24Notice that these figures omit considering the underlying distribution of z-types, which is needed to
properly count the shares of individuals who choose one or the other occupation or educational level. One
way to easily incorporate in these Figures the distribution of z is to assume a uniform distribution. But
the results hold true for other well-behaved (unimodal) distributions as well.
25While zˆU,I,MS,W is reduced, zˆ
S,F,M
S,I,M is increased, leading to this result.
Chapter 3. Investing in Myself?: Informality, Occupational Choice and Investments in
Human Capital 92
workers. The opposite occurs with the number of individuals who choose to be skilled
informal managers. Moreover, the aggregate number of skilled managers, either formal or
informal, does not decrease when η is reduced. Therefore, the share of skilled individuals
that choose to become entrepreneurs in this economy increases when the enforcement of
contracts becomes more costly. This result is related to the empirical fact 3 (skills are
relatively more concentrated among entrepreneurs the more informal the economies are),
which is shown in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.9: Changes of the cutoffs for occupational, educational, and sector choices along
the support of z for higher costs of enforcing contracts (a lower η).
Analyzing the effects of higher costs of enforcing contracts for the other three possible
configurations of the occupational cutoffs produces similar results, which are detailed in
Appendix C (Figures C.2, C.5, and C.8).
3.6 Conclusions
Informality is pervasive in many developing countries, and its effects range from harming
credit, reducing the stock of available physical capital, segmenting labor markets, depriv-
ing large shares of population from labor rights, and, as shown in this paper, to also affect
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Figure 3.10: Occupational cutoffs for two values of η (η0 and η
′, with η0 > η′).
the incentives to invest in human capital across different occupations, as well as occu-
pational choices themselves. In the current paper, the key mechanism producing these
effects is also related to the impact of informality on the extent of financial intermediation
and, as a result, on the use of capital in the production of goods and services.
This paper offers an analytical framework that is able to connect different empirical facts
that a priori seem unrelated. In particular, these facts show a strong link between the
extent of informal activities, the rate of entrepreneurship, and the distribution of edu-
cational attainment across occupations. More informal economies not only have more
entrepreneurs (many of them are the so called ’subsistent’ entrepreneurs), but are also
characterized for paying relatively more to skilled entrepreneurs than to skilled workers,
as compared with more formal economies. Also, in informal (less developed) economies
the relatively scarce stock of skills is more concentrated among entrepreneurs. The model
presented here links all these facts to the idea that the higher are the costs of enforcing
contracts -in particular, credit contracts- the higher will be the extent of the informal
economy, and there will exist more incentives to becoming an entrepreneur instead of a
worker and to invest in human capital only if you are an entrepreneur and not so much if
you are a worker.
The mechanisms at work start to operate through financial intermediation. When the
costs of enforcing contracts are higher, financial intermediaries are reluctant to lend much
money, and formal entrepreneurs (who are not excluded from the credit market) are more
financially constrained and, therefore, less capable of hiring physical capital to operate
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their businesses. Since the technology features capital-skill complementarity, this implies
that formal entrepreneurs will demand less skilled workers, who in the new equilibrium
for the labor market will be paid lower salaries. On the other hand, these changes in
the market for credit will not impact directly those entrepreneurs acting in the informal
sector, since they were already excluded from the possibility of being externally financed.
However, some entrepreneurs will now not only be more inclined to act in the informal
sector, but to also to invest ’in themselves’. That is, some individuals who otherwise
would have chosen to be formal entrepreneurs, under higher costs of enforcing contracts
will choose to act informally and also to spend time and other resources in the formation
of their own human capital, as way to overcome the lack of physical capital. This happens
because in the model economy the investments in human capital increase managerial skills,
which improve the overall efficiency of the productive unit.
Therefore, more informality implies a different distribution of skills across occupations
and sectors of activity, because it incentivizes investments in human capital of some
managers, but it causes the opposite effect for workers. Importantly, informality affects
crucially the occupational choices of individuals, making some of them to change their
decision regarding being a worker or an entrepreneur, and also regarding in which sector
of the economy to operate for the case of entrepreneurs.
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Discussion on other possible mechanisms leading to
sorting of students
In this section I discuss other mechanisms that may be at work in the sorting of students
across public and private alternatives assessed in this paper. I discuss the sorting by
income, peer effects, and crowding-out hypotheses that usually are supported by this
type of segregation.
It is possible that the sorting in Figure 1.1 was generated by a simple sorting by income
process. For instance, if natives were becoming richer while immigrants poorer in this
period of time, the income effect associated to the demand for education (assuming it
is a normal good) may help to explain Figure 1.1. However, the four regions in Figures
A.1(a) to A.1(d) were becoming wealthier as well. Figure A.2 shows that GDP per capita
in these regions was increasing at the same pace as in Madrid. However, in none of these
four regions private education started to be relatively more attractive for native parents,
which contradicts the hypothesis of a mere income effect as a driver of the sorting of
students across the two systems. On the other hand, there is no available data which
allows for a comparison of the evolution of socio-economic status of immigrants versus
natives from 1998 to 2006.1
1For Spain, the lack of microdata about individual characteristics in the two population groups limits
severely the analysis that can be done in this direction. Some simple comparisons can be done. Data from
the ENI (Encuesta Nacional de Inmigrantes, 2007) and the EPA (Encuesta de Poblacio´n Activa) indicate
that natives are on average more educated than immigrants, but differences among both groups in this
dimension are not sharp. While 27% of immigrants have at least tertiary education, this number is 31%
for natives. About the evolution of the type of immigrants arriving to Madrid, using the composition of
95
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(a) Extremadura (b) Galicia
(c) Asturias (d) Basque Country
Figure A.1: Schooling choices of natives and immigrants in the four regions with less
immigrants in Spain (1998-2007).
Another reason that may help to explain the widening gap between natives and immigrants
schooling decisions is the presence of negative peer group effects on educational attainment
in those schools with larger shares of foreign-born students. These negative peer effects
are often suggested to be a consequence of language disadvantages and lower educational
background of both parents and students with immigrant background. However, the
importance of the role played by these peer effects still remains under discussion in the
empirical literature on education production function.2
immigrants in each year and the HDI (Human Development Index) in their countries of origin, gives a
vague idea of the average “quality” of immigrants in Madrid in 1998 and 2006. The weighted averages
of this index for a representative immigrant in Madrid changed little from 1998 to 2006 (0.81 in 1998
and 0.78 in 2006). Computing the same weighted measure but just considering the education component
in the HDI also provides evidence on the small changes in this measure: the representative immigrant
in Madrid in 1998 has an education-level index of 0.84 in 1998 and of 0.85 in 2006. Of course, such
computations are seriously flawed by the fact that they do not deal with selection issues of individuals
who migrated.
2For instance, while Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2009) find that more immigrants in a grade had a
significant and large adverse effect on educational outcomes of native students, Angrist and Lang (2004)
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Last, the usual crowding-out effect might be operating: a higher number of immigrant
students may displace native students in the public education system. This crowding-out
effect is usually related to some degree of capacity constraints or congestion in public
schools. However, no signals of capacity constraints are observed neither in the case of
Madrid nor in the case of Comunitat Valenciana in several indicators of capacity, such
as spending per capita or the student-teacher ratio. The student-teacher ratio has been
decreasing in both type of schools (public and private) at the same rate in Madrid and
also in the case of Comunitat Valenciana (Figure A.3) and the spending per student in
public schools has been increasing remarkably more than the number of students in those
schools (Figure A.4).
Therefore, the recent experience of Spain shows that in spite of the fact that some of the
other sorting forces (income differences across groups, peer effects, and crowding-out in
public schools) might be at work, still socialization concerns play an important role in the
sorting of students which often follows large-scale immigration.
Figure A.2: Per capita income in the four regions with less immigrants in Spain and in
Madrid.
conclude that peer effects from a desegregation program are modest and short lived. Also, for the case of
Madrid, Anghel and Cabrales (2010) and Silaghi (2010) only find some small significant negative effects of
having many more immigrants in a classroom and only on reading test scores. For instance, Silaghi (2010)
finds that passing from a school with 0 immigrants to a school with 50% immigrants would decrease the
results of the native students by 0.24 points in reading scores (on a scale from 0 to 10).
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Figure A.3: Evolution of the student-teacher ratio in public and private schools in Madrid
and Com. Valenciana.
Figure A.4: Evolution of the spending per student in public schools in Madrid.
Figure A.5: Public spending in public and private (non-higher) education as a % of
regional GDP (calibrated as τ), and the rate of subsidy for private education (calibrated
as φ) in Madrid.
PISA results
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Table A.1: Native-immigrant educational gap in Spain, according to PISA 2000, 2003,
and 2006.
Ratio natives’ to immigrants’ scores
Year Reading Mathematics Science
2000 1.06 1.03 1.09
2003 1.07 1.09 1.10
2006 1.11 1.12 1.13
Table A.2: Private-public schools educational gap in Spain, according to PISA 2000, 2003,
and 2006.
Ratio scores private/public schools
Year Reading Mathematics Science
2000 1.08 1.08 1.08
2003 1.08 1.07 1.07
2006 1.09 1.08 1.08
Data on housing prices
Table A.3: Housing prices and population by districts in Madrid.
Districts Housing Price, Total Population Cumulative
1998 (euros per m2) (July 1, 2002) Pop. (%)
“Bad” neighborhood (m1)
Villaverde 871 132848 4.3%
Villa De Vallecas 1022 63625 6.3%
Usera 1142 123175 10.3%
Puente Vallecas 1199 235723 17.9%
San Blas 1202 141174 22.5%
Vica´lvaro 1208 56721 24.3%
Carabanchel 1265 229336 31.7%
Barajas 1293 39397 33.0%
Latina 1307 258948 41.4%
Fuencarral-Pardo 1325 210404 48.2%
Moratalaz 1400 108174 51.7%
Arganzuela 1520 141698 56.2%
Retiro 1594 126325 60.3%
Moncloa-Aravaca 1653 114886 64.0%
Ciudad Lineal 1683 231546 71.5%
Hortaleza 1683 151204 76.4%
“Good” neighborhood (m2)
Centro 1722 143113 81.0%
Tetua´n 1746 147800 85.8%
Chamart´ın 1953 142270 90.4%
Chamber´ı 2078 150037 95.2%
Salamanca 2182 148343 100.0%
Source: Ayuntamiento de Madrid, http://www.munimadrid.es/UnidadesDescentralizadas/
UDCEstadistica/Publicaciones/PUrbanoVivienda/MercadoVivienda/Ficheros
/Distritos%20de%20Madrid/PVdic99 dic06ddat.xls.
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DDD estimator in a non-linear model
To simplify notation, in this section we use the specification of the outcome equation,
which does not include state classification, covariates, and gender interactions.
Considering that the outcome variable is binary, the expectation of the outcome equation
measures the probability of doing light physical activity any positive number of times per
week, and has the following form
E[yit|elemi, Si, τt] = f
[
β0 + β1τt + β2elemi + β3Si
+ β4(elemi × τt) + β5(Si × τt) + β6(elemi × Si)
+ β7(τt × elemi × Si)
]
,
(B.1)
where f is the cumulative distribution function of idiosyncratic shocks (uit).
As remarked in Blundell and Dias (2009), applying DD and DDD methods imposes ad-
ditive separability of the error term conditional on the observables, an assumption that
does not hold when the outcome of interest is a dummy variable. To overcome this limi-
tation, we follow Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Reenen (2004) by imposing the identifying
assumption:
E(ui1 − ui0|elemi = 1, Si = 1)− E(ui1 − ui0|elemi = 1, Si = 0)
= E(ui1 − ui0|elemi = 0, Si = 1)− E(ui1 − ui0|elemi = 0, Si = 0),
(B.2)
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over the index, rather than over the probability itself. Assuming that the inverse proba-
bility function, f−1, is known, the DDD estimator of the ATT is
ÂTT = y¯1,11 − f
{
f−1(y¯1,10 ) + [f
−1(y¯1,01 )− f−1(y¯1,00 )]
+ [f−1(y¯0,11 )− f−1(y¯0,10 )]− [f−1(y¯0,01 )− f−1(y¯0,00 )]
}
,
(B.3)
where y¯elem,St is the average of the estimated outcome over individuals in group elem,
residing in states S, at time t.1
Assuming that the idiosyncratic shocks have a normal distribution, f is the normal cu-
mulative distribution function. We estimate the parameters of interest by maximum
likelihood and compute robust standard errors clustered at the state level. A report of
the estimated coefficients can be found in Table B.3 in the Appendix.
With the estimated parameters we compute the Indirect Average Treatment effects on
the Treated (IATT), using equation (B.3), including the state classification, gender inter-
actions, and covariates.
Average Treatment Effects: More details
ATT as a function of missing counterfactuals
In what follows we show how to recover the missing counterfactual E(y0it|elemi = 1, Si =
1, τt = 1). If we assume that equation (B.2) holds, we have
E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1) = E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0)
+ [E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 0)]
+ [E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 0)]
− [E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 0)].
(B.4)
1In Section B, we show how we obtain the expression for the DDD estimator.
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We can rewrite the ATT as a function of the unobserved counterfactual E(y0it|elemi =
1, Si = 1, τt = 1)
ATT = E(y1it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0)
− [E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 0)]
− [E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 0)]
+ [E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 0)].
(B.5)
The sample analog of equation (B.5) is the DDD estimator of the ATT
ÂTT = (y¯1,11 − y¯1,10 )− (y¯1,01 − y¯1,00 )
− [(y¯0,11 − y¯0,10 )− (y¯0,01 − y¯0,00 )],
(B.6)
where y¯elem,St is the average of the estimated outcome over individuals in group elem,
residing in states S, at time t.
ATT in a non-linear model
We rewrite the identifying assumption as follows
f−1[E(uit|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(uit|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0)]
− {[f−1[E(uit|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(uit|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 0)]}
= f−1[E(uit|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(uit|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 0)]
− {f−1[E(uit|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 1]− f−1[E(uit|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 0)]}.
(B.7)
If equation (B.7) holds, the missing counterfactual is
E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1) = f
{
f−1[E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0)]
+ {f−1[E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 0)]}
+ {f−1[E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 0)]}
− {f−1[E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 0)]}
}
,
(B.8)
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and the ATT = E(y1it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1) − E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0), can be
estimated replacing the expected values by their sample analogs
ÂTT = y¯1,11 − f
{
f−1(y¯1,10 ) + [f
−1(y¯1,01 )− f−1(y¯1,00 )]
+ [f−1(y¯0,11 )− f−1(y¯0,10 )]− [f−1(y¯0,01 )− f−1(y¯0,00 )]
}
,
(B.9)
where y¯elem,St is the average of the estimated outcome over individuals in group elem,
residing in states S, at time t.
CiC estimator (Athey and Imbens, 2006)
The CIC estimator introduced by Athey and Imbens (2006), generalizes the difference-in-
difference estimator under fewer assumptions for consistent estimates. In particular, the
CiC estimator is suitable when the policy change analyzed affects a group with different
characteristics (observed and/or unobserved) than the group not affected, and the ex-
pected benefit of the policy may vary across groups. In the case of HED reforms, it means
that the CiC estimator is consistent even if the policy change took place in those states
with higher incidence of obesity and lower levels of physical activity among its population.
For this reason, the CiC estimator may be an alternative to the DDD estimator presented
so far, provided that the assumptions for consistency are fulfilled. The CiC is particularly
appealing in our application since the authors developed an extension of the estimator to
deal with discrete dependent variables.
The relevant population to implement a CiC estimator, is the same as the one we would
use when applying a DD identification strategy. To evaluate the IATT of HED changes,
the relevant population are parents of children of elementary-school age.
To discuss the assumptions behind the CiC estimator we will consider its simplest version,
that is the one without covariates. Let’s assume that in the absence of treatment, the
outcome satisfy
yi = h(ui, τi),
with h(u, τ) increasing in u. u are the unobservables that affect the decision of doing
physical activity, and τi is a dummy variable equal to one in the post treatment period,
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that is, in 2005. Additionally, consider a dummy variable Si that takes the value one if
the individual resides in a state that changed its HED program between 1999 and 2005.
Formally, the crucial assumption for identification with the CiC estimator, called the
“Time Invariance Within Groups” assumption, is the following:
u ⊥ τ |S.
In words, the unobservables that affect the decision of doing physical activity have to
be orthogonal to the time period, but can be different between individuals residing in
experimental and non-experimental states. Specifically, the distribution of ui is allowed
to vary across groups (treated vs. controls), but not over time within groups. In our case,
the distribution of unobservables can differ between individuals residing in experimental
and non-experimental states, something highly likely since the experimental states are
those with higher proportion of population with weight problems, and higher proportion
of physically inactive population. Additionally, the distribution of unobservables in both
groups of states (experimental and non-experimental), cannot change over time. This part
of the assumption we find difficult to be fulfilled since we observe outcomes within a six
years gap (1999 and 2005). The assumption requires that the distribution of unobservables
that determines whether parents are physically active or not, let’s say in the experimental
states, does not change between 1999 and 2005. A phenomenon that is contained in those
unobservables is the aging of the individuals, whose distribution changes over time mainly
because a relevant proportion of our dataset is a panel.
One could think that by introducing the age of the individual as a covariate, the assump-
tion could be fulfilled. In fact, with covariates denoted in a vector X the identifying
assumption is
u ⊥ X|S.
The distribution of X (age for example) can vary over time, and across groups, but the
remaining unobservables should be orthogonal to the X in a given group. Let’s say that
u includes individual preferences toward doing physical activity. The assumption does
not allow this preferences to vary with the age (and closely related the health status,
family composition, time availability after work, etc.) of the individual, preferences that
we believe are highly volatile over the life-cycle of an individual.
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The CiC estimator for discrete outcomes, without further assumptions, provides bounds
for the effect of interest, rather than a point estimate. In some applications, as it is in
our case, the bounds are too broad to provide a clear conclusion on the direction of the
effect of a policy change. Athey and Imbens (2006) propose two alternatives to narrow
the bounds: using covariates and imposing a conditional independence assumption. The
use of covariates requires the strong assumption previously discussed. The conditional
independence assumption requires that
u ⊥ S|y, in a given time period.
One example in which the assumption holds is if the distribution of unobservables for
individuals who are physically active in 1999, and reside in the experimental states, is
equal to the distribution of unobservables for individuals who are physically active in
1999, and reside in the non-experimental states. Although we are not fully confident that
such an assumption is true in our study, we do think that conditional independence is
more likely to hold than the assumption that includes covariates.
Summing up, we consider that for the policy under analysis the identifying assumption of
the CiC estimator (under conditional independence) is less likely to be fulfilled than the
identifying assumption of the DDD estimator. However, we accept that the assumptions
behind the CiC estimator are more likely to hold than those of the DD estimator. For
this reason we present and compare the IATT for the three estimators, using non-linear
models and no covariates.
Reassuringly, the conclusions we can make on the indirect effect of HED programs are
consistent across the three estimators: there is a positive and significant effect of major
changes in HED programs on fathers of children of elementary-school age, while mothers
are not affected by such policy reforms. Significant HED reforms increase fathers’ prob-
ability of doing physical activity between 7.2 and 13.4 percentage points, depending on
the estimator chosen. In general, the CiC estimators are quantitatively smaller than the
DD and DDD comparable estimators. Note that the CiC estimators are closer to the DD
estimators than DDD estimators. This might be because CiC and DD assumptions are
more similar than DDD assumptions.
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Table B.1: IATT by type of treatment and gender. DD, CiC, and DDD estimators (non-
linear models without covariates).
Group of Male Female
experimental DD CiC DDD DD CiC DDD
states (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S3: Moderate -0.029 -0.020 -0.042 0.003 -0.023 -0.057
changes A (0.053) (0.032) ( 0.059) (0.066) (0.067) (0.104)
[0.584] [0.539] [0.478] [0.960] [0.737] [ 0.587]
S4: Moderate -0.030 -0.011 -0.047 0.075 0.036 0.016
changes B ( 0.059) (0.062) (0.087) (0.072) (0.042) (0.117)
[0.615] [0.865] [0.590] [0.297] [0.389] [0.895]
S5: Major 0.100 0.072 0.134 -0.052 -0.040 -0.102
changes (0.036) (0.019) ( 0.071) (0.072) (0.040) (0.067)
[ 0.005] [0.000] [0.059] [0.474] [0.313] [0.125]
Notes: Each entry reports marginal effect of the corresponding treatment. No covariates in all models.
Bootstrap robust standard errors clustered at state level (1,000 replicas). DD, and CiC estimators
computed using only sample of parents with children of elementary school age. The CiC estimators
corresponds to the average treatment effect on the treated. For the CiC we ran separated estimations
for female and males, and by treatment (S3, S4, S5). DD and CiC sample sizes: 1,819 males and
2,401 females. DDD sample sizes: 6,198 females and 4,828 males.
Questions regarding light physical activity in PSID
In the 1999 questionnaire the questions are
How often do you participate in light physical activity -such as walking, dancing, gardening,
golfing, bowling, etc.’-NUMBER OF TIMES
How often do you participate in light physical activity-such as walking, dancing, gardening,
golfing, bowling, etc.?-TIME UNIT
There were slight changes in the wording of the questions between 1999 and 2005, although
according to PSID codebooks these variables are comparable across time. In the 2005
questionnaire, questions are
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How often do you do light or moderate activities for at least 10 minutes that cause only
light sweating or slight to moderate increases in breathing or heart rate?-NUMBER OF
TIMES
How often does she do light or moderate activities for at least 10 minutes that cause only
light sweating or slight to moderate increases in breathing or heart rate?-NUMBER OF
TIMES
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Specialization within the household: evidence from
ATUS
Figure B.1: Ratios father-mother of means of time spent in childcare activities (hours per
week), by demographic subgroups.
Source: Ratios computed using data in Table 1 in Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008) based on the 2003-2006 waves of
the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Childcare activities are classified into: “Basic” childcare (breast feeding, rocking
a child to sleep, general feeding, changing diapers, providing medical care to child, grooming child, etc.); “Educational”
childcare (reading to children, teaching children, helping children with homework, attending meetings at a child’s school,
etc.); “Recreational” childcare (playing games with children, playing outdoors with children, attending a child’s sporting
event or dance recital, going to the zoo with children, taking walks with children, etc.); “Travel” childcare (any travel related
to any of the three other categories of childcare). Samples include all individuals between the ages of 21 and 55 (inclusive)
who had time diaries summing to a complete day and at least one child under the age of 18.
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Tables
Table B.2: Correlation between individuals’ health status and light physical activity in
PSID.
Output Output Description Coefficient S. Error p-value
Self Reported The higher the value of the variable -0.218 0.029 0.000
Health Status (SRHS) the better the SRHS
Bmi Body mass index -0.485 0.171 0.007
Stroke Dummy variable for having suffered a stroke -0.008 0.003 0.011
Hypertension Dummy variable for having hypertension -0.019 0.009 0.033
Diabetes Dummy variable for having diabetes -0.012 0.005 0.017
Emotional Dummy variable for having an emotional illness -0.020 0.007 0.005
Asthma Dummy variable for having a asthma -0.010 0.008 0.215
Mental Dummy variable for having a metal illness -0.002 0.002 0.379
Notes: Correlations, standard errors, and p-values obtained using linear specifications. Robust stan-
dard errors are clustered at the state level. All regressions include the following covariates: age,
age squared, race, gender, marital status, number of children, children of high school-age, years of
education and its square, employment status, full-time/part-time employment, log of family income
per capita, and state fixed effects.
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Table B.3: Probit Model: Probability of doing light physical activity at least once a week.
Number of obs= 11,026 Pseudo R2 = 0.0928
Log pseudo-likelihood = -4304.9867 (Std. Err. adjusted for 46 clusters in state)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
female -0.059 (0.116) onleave -0.179 (0.115)
τ -0.207∗∗∗ (0.058) unemployed -0.099 (0.104)
elem 0.179 (0.109) retired -0.563∗∗∗ (0.179)
τ × elem -0.091 (0.144) disabled -0.708∗∗∗ (0.082)
S2 0.491∗∗∗ (0.122) housekeeper 0.019 (0.085)
S3 0.278∗ (0.162) student 0.22 (0.186)
S4 0.215 (0.163) stated2 0.204∗∗∗ (0.040)
S5 -0.432∗∗∗ (0.125) stated4 -0.499∗∗∗ (0.021)
S2× τ -0.156∗ (0.090) stated5 0.684∗∗∗ (0.045)
S3× τ -0.192 (0.147) stated6 -0.162∗∗∗ (0.019)
S4× τ -0.093 (0.256) stated8 0.422∗∗∗ (0.015)
S5× τ -0.242∗ (0.145) stated9 -0.430∗∗∗ (0.026)
S2× elem -0.057 (0.079) stated10 -0.440∗∗∗ (0.037)
S3× elem 0.058 (0.188) stated12 0.579∗∗∗ (0.054)
S4× elem -0.031 (0.198) stated13 -0.021 (0.023)
S5× elem -0.356∗ (0.206) stated16 -0.240∗∗∗ (0.049)
female× τ -0.143 (0.097) stated17 -0.292∗∗∗ (0.025)
female× elem 0.156 (0.149) stated18 -0.260∗∗∗ (0.030)
female× τ × elem 0.015 (0.163) stated19 -0.231∗∗∗ (0.041)
S2× female 0.184 (0.144) stated20 -0.301∗∗∗ (0.029)
S3× female 0.043 (0.237) stated21 -0.099∗∗∗ (0.036)
S4× female 0.057 (0.178) stated22 0.084∗∗∗ (0.028)
S5× female -0.138 (0.164) stated23 0.240∗∗∗ (0.033)
female× S2× τ -0.018 (0.115) stated24 -0.259∗∗∗ (0.028)
female× S3× τ 0.202 (0.213) stated25 -0.449∗∗∗ (0.033)
female× S4× τ 0.124 (0.231) stated26 -0.297∗∗∗ (0.027)
female× S5× τ 0.331 (0.203) stated28 0.044∗ (0.023)
female× S2× elem -0.227∗∗ (0.108) stated29 -0.262∗∗∗ (0.027)
female× S3× elem -0.343 (0.290) stated30 -0.01 (0.045)
female× S4× elem -0.505∗∗ (0.249) stated31 0.307∗∗∗ (0.032)
female× S5× elem 0.482∗∗ (0.221) stated32 -0.360∗∗∗ (0.034)
S3× elem× τ -0.120 (0.241) stated34 -0.159∗∗∗ (0.015)
S3× elem× τ × female -0.161 (0.236) stated35 0.762∗∗∗ (0.024)
S4× elem× τ -0.134 (0.374) stated36 -0.474∗∗∗ (0.021)
S4× elem× τ × female 0.067 (0.456) stated37 -0.262∗∗∗ (0.029)
S5× elem× τ 0.418∗∗ (0.202) stated38 -0.374∗∗∗ (0.036)
S5× elem× τ × female -0.426 (0.260) stated39 -0.263∗∗∗ (0.031)
jhs 0.085∗∗ (0.035) stated40 -0.115∗∗∗ (0.021)
ch18 0.014 (0.055) stated41 -0.004 (0.036)
age -0.017 (0.015) stated42 -0.428∗∗∗ (0.029)
age2 0.000 0.000 stated45 -0.165∗∗∗ (0.015)
white 0.362∗∗∗ (0.050) stated47 -0.192∗∗∗ (0.028)
edu -0.033 (0.031) stated48 0.671∗∗∗ (0.057)
edu2 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001) stated49 0.358∗∗∗ (0.039)
single -0.086 (0.052) stated50 -0.342∗∗∗ (0.059)
widowed -0.257∗ (0.148) stated51 -0.408∗∗∗ (0.029)
divorced -0.032 (0.045) stated54 -0.443∗∗∗ (0.031)
separated -0.154∗∗ (0.066) Intercept 0.584∗ (0.303)
fulltime -0.073∗ (0.042)
nchildren 0.025 (0.018)
famincpc 0.058∗∗∗ (0.014)
Notes: Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
Description of variables in Table B.4.
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Table B.4: Description of variables in Table B.3.
Name Description
female dummy variable equal to one if individual is female
τ time fixed effect
elem group of parent’s of elementary school-age children fixed effect (group fixed effect)
Sk groups of states k fixed effect (region fixed effect)
elem× τ group time trend control (group-time interaction)
Sk × τ group of states’ time trend control (region-time interaction)
Sk × elem region-group interaction
Sk × elem× τ triple interaction (region-group-time interaction)
jhs dummy variable equal to one if the individual has at least one children
of junior-high-school age
ch18 dummy variable equal to one if the individual has at least one children
older than 17 years.
age age in years
age2 square of age
white white race dummy
edu year of education completed
edu2 square of edu
married married or permanently cohabiting dummy
widowed widowed dummy
separated separated dummy
divorced legally divorced dummy
fulltime equal to one if the individual works less than 36 hours a week during the last year
nchildren number of children (all ages)
famincpc log of per-capita total family income
onleave only temporarily laid off, sick leave or maternity leave dummy
unemployed looking for work, unemployed dummy
retired retired dummy
disabled permanently or temporarily disabled dummy
housekeeper housekeeper dummy
student student dummy
statedj state j fixed effect.
Notes: All variables of the form X × female are X variables interacted with the gender dummy
female.
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Table B.5: DD (linear): Marginal effects by school level (low vs high education)
DD Male DD Female
Education Level Education Level
LOW HIGH Difference LOW HIGH Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
S3: Moderate -0.075 -0.032 -0.043 -0.017 -0.020 0.003
Changes A ( 0.116 ) ( 0.039 ) ( 0.100 ) ( 0.122 ) ( 0.056 ) ( 0.107 )
[ 0.517 ] [ 0.409 ] [ 0.670 ] [ 0.890 ] [ 0.718 ] [ 0.977 ]
S4: Moderate 0.036 -0.039 0.075 0.028 0.057 -0.029
Changes B ( 0.284 ) ( 0.036 ) ( 0.276 ) ( 0.068 ) ( 0.050 ) ( 0.079 )
[ 0.900 ] [ 0.278 ] [ 0.786 ] [ 0.680 ] [ 0.259 ] [ 0.717 ]
S5: Major 0.360 -0.019 0.379 0.045 -0.042 0.087
Changes ( 0.069 ) ( 0.031 ) ( 0.072 ) ( 0.086 ) ( 0.044 ) ( 0.060 )
[ 0.000 ] [ 0.537 ] [ 0.000 ] [ 0.599 ] [ 0.338 ] [ 0.147 ]
Notes: Each entry reports marginal effect of the corresponding treatment. Robust standard errors
reported in parenthesis are clustered at the state level. P-values reported in brackets. All regressions
include the following covariates: age, age squared, race, gender, marital status, number of children,
children of high school-age, years of education and its square, employment status, full-time/part-time
employment, log of family income per capita, and state fixed effects.
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Table B.6: HED topics and enforcements. Full list.
Topics List
1) Alcohol- or Other Drug-Use Prevention
2) Emotional and Mental Health
3) Nutrition and Dietary Behavior
4) Physical Activity and Fitness
5) Tobacco-Use Prevention
6) Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevention
7) Accident or injury prevention
8) Sexually transmitted disease (STD) prevention
9) Pregnancy prevention
10) Suicide prevention
11) Violence prevention, for example bullying, fighting, or homicide
Enforcements List
1) State requires districts or schools to follow national or state
health education standards or guidelines
2) State requires students in elementary school to be tested
on health topics
3) State requires each school to have a HED coordinator
4) State uses staff development for HED teachers to
improve compliance with HED standards or guidelines
5) State uses written reports from districts or schools to document
compliance with HED standards or guidelines
6) State provides a list of one or more recommended elementary
school HED curricula
7) State provides a chart describing the scope and sequence of
instruction for elementary school HED
8) State provides lesson plans or learning activities for
elementary school HED
9) State provides plans for how to assess or evaluate students
in elementary school HED
10) State adopts a policy stating that newly hired staff who teach
HED at the elementary school level
will have undergraduate or graduate training in HED
11) State offers certification, licensure, or endorsement to teach HED
12) State adopts a policy stating that teachers will earn continuing
education credits
on HED topics to maintain state certification, licensure, or endorsement to teach HED
Notes: The topics and enforcements considered for the analysis are in italics.
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Table B.7: HED programs: health topics required, by state and year.
1999 2005
State topic 1 topic 2 topic 3 topic 4 topic 5 topic 1 topic 2 topic 3 topic 4 topic 5
Alabama yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Alaska no no no no no no no no no no
Arizona no no no no no no no no no no
Arkansas no no no no no yes no yes yes yes
California yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Colorado no no no no no no no no no no
Connecticut yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Delaware yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District of Columbia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Florida no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Georgia yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hawaii yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Idaho yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Illinois yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiana yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Iowa yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Kansas (a) . . . . . . . . . .
Kentucky yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Louisiana yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Maine yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Maryland yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Massachusetts yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Michigan yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Minnesota . . . . . . . . . .
Mississippi no no no no no no no no no no
Missouri yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Montana yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Nebraska yes no no no yes yes no yes yes yes
Nevada yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
New Hampshire . . . . . yes yes yes yes yes
New Jersey yes no no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
New Mexico no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
New York yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
North Carolina yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
North Dakota yes no no no yes yes no no yes yes
Ohio yes no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Oklahoma no no no no no no no no no no
Oregon yes no no no yes yes no no no yes
Pennsylvania yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Rhode Island yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
South Carolina yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
South Dakota no no no no no no no no no no
Tennessee yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Texas (a) no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Utah yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Vermont yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Virginia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Washington yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
West Virginia yes no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Wisconsin yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wyoming no no no no no no yes no no no
Source: NASBE Database and School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
Notes: The data contained in this table was constructed cross-checking the information from both sources, and in most of the cases survey
information from SHPPS coincides with the legal information summarized in NASBE. In those cases in which there is no coincidence, we
rely on NASBE information only. In few cases NASBE does not provide complete information -i.e., cases in which the regulations contained
in NASBE are not informative about the characteristics of the policy the state implements-, then we rely on SHPPS. Missing values indicate
that the information cannot be recovered from any of the two sources.
(a) More details on this state can be found in the last section of this appendix.
Topic 1:Alcohol or other drug-use prevention; Topic 2: Emotional and mental health; Topic 3: Nutrition and dietary behavior; Topic
4: Physical activity and fitness; Topic 5: Tobacco-Use prevention.
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Table B.8: HED programs: enforcements required, by state and year.
1999 2005
State enf 1 enf 2 enf 3 enf 1 enf 2 enf 3
Alabama yes no no yes no yes
Alaska no no no no no no
Arizona yes no no yes no no
Arkansas yes no no yes no no
California no no no no no no
Colorado no no no no no no
Connecticut no no no no no no
Delaware yes no yes yes no yes
District of Columbia . . . . . .
Florida yes no no yes no no
Georgia yes no no yes no no
Hawaii yes no no yes no no
Idaho no no no no no no
Illinois yes no no yes no no
Indiana yes no no yes no no
Iowa no no no no no no
Kansas (a) . . . . . .
Kentucky no yes no yes yes no
Louisiana yes no no yes no no
Maine yes yes no yes yes no
Maryland yes no no yes no no
Massachusetts yes no no yes no no
Michigan yes no no yes no no
Minnesota . . . . . .
Mississippi no no no no no no
Missouri yes yes no yes yes no
Montana yes no no yes no no
Nebraska no no no no no no
Nevada yes no no yes no no
New Hampshire . . . yes . .
New Jersey yes . . yes . .
New Mexico no . . yes . .
New York (a) no . . no . .
North Carolina yes no no yes no no
North Dakota no no no no no no
Ohio (a) . . . . . .
Oklahoma no no no no no no
Oregon no no no yes no no
Pennsylvania (a) yes . . yes . .
Rhode Island yes yes no yes yes yes
South Carolina yes no no yes yes no
South Dakota no no no no no no
Tennessee yes no no yes no no
Texas no no no yes no no
Utah yes no no yes yes no
Vermont yes no no yes yes no
Virginia yes no no yes no no
Washington yes yes no yes yes no
West Virginia yes no no yes no no
Wisconsin no no no no no no
Wyoming no no no yes no no
Source: NASBE Database and School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
Notes: The data contained in this table was constructed cross-checking the information from both sources, and in most of the cases survey
information from SHPPS coincides with the legal information summarized in NASBE. In those cases in which there is no coincidence, we
rely on NASBE information only. In few cases NASBE does not provide complete information -i.e., cases in which the regulations contained
in NASBE are not informative about the characteristics of the policy the state implements-, then we rely on SHPPS. Missing values indicate
that the information cannot be recovered from any of the two sources.
(a) More details on this state can be found in the last section of this appendix.
Enforcement 1: State requires districts or schools to follow national or state health education standards or guidelines.
Enforcement 2: State requires students in elementary school to be tested on health topics.
Enforcement 3: State requires each school to have a HED coordinator.
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Table B.9: States classified by groups Sk.
NON-EXPERIMENTAL EXPERIMENTAL
State # of obs. State # of obs.
S1 825 S3 1095
Alaska 11 Alabama 124
Colorado 219 Kentucky 162
Mississippi 481 Oregon 193
Oklahoma 61 South Carolina 522
South Dakota 53 Utah 87
Vermont 7
S2 6,602
Arizona 150 S4 1,193
California 1,112 Georgia 370
Connecticut 72 Louisiana 183
Delaware 12 Maine 28
Idaho 25 Nebraska 98
Illinois 366 New Jersey 303
Indiana 330 North Dakota 13
Iowa 235 Washington 198
Kansas 69
Maryland 420 S5 1,311
Massachusetts 242 Arkansas 252
Michigan 557 Florida 414
Missouri 316 New Mexico 13
Montana 12 Texas 618
Nevada 66 Wyoming 14
New York 447
North Carolina 508
Ohio 478
Pennsylvania 438
Tennessee 221
Virginia 333
West Virginia 22
Wisconsin 171
Notes: We do not include the District of Columbia, Minnesota, and New Hampshire since the information regarding HED
policies for these states is not precise in terms of when HED was implemented, making impossible their classification.
Hawaii and Rhode Island not included because of lack of observations.
Clarifications on the classification of selected states
• Kansas: It has HED requirements at state level mandatory by legislation passed
in 1979. There is no other legislation on HED until 2005. The legislation is not
completely clear about which topics and which enforcements were in place, but we
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are confident that there was HED implemented in 1979 and its situations did not
change by 2005. Hence, the state is classified as S2.
• New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania: The legislation in each of these states is not
precise about the situation of some of the enforcements in 1999 and 2005, while it
provides enough information on topics. Additionally, we know that until the year
2005 the last change in the legislation on HED took place in 1996, 1997, and 1998
respectively. So we include these states in the group of states S2.
• Texas: There exist evidence that by 1999 some educational districts had imple-
mented a HED program, but we are confident that HED was not mandatory at
state level until 2001. Since our definition of the policy is a “state HED program”,
we consider that going from non-mandatory HED programs designed at district
level, to a coordinated HED program mandatory for all publics schools in the state,
is a major change in the policy. Hence, the state is included in the group S5.
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Figure C.1: Case 2: Cutoffs for occupational, educational, and sector choices along the
support of z.
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Figure C.2: Case 2: Changes of the cutoffs for occupational, educational, and sector
choices along the support of z for higher costs of enforcing contracts (a lower η).
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Figure C.3: Case 2: Occupational cutoffs for two values of η (η0 and η
′, with η0 > η′).
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Figure C.4: Case 3: Cutoffs for occupational, educational, and sector choices along the
support of z.
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Figure C.5: Case 3: Changes of the cutoffs for occupational, educational, and sector
choices along the support of z for higher costs of enforcing contracts (a lower η).
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Figure C.6: Case 3: Occupational cutoffs for two values of η (η0 and η
′, with η0 > η′).
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Figure C.7: Case 4: Cutoffs for occupational, educational, and sector choices along the
support of z.
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Figure C.8: Case 4: Changes of the cutoffs for occupational, educational, and sector
choices along the support of z for higher costs of enforcing contracts (a lower η).
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Figure C.9: Case 4: Occupational cutoffs for two values of η (η0 and η
′, with η0 > η′).
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